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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY  
The global financial crisis, which started in the summer of 2007 and 
deepened in the aftermath of the failure of Lehman Brothers in September 
2008, has led to a virtual collapse in economic activity and increased 
financial volatility worldwide. For the developing countries, the main 
channel of transmission has been a drop in external transactions, such as 
trade, financial and capital flows, and remittances.  
While on average the economic slowdown has been modest, the emerging 
economies in the southern and eastern Mediterranean countries (SEMCs) 
are likely to experience a slow recovery, further hampered by the regional 
political instabilities brought on by the Arab spring. Limited external 
financing, little space for fiscal stimulus, a real appreciation of most 
domestic currencies, sluggish receipts from tourism and remittances, and 
increasing food and energy prices in the future will all continue to be a 
drag on growth for some time. Thus, the weaknesses in the short term are 
likely to persist, largely affected by the slow improvement in the world 
economy. 
On the external sector. A slowdown in exports is expected to continue as 
long as growth and unemployment figures for trading partners remain 
gloomy. Tourism and remittances have proved resilient so far, but with the 
global recession continuing and wealth effects settling in, countries in the 
region might not be able to sustain higher GDP growth. Similarly, global 
foreign direct investment (FDI) flows fell sharply and SEMCs are expected 
to continue to be directly affected by this trend. Competition to attract FDI 
will become even tougher as countries in the region continue to experience 
a downgrading trend as a result of political instabilities.  
On the real sector. The repercussions of the crisis continue to reverberate 
from the balance-of-payments to the real economy. Since external demand 
declined sharply, enhancing domestic demand remains the only way to 
increase growth, at least until trading partners show sustainable economic 
recovery. The lack of modern infrastructure to raise the region’s 
competitiveness and take full advantage of the growing global 
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manufacturing and services trade can also pose a risk for investments and 
growth.  
On the monetary sector. With the decline in interest rates and inflation 
worldwide and also the decline in inflation in all the sampled countries, 
there seems to be room for adopting an expansionary monetary policy 
through decreasing interest rates to stimulate domestic demand.   
On banking and capital markets. Most of the SEMCs have been spared the 
negative impacts of the crisis during its initial phase in 2007-08. Banks in 
the region had little direct exposure to the toxic products that weakened the 
balance sheets of many banks in the US and the EU. Indeed, the impact of 
the financial crisis on the banking systems assessed by pre- and post-crisis 
comparisons of the liquidity, performance, efficiency and fragility showed 
divergent impacts between countries. Overall, the results underline that the 
impact of the financial crisis on the banking sectors in the SEMCs was very 
limited.  
The more developed banking sectors of Israel and Turkey were the only 
exceptions. In Israel both performance and efficiency deteriorated, while 
the system became more fragile. In Turkey both liquidity and performance 
worsened and the banking system became more fragile. The impact of the 
financial crisis on capital markets varied from country to country. In 
particular, as of November 2012, the Israeli, Tunisian and Turkish stock 
exchanges had outperformed the US Dow-Jones index during the global 
crisis. At the same time, the Egyptian, Jordanian, Palestinian and Syrian 
indices remained below their January 2007 levels.  
The correlation coefficients between the region’s stock markets and 
commodity indices highlight several interesting findings. The results show 
that the correlations clearly increased in Israel, Turkey, the US, and Europe 
after the crisis (up until the ousting of Mubarak). The same is also true only 
for grains in Egypt, especially after the onset of the Arab spring uprisings. 
The correlation with grains also increased in the post-crisis period, up until 
January 2011, for Palestine. The correlation of the market returns with Brent 
oil increased in Jordan, but only weakly so. The correlation of the market 
returns with the US and EU markets highlights a close relationship 
between these economies. Clearly, the correlation with the US and EU is 
extremely strong for Egypt, Israel and Turkey. The results show that the 
relationships have not increased after the crisis for most cases, except for 
Egypt (with the US only), Tunisia (only weakly) and Jordan (relatively 
strongly so). Even though Israel’s and Turkey’s stock markets display the 
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closest interdependence with both the EU and the US, the relationship has 
not become more sensitive after the crisis or the ousting of Mubarak.  
Much like developing countries elsewhere, the economies in the 
region have implemented various initiatives to respond to the crises. To a 
large extent, fiscal measures have been the preferred instrument of choice, 
owing partly to the limited policy space that the authorities have in these 
countries. While these policies appear to have been successful, they have 
also put additional strain on existing and future fiscal pressures.  
On fiscal sustainability. The research reveals several vulnerabilities 
of the Tunisian and Egyptian economies that clearly undermine their debt 
sustainability. One important conclusion from the debt sustainability 
scenario analysis performed is that political instability has significant 
implications on debt sustainability. Political stability is crucial for 
investments – both domestic and foreign – in Egypt and Tunisia. With 
political uncertainty, investments tend to decline, remain low and take time 
to pick-up. This means lower production (lower GDP), which might also 
translate into higher unemployment (as the population and the labour force 
increase every year). Lower production also means lower profits for 
investors and lower income for workers, leading to lower revenues for the 
government. As seen from their budgets, tax revenues are forecasted based 
on highly optimistic assumptions that do not really take into account the 
possibility for a lower level of private investment and therefore lower level 
of tax revenue. The direct implication of such an optimistic assumption is 
an increase in the budget deficit and in the debt ratio, beyond the level the 
government expected.  
Another implication of the political instability is the loss of trust on 
the part of the international community in political transitions. This can 
lead to downgrades of the countries’ credit ratings and an increase of their 
interest rates for borrowing on the international markets. This can also 
make it much more difficult for the government to finance its deficit or to 
refinance its existing debt, putting further pressure on debt sustainability. 
A second important conclusion is related to expenditures. Indeed, the 
revolutions demanded more social justice and more employment 
opportunities, but increasing current expenditures would be a big mistake. 
Any government that is freshly elected, and seeks re-election or more 
power, would be tempted to increase wages and increase hiring in the 
public sector to satisfy the population. Such an action, however, would 
have dramatic implications for the future and would be a heavy weight to 
carry for years to come. The situation in Tunisia is much better than in 
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Egypt, where the deficit and the debt ratio are already very high, but the 
implications for debt sustainability are the same.  
Finally, it is clear that the exchange rate could be a factor in debt 
sustainability. On the one hand, maintaining a fixed exchange rate at an 
overvalued level is harmful for the whole economy and is obviously 
unsustainable. On the other hand, the devaluation of the currency can lead 
to serious implications for debt sustainability. The case of Egypt is worth 
mentioning, the sharp decline in the official reserves, combined with an 
appreciation of the real effective exchange rate over the past 10 years, 
reflect the urgent need for an exchange-rate correction. The recent 
depreciation is a step in the right direction, but the continuous 
interventions from the Central Bank can be harmful. The Gulf countries’ 
deposits in the Egyptian Central Bank are absorbed by the market right 
away, leading to the need for more borrowing. The mismanagement of the 
exchange rate in Egypt is only leading to higher debt without any 
stabilisation of the market. Therefore, and in the absence of alternatives, the 
Central Bank should allow the exchange rate to float and depreciate. This 
will increase the debt ratio, indeed, but it will avoid accumulating more 
and more foreign debt, and ultimately having to devalue the currency, 
resulting in an even higher debt. 
On monetary policy. There appears to be homogeneity in the 
operational framework followed by central banks, despite some differences 
in the specificities. Although price stability was announced as the final 
objective of the unconventional measures, errors in the monitoring and 
controlling of the interest rate forced monetary authorities to shift the 
intermediate objectives to targeting money supply and credit aggregates. 
The specificities are mainly visible in the oil-exporting countries (i.e. 
Algeria and Libya) that followed restrictive monetary policies controlling 
the monetary base to absorb the structural excess liquidity in the banking 
system. In the other countries, monetary authorities have adjusted their key 
policy interest rates to maintain positive real interest rates. In general, the 
low interest rates in combination with a broad range of monetary policy 
instruments revamped economic growth in most of the countries, except 
for the crisis countries (i.e. Tunisia and Egypt). 
Low operational independence and a slow adjustment characterise 
the formal procedures that central banks in the region, with the exception 
of Turkey and Morocco, use to target inflation. Excessive use of subsidies 
and price controls seem to be the main obstacles to adopt explicit inflation 
targets. Turning to exchange rate policy, monetary authorities in a floating 
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exchange rate regime in general target the real effective exchange rate, 
whereas they aim at a constant nominal exchange rate, if the currency is 
pegged or linked for example to the dollar or SDR. 
While inflation in these countries usually depends on international 
energy and food prices as well as domestic tensions and demand, thorough 
econometric analysis suggests that inflation is determined by a 
combination of the items above and the monetary transmission channels.  
However it appears that the adjustment mechanism of the interest 
rate is relatively weak, or the interest rate is slightly volatile in response to 
price fluctuations. In turn, active control offsets inflation corrections. 
Hence, the central bank interest is thus more important for exchange rate 
stability than the real stability. 
To conclude we recommend the establishment of a (systemic) risk 
management system. In this context, an early warning system (EWS) and 
effective early prevention system was implemented in Tunisia to prevent 
systemic risks and crises. The system allows to: i) decompose the impact of 
shocks on the real economy and financial markets and ii) identify early 
warning indicators or estimate a binomial Probit model. These leading 
indicators have been grouped into three blocks related to i) macroeconomic 
resilience factors, ii) factors weakening bank (CAMELS accounting ratios) 
and iii) macro-prudential factors indicating the soundness of financial 
systems. 
The results of the econometric analyses have generally shown that the 
early warning system clearly indicates that, in addition to the actual 
obvious effects, the probability of a negative impact of international 
financial crisis seem explained by the mechanisms of monetary contagion,: 
i) the risk of deteriorating terms of trade, ii) the risk of over-appreciation of 
the real effective exchange rate, iii) the swelling of compromised bank 
accounts and incidentally iv) excessive use of central bank refinancing. 
On banking policy. The collective assessment of the regulatory and 
supervisory structures of the SEMCs in comparison with the EU-MED 
standards pre- and post-crisis gives a mixed picture. Despite some 
improvements, key weaknesses remain in deposit insurance, entry 
obstacles and legal rights. Moreover, some disparities have also become 
more apparent, especially in the potential for political interference and 
private monitoring.  
The deposit insurance index has failed to improve between 2007 and 
2013, because the Egyptian, Israeli, Palestinian, Syrian and Tunisian 
vi | EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
 
authorities have chosen not to put in place an explicit insurance scheme. 
Implicit schemes may enhance risk-taking through a blanket government 
guarantee for the leading institutions. In addition, in Algeria, Jordan, 
Lebanon and Morocco, no effort has been made to align the banks’ 
incentives by implementing risk-based premiums or co-insurance schemes, 
which would help internalise some of the costs to the deposit guarantee 
schemes that stem from excessive risk-taking.  
Another major issue, the presence of entry obstacles, continues to be a 
key weakness in the regulatory structures of the region. Although the 
licensing requirements exhibit similarities in all countries bordering the 
Mediterranean, other indicators point at substantial barriers to entry. 
Government ownership, which is widespread in the region, gives undue 
advantages to incumbent banks and restricts entry incentives. In Algeria, 
Egypt and Syria as well as to some extent Morocco, Tunisia and Turkey, 
government ownership remains significant. Although government 
ownership may have some benefits, the authorities have to ensure that such 
roles are well-defined within a national strategy with clear objectives and 
instruments, and that they do not represent an obstacle to the development 
of the financial system. The rates of foreign denials are also still very high, 
further supporting the idea of substantial entry barriers and competitive 
advantages enjoyed by domestic incumbent banks.  
In addition to the two key weaknesses summarised above, the 2011 
survey points at three new concerns. Poor accounting practices have 
contributed to an increasing disparity in private monitoring indices. 
Furthermore, political interference has become a significant possibility, 
potentially undermining supervisory authority and reinforcing the 
governments’ direct control – an additional concern for the competitiveness 
and efficiency of the banking sector (Casu & Ferrari, 2013). As the eruption 
of public discontent in Tunisia and Egypt in early 2011 clearly attests, the 
region’s governments have attempted to maintain a tight grip on their 
countries’ political and economic systems. It is exactly such forms of 
interference that may conflict with the objectives of the financial and 
competition authorities.  
In contrast, the SEMCs have implemented a number of reforms to 
improve the availability and use of credit information by financial 
institutions. Egypt, and more recently Morocco, established private credit 
bureaus in 2006 and 2009, respectively. Algeria, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon and 
Tunisia continue to rely solely on public registries, three of them meeting 
all the criteria except collecting credit information on retail stores or utility 
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companies. The same applies to Turkey, which has both public and private 
credit bureaus. Although the literature provides little guidance, private 
credit bureaus have better access to new technologies and know-how to 
ensure that information-sharing mechanisms work effectively.  
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1. INTRODUCTION 
he global financial crisis, which started in the summer of 2007 and 
deepened in the aftermath of the Lehman bankruptcy in September 
2008 led to a virtual collapse in economic activity and increased 
financial volatility worldwide. For the developing countries, the main 
channel of transmission has been a drop in external transactions, such as 
trade, financial and capital flows, and remittances. The emerging 
economies in the Mediterranean basin have also faced declining economic 
activity, although there seems to be considerable variation in the relative 
magnitudes and timing. Most of the economies in the southern and eastern 
Mediterranean countries (SEMCs) have taken a delayed but more durable 
response to the crisis, largely driven by their trade and investment ties with 
the EU and the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries.  
Further to the potential effects of the global financial crisis, the Arab 
uprisings in several of the countries in the region and the resulting political 
instabilities have added to the socio-economic and financial woes of these 
countries. The simultaneity of the global financial crisis and the Arab 
uprisings makes it especially challenging to disentangle the effects of one 
on the other. 
Much like their counterparts elsewhere, the economies in the region 
have implemented various initiatives in response to the crises. To a large 
extent, fiscal measures have been the instrument of choice, owing partly to 
the limited room for manoeuvre that the authorities have in these countries. 
While these policies appear to have been successful, they have exacerbated 
existing and future fiscal pressures.  
These observations invite various questions on the effect of the crisis 
and the future of the Mediterranean basin countries. What are the economic 
and financial implications of the crisis, considering the different trade, 
fiscal, monetary and financial aspects of the economies? Has the crisis 
changed the focus of the reforms from undertaken in the pre-crisis era? 
What are the exit strategies and key challenges in the region in the post-
crisis era? How will the new thinking on economic policy impact the future 
of reforms in these countries?  
T
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In answering these questions, the main aim of the study is to explore 
the fiscal, monetary and financial effects of the crisis in the region and to 
provide in-depth analyses of the fiscal, monetary and banking policies in 
the post-crisis era, the viability of exit strategies and the prospects of 
macroeconomic and financial reforms in the region. These analyses will not 
only offer a comprehensive comparison between the countries but will also 
create a solid basis for assessing future economic and financial 
developments and policies in the region. A fresh, updated round of 
analyses in the post-crisis era is essential to produce an informed 
assessment of the future Euro-Mediterranean relationship and regional 
integration.  
In order to comprehensively evaluate the impact of the crisis and 
crisis-management practices in the southern and eastern Mediterranean 
countries, the study examines a relatively broad sample of countries – 
comprising Algeria, Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, Libya, Morocco, the 
Palestinian Autonomy, Syria, Tunisia and Turkey – and uses a number of 
state-of-the-art methodologies, both quantitative and qualitative. The 
impacts are placed in the broader Euro-Mediterranean context. This 
approach allows us to contrast the different experiences of these countries 
and their relationships with the EU and other regions, such as the GCC 
countries when relevant, providing a rich set of observations, subject to the 
availability of data. Additionally, it helps researchers to draw lessons and 
develop case studies on policies that work and others that fail to produce 
the desired outcomes.  
The study is composed of two mutually reinforcing parts. The first 
part provides an in-depth analysis of the impact of the financial crisis on 
the macroeconomic and financial conditions in the region, using a 
comprehensive framework of crisis-transmission channels. The second 
part, moving away from the analysis of the impact of the crisis, focuses 
more on the policy responses employed (or recommended) by each country 
and analyses future challenges and prospects.  
Chapter 2 provides a comprehensive analysis of the macroeconomic 
and financial impacts of the financial crisis in the southern and eastern 
Mediterranean countries. The third chapter delves more specifically into 
banking and capital markets by assessing the potential contagion effects on 
the region of the global financial crisis. Chapter 3 also provides a novel and 
comprehensive analysis of the fiscal response and an assessment of 
different scenarios of fiscal sustainability, applied to the cases of Egypt and 
Tunisia, followed by a critical assessment of their policy responses to the 
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financial crisis and political transitions. After outlining the monetary policy 
responses pre- and post-financial crisis, the fourth chapter provides an 
early warning system to prevent future crises. The fifth chapter assesses the 
regulatory responses in the areas of banking and finance pre-and post-
financial crisis. The final chapter offers conclusions. 
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2. A MACROECONOMIC AND FINANCIAL 
OVERVIEW ON THE IMPACT OF THE 
CRISIS  
DAMYANA BAKARDZHIEVA AND BASSEM KAMAR 
hile the global economic crisis has led to recession and negative 
economic growth in many parts of the world, its impact on the 
southern and eastern Mediterranean countries (SEMCs) was 
relatively mild. For those countries, the effect in 2009 and 2010 has been 
limited to a slowdown in growth rather than severe economic decline. Even 
though some economies in the region experienced negative growth for one 
or two quarters in early 2009, for the year as a whole, their economic 
growth rates were lower but remained positive (Habibi, 2009).  
These initially encouraging signs could be explained by the fact that 
diversified economies with strong trade and tourism linkages with Europe 
and the OECD (e.g. Morocco, Tunisia and Egypt) entered the crisis in a 
relatively good macroeconomic position, which initially limited the effect 
of the crisis on their financial systems. However, most countries in the 
region later saw a significant impact on their real economies as recession 
deepened in their major export markets (Habibi, 2009). Furthermore, the 
protests that led to the political changes in Tunisia and Egypt have 
significantly disrupted their economic activity and have caused the IMF to 
revise downwards its 2011 growth forecasts and place them 2½–4 
percentage points lower than in 2010, with the actual data standing at 1.6% 
and 1.9%, respectively, for the region for 2011 and 2012. Tunisia has 
recorded the only recessionary episode so far with -1.9% growth in 2011. 
The prolonged turmoil and insecurity in Egypt, exacerbated by the 
insecurity in Libya and Syria, are still undermining the region’s capacity for 
economic rebound, and the mid-2013 IMF (2013) forecasts are for 2.7% 
growth for this year, with an optimistic projection of 3.7% for 2014 (Figure 
2.1). 
W 
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Figure 2.1 Real GDP growth rates for selected SEMCs, 2006-12 (%) 
 
Sources: World Bank, World Development Indicators (WDI) and IMF World Economic 
Outlook (WEO) databases. 
At the country level, the economic impact of the global slowdown has 
varied, depending on the degree of economic and financial integration. The 
relatively closed financial systems of most SEMCs protected them from the 
direct effects of the financial crisis. Their low level of international 
integration is also particularly apparent in their limited engagement in 
advanced manufacturing (IMF, 2009a). This sector relies on a highly 
specialised and intricate supply chain across the globe – which is extremely 
efficient, but also vulnerable to turmoil. In addition, much of the sector’s 
output consists of capital goods and machinery, for which demand tends to 
be cyclical. Thus, the sector has become among those most affected by the 
global crisis. Its minor role in the region (except in Egypt and Tunisia) 
helps explain why these economies were initially relatively unharmed by 
the global crisis. Additionally, the countries’ ability to attenuate external 
shocks has depended upon their available fiscal space as well as their 
institutional capacity to implement sound macroeconomic and structural 
policies. 
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Figure 2.2 Three crisis transmission channels 
 
 
 
Source: Ayadi & De Groen (2013). 
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The purpose of this chapter is to use descriptive statistics to analyse 
the different transmission mechanisms through which the 2008 
international financial crisis spread from its origins to the developing 
SEMCs. The channels have been grouped into three broad categories, 
including real transmission channels (i.e. trade, transfers, public finances, 
trade and commodity prices), monetary transmission channels (i.e. money 
supply, target interest rates and inflation) and financial transmission 
channels (i.e. capital markets and financial intermediation) (see Figure 2.2). 
Although we don’t aspire to cover in detail every single element of 
these channels, we will try to highlight the most important parameters of 
each one and track their development after the crisis. 
2.1 Real transmission channels 
As a result of the weakness in global demand, the tourism and export 
sectors have suffered, but government stimulus programmes have partly 
limited this decline. In fact, after enjoying solid economic growth for the 
period 2004–08, the SEMCs’ economies grew at a slower but steady pace in 
2009 and 2010, with the most affected countries being Egypt, Lebanon and 
Jordan and in 2011, Tunisia (IMF, 2009a). 
2.1.1 Growth 
The region’s oil-exporting countries (Algeria and Libya) were initially 
expected to see a sharp deterioration in their fiscal and external balances 
while avoiding recessionary growth in 2009–10. According to IMF (2011) 
data, Algeria’s real growth rate was 2.4% in 2009 and 3.3% in 2010, and 
prospects were increased to 3.6% for 2011 based on higher oil prices. The 
political and social unrest in Libya clearly led to adverse investor 
sentiment, lower domestic economic activity and higher external financing 
costs, causing the country’s growth to slump 62.5% in 2011. But the 
economy vigorously rebound in 2012 with growth of 104.5% and expected 
an additional 20% increase in economic output in 2013 (Figure 2.1). 
The Libyan revolution is also having important spillover effects in the 
economies of neighbouring Egypt and Tunisia through the channel of 
reduced remittances. More than 100,000 expatriates are estimated to have 
returned home since the beginning of the conflict. 
Non-oil exporting countries with strong economic linkages with the 
GCC (Gulf Cooperation Council) countries and/or a dependency on aid 
(Jordan, Syria and Lebanon) faced stagnation of financial flows from the 
8 | AN OVERVIEW OF THE MACROECONOMIC & FINANCIAL IMPACT OF THE CRISIS  
 
GCC countries and needed to mobilise aid because the source countries 
were affected by crisis. Real GDP growth had fallen by 43% on average 
during the period 2009-11 in Lebanon and 63% in Jordan. The real growth 
rate for the group of oil-importing MENA (Middle East and North African) 
countries had declined from 4.9% in 2009 to 4.3% in 2010, and then even 
further to 1.6% in 2011 (excluding Syria, for which data are unavailable 
from 2011 onwards). 
In 2012 and 2013, political uncertainty, continued social unrest and 
declining investor confidence decreased trade and investment, and 
increased unemployment, borrowing costs and capital outflows, providing 
altogether for weak growth, averaging about 2.7% (again excluding Syria). 
2.1.2 Trade 
The turmoil in international markets caused by the economic crisis has 
given rise to a significant decline in SEMCs’ exports in 2009. Their foreign 
trade was unable to resist the adverse impact of the severe worldwide 
economic recession, and the drop in demand in Europe, the United States 
and Asia. 
The decline in goods exports did not cause a deterioration in the 
current account balances of Tunisia, Jordan and Morocco in 2009. For these 
countries, the decline in oil-import costs was able to offset the decline in 
export revenues, and consequently their current account deficits were 
moderately smaller in 2009 as compared to 2008 (Figures 2.3 and 2.4). 
Figure 2.3 Export of goods in selected SEMCs, 2004-11 (% change) 
 
Sources: World Bank WDI and IMF WEO databases. 
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Figure 2.4 Import of goods in selected SEMCs, 2004-11 (% change) 
 
Sources: World Bank WDI and IMF WEO databases. 
However, for these and the other SEMCs (except Algeria, which runs 
a surplus, and Syria), current account deficits increased in 2011 due to a 
larger decrease in exports as compared to imports (Figure 2.5). The increase 
in oil prices in 2011 generated an improvement in the current-account 
surplus of oil-exporting Algeria, but it has significantly increased the 
import bill in the other SEMCs. 
Figure 2.5 Current account balance in selected SEMCs, 2004-11 (% of GDP) 
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Source: World Bank WDI and IMF WEO databases. 
 
2.1.3 Remittances 
Remittances have also declined in 2009, but not as much and with 
significant variations across countries. For example, they have fallen by 
24% in Egypt, while they only fell by 12% in Morocco (Figure 2.6). Migrant 
workers who still have a job continue to send money back home, and those 
who have lost their jobs are returning to their home countries with the 
stock of their accumulated savings. However, as already noted, the 
situation is particularly adverse for Egypt and Tunisia in 2011, due to the 
events in Libya and their own political crises. 
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Figure 2.6 Remittances inflows in selected SEMCs, 2004-11 ($ bn) 
 
Source: World Bank WDI and IMF WEO databases. 
The impact of the global recession on the Palestinian economy was 
also initially limited. While the global recession lowered growth in Israel, 
its impact on the West Bank and Gaza was limited by the small share of its 
exports in GDP. For now, donors decide when and whether to disburse 
payments based on domestic and political factors, rather than the global 
recession, and there are no indications of a significant decline in 
remittances from the Palestinian diaspora (IMF, 2009b). 
2.1.4 Tourism 
In 2009 tourism remained stable or was even growing in Jordan, Lebanon, 
Tunisia and Syria (Table 2.1). This fact reflects country specificities, such as 
the recovery from the 2008 unrest in Lebanon and the increased tourism 
from neighbouring oil-exporting countries (such as the GCC). The region’s 
tourism industry has also benefited from the global trend among tourists to 
switch away from higher-cost destinations. Proactive policies oriented 
towards stimulating tourism demand have also proved useful. For 
example, in early 2009, Egypt adopted a set of measures aimed at 
invigorating tourism: hotels have been exempted from paying 
contributions to the country’s Tourism promotion authority, and charter 
flights face lower fees (World Tourism Organization, 2009). 
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Table 2.1 Tourism receipts in selective SEMCs, 2000–2011 ($ bn) 
Country 2000–2006 average 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 
Algeria 0.2 0.3 0.5 0.4 0.3 0.3 
Syria 1.4 3.0 3.2 3.8 6.3 0.0 
Lebanon 4.3 5.8 6.3 7.2 8.2 7.1 
Egypt 5.6 10.3 12.1 11.8 13.6 9.3 
Morocco  4.2 8.3 8.9 8.0 8.2 9.1 
Tunisia 2.3 3.4 3.9 3.5 3.5 2.5 
Jordan 1.4 2.8 3.5 3.5 4.4 3.9 
Source: World Bank 2013 WDI database. 
In 2011, however, due to political instability, tourism collapsed in 
Egypt and Syria, and the sector receipts declined by 40% in Tunisia. 
Although past experience suggests that the region’s tourism recovers 
relatively quickly, the setback led to lower receipts more generally in the 
balance of payments and higher unemployment.  
2.1.5 Unemployment 
High unemployment indeed remains a major challenge in the region, 
averaging around 12% – the highest regional rate worldwide in 2008. The 
increased growth over the past decade did not generate enough jobs, nor 
was it inclusive, leaving youth unemployment at 25-30% in Egypt, Tunisia 
and Morocco. The young are also the ones most affected by unemployment 
among the different age groups, with up to 60% of unemployment being 
youth unemployment in countries like Egypt and Syria. Unemployment in 
SEMCs is mainly structural, due to the high growth rate of the population 
and subsequently of the labour force, lack of flexibility of the labour 
market, skill mismatches and low labour-force participation ratios 
(especially for women, as was stressed by Ayadi & El Mahdi, 2013). Recent 
data for unemployment remain scarce, but for 2012 the IMF estimates 
unemployment in Egypt and Jordan at above 12% and above 16% for 
Tunisia. All of these elements conspire to keep social discontent well 
nourished.   
2.1.6 Public deficit and debt 
As the economies of the SEMCs were affected by the global crisis, 
governments used a variety of measures, similar to those adopted by other 
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governments worldwide, to attenuate the adverse consequences. In most 
countries, this involved a mix of monetary and fiscal stimuli along with 
stricter financial regulations (Table 2.2). 
Table 2.2 Key responses to the crisis in selected SEMCs 
 Financial sector Macroeconomic 
Country Deposit guarantee 
Liquidity 
support 
Monetary 
easing 
Fiscal 
stimulus 
Algeria   X X 
Egypt X  X X 
Gaza/West Bank     
Jordan X X X  
Lebanon  X   
Morocco X X X X 
Syria  X  X 
Tunisia  X X X 
Source: Authors’ own compilation. 
SEMCs have many fiscal challenges in the areas of deficit, debt 
reduction and the maintenance of fiscal discipline. However, most 
countries in the region face some specific fiscal issues, such as relatively 
high public debt,1 dependency on some form of aid and financial 
concession, exposure to fluctuations in hydrocarbon prices, high defence 
expenditures and weak tax bases (Ben Slimane & Ben Tahar, 2010). 
 
                                                     
1 Although, of course, there is a difference between countries whose debt is mostly 
domestically held and those whose debt is mostly external. 
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Figure 2.7 Central government fiscal balance in selected SEMCs, 2004-11 
(% of GDP) 
 
Sources: World Bank WDI and IMF WEO databases. 
The general government-balance-to-GDP ratio in SEMCs has 
improved on average, even though some countries continue to exhibit large 
deficits (like Lebanon). This improvement is mainly explained by the 
positive development in the region’s oil-producing economies (notably 
Algeria), which have accumulated large fiscal surpluses in the wake of 
higher oil prices (Figure 2.7).  
Morocco, Tunisia, Algeria and Egypt had successfully accomplished 
their budgetary consolidation programmes and entered the crisis with a 
sound fiscal situation. Those countries were able to use their fiscal policy to 
smoothen the negative effects of the global crisis (stimulating internal 
demand through the increase in public expenditures). Creating fiscal space 
before the crisis allowed those countries to implement countercyclical 
macroeconomic policies by running fiscal stimulus programmes and the 
operation of automatic fiscal stabilisers. 
Algeria and Jordan experienced significant fiscal growth in 2009. 
Egypt, Morocco, Lebanon and Tunisia, on the other hand, adopted smaller 
fiscal budgets for 2009 and 2010 in comparison with 2008. This is partly due 
to revenue constraints and high sovereign debt, which has discouraged 
additional borrowing. In general, fiscal stimulus programmes result in 
budget deficits – which, in oil-importing countries, must be financed by 
additional borrowing as no sovereign wealth funds are available. 
According to IMF estimates, Morocco’s 1.8% fiscal surplus of 2007 and 2008 
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was replaced by fiscal deficits of 2.1% and 4.2% in 2009 and 2010, 
respectively, arriving possibly at 4.9% of GDP in 2011 (Figure 2.7). 
Figure 2.8 General government gross debt in selected SEMCs, 2004-11 
(% of GDP) 
 
Sources: World Bank WDI and IMF WEO databases. 
The decline of public debt in several SEMCs was the consequence of 
both debt rescheduling and macroeconomic stabilisation programmes. 
Nevertheless, Egypt and Lebanon still have debt-to-GDP ratios above or 
around 100%, and Jordan, Morocco and Tunisia have debt levels well 
above 50% of GDP. Lebanon faces a particularly challenging situation, as 
public debt is not only very high at 170% of GDP, but has also steadily 
increased in recent years (Figure 2.8). By contrast, oil-producing countries 
have used part of the windfall profits resulting from high oil prices to 
repay public debt.  
Fiscal consolidation efforts could be a major part of the institutional 
reforms that might be affected by the global economic crisis and therefore 
postponed for a few years. While Morocco and Tunisia have some fiscal 
space thanks to moderate levels of public debt, and Algeria is still enjoying 
comfortable oil revenues; Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon and Syria have none left. 
Egypt might find it difficult to finance additional stimulus spending unless 
it can secure low-interest financing for the fiscal deficit and a significant 
amount of foreign aid. In Lebanon, where deficit and debt-to-GDP ratios 
are high and the cost of servicing domestic debt is already significant, the 
government may want to avoid adding to that cost. With falling fiscal 
revenues and tightening external financing conditions, domestic public 
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debt can be an appealing alternative for financing fiscal stimulus packages, 
but it bears the risk of crowding-out the private sector.  
2.2 Monetary transmission mechanisms 
2.2.1 Inflation 
Monetary stimulus in the region was quite uniform. During 2008, inflation 
moved into double digits in several countries linked to the price increases 
for food and fuel. Because the countries in the region are large importers of 
food, the inflationary impact of high international food prices was higher in 
the region than anywhere else in the world – with 25% of inflation in 
SEMCs between December 2005 and December 2007 attributable to 
international food prices, more than twice the level for the next-affected 
region (World Bank, 2009). The authorities undertook measures to offset 
the most adverse effects on the poor. These measures included increased 
subsidies, measures to boost incomes through higher civil service wages 
and finally an increase in interest rates in a number of countries to counter 
the inflationary impulse. For example, the Central Bank of Egypt increased 
the key policy rates by 275 basis points between February and September 
2008. 
The sharp decrease in commodity prices during 2009, however, 
lessened the concern over inflationary pressures. GDP growth below 
potential has helped the sharp decrease in inflation and helped create space 
for monetary easing. For example, in Tunisia the CPI inflation softened to 
3.1% in February 2009, (year-on-year) from 4.9% during 2008; and in Jordan 
to 1.5% from 14.9% (Figure 2.9). This easing is serving to boost the 
purchasing power of the broader population in the region, setting the stage 
for an eventual turnaround in household spending, when economic 
conditions become clearer and more stable.  
Despite the expansionary macroeconomic policies, inflation rates 
have continued to fall since August 2008, and have remained in the 5–10% 
range in most countries for the period 2009-12. Accordingly, in many 
countries, the authorities have lowered reserve requirements substantially. 
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Figure 2.9 Inflation rate in selected SEMCs, 2006-12 (% change in CPI) 
 
Sources: World Bank WDI and IMF WEO databases. 
In 2011, however, inflationary pressures started building up again, 
against the background of rising world food, commodity and oil prices. 
The costs of imports were expected to increase by about 3% of GDP, which 
will later translate either into higher consumer prices (imported inflation) 
or a worsened fiscal balance (in case of price controls or government 
subsidies). A notable outlier in this general picture is Syria, where prices 
skyrocketed amidst the ongoing crisis to stabilise at little under 50% in the 
first quarter of 2013 (Economist Intelligence Unit, 2013). 
2.2.2 Interest rates 
Interest rates have remained relatively low, both internationally and in the 
SEMCs since the crisis, which is the result of the easy monetary policy 
applied in order to stimulate the world economies. 
Reductions in policy rates have generally been more cautious and to a 
large extent dictated by exchange-rate considerations, because most SEMCs 
are targeting a steady nominal exchange rate.  
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Figure 2.10 Deposit interest rates in selected SEMCs, 2000-12 (%) 
 
Source: World Bank WDI database. 
In Egypt, the central bank has cut policy rates six times in 2009 alone 
to promote economic recovery and reiterated its 100% guarantee on local 
bank deposits (Economist Intelligence Unit, 2009). In Jordan, interest rates 
have been cut by 150 basis points since late 2008, and required reserves 
have been reduced from 10% to 7%. A temporary guarantee on bank 
deposits was issued in October 2008 as a pre-emptive step to maintain 
confidence and to support the domestic money market. In Morocco, the key 
policy rate has been reduced by 25 basis points and required reserves have 
been reduced from 15% to 10% since the start of 2009. In Tunisia, the 
required reserve ratio was lowered from 10% to 7.5%, and the key policy 
rate was reduced by 75 basis points (Figures 2.10 and 2.11).  
Although inflation has remained relatively subdued this far (except 
in Syria), the situation isn’t without potential threat, especially if 
international rates start increasing, which can jeopardise the SEMCs’ 
capacity to finance their debt through further foreign borrowing.  
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Figure 2.11 Interest rate spread in selected SEMCs, 2004-09 (%) 
 
Source: World Bank WDI database. 
 
2.2.3 Official reserves 
In general, the levels of official reserves remained stable during 2009 and 
similar to pre-crisis levels. They nonetheless fell slightly in a certain 
number of countries in 2010-12 (Egypt, Jordan, Morocco, Syria and 
Tunisia).  
The situation even became critical in Egypt in 2012 with the central 
bank trying to prevent the Egyptian pound from depreciating, and 
allowing the level of official reserves in the country to fall under the 
internationally acceptable threshold of 3 months worth of imports, 
plummeting from $36 billion in 2011 to $9.6 billion in February 2013.  
More recently, with the help of Libya, Qatar and later Saudi Arabia 
and United Arab Emirates, the Egyptian official reserves improved slightly, 
but they still stand at only $15 billion, which isn’t really sufficient and 
leaves little room for central bank manoeuvres (Figure 2.12). 
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Figure 2.12 Official reserves in selected SEMCs, 2006-11 
(in months of imports) 
 
Sources: World Bank WDI and IMF WEO databases. 
 
2.3 Financial transmission channels 
For most SEMCs, the global financial crisis manifested itself mainly in 
decreased receipts from abroad. The crisis affected more directly the oil-
exporting countries like Algeria, through a sharp drop in oil prices, a 
contraction in the global economy, and again a sudden drying up of capital 
inflows. 
2.3.1 Foreign capital inflows 
The net flows of foreign direct investments (FDI) have been particularly 
hard hit, declining on average by 35% in 2009. On the inflows side, the FDI 
declined roughly by 32%. Given the increased insecurity in the region, FDI 
has declined in both Egypt and Tunisia by 1-2% of GDP in 2011, possibly 
much more in Libya (Figure 2.13). The crisis in Syria and the ongoing 
turmoil in Egypt are creating negative spillover effects for the entire region, 
and this instability seriously undermines investors’ confidence. 
Portfolio investments have generally decelerated too, reflecting the 
slump in the global stock market and in the Middle Eastern bourses as 
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discussed below. As of 2013, they still remain lower than in other 
developing and emerging markets (Figure 2.14). 
Figure 2.13 Net foreign direct investment inflows in selected SEMCs, 2004-11 
 ($ billions) 
 
Source: World Bank WDI and IMF WEO databases. 
 
Figure 2.14 Portfolio investments in selected SEMCs, 2004-11 ($ billions) 
 
Sources: World Bank WDI and IMF WEO databases. 
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2.3.2 Stock markets 
During the worst phase of financial turmoil in late 2008, global equity 
markets dropped 40% to 50%. The MSCI-all developing index was off 38% 
from September through year-end (World Bank, 2009) (Figure 2.15). The 
SEMCs followed this general trend, and the decline in stock prices is visible 
both in the main index performance and in the overall market 
capitalisation. 
Figure 2.15 Stock market capitalisation in selected SEMCs, 2006-12 ($ billions) 
 
Source: World Bank WDI database. 
Egypt was among the markets that saw the sharpest initial decline. 
The Egyptian index peaked at 12,000 in April 2008 before declining sharply 
to 4,300 in December and further to 3,563 in February 2009 (a 66.3% 
decline). Immediately after the Lehman Brothers episode, the Egyptian 
index fell by almost 30% in October (month on month), mainly due to panic 
selling from local and foreign investors. In Jordan, the Amman Stock 
Exchange index, declined by 9% in July and August before plunging 35% 
between August and December 2008 in the midst of the financial turmoil. 
Tunisia appears to have avoided a sharp decline in its major stock index. 
Although Tunisia’s stock market recorded a significant downturn between 
October and December 2008, the Tunis Stock Index rose by 1.8% for the 
whole of 2008 and kept rising during 2009. 
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Since March 2009, SEMCs’ financial markets have begun to turn 
around with partial recovery after the large drop in the major stock market 
indices (Figure 2.16). Markets in the region have generally outperformed 
the MSCI Emerging Market, except for Egypt and Morocco in 2010 and 
2011.2  
Figure 2.16 Stock exchange indices in selected SEMCs, 2007-10 
 
Source: MSCI. 
The financial market conditions in Egypt and Lebanon outperformed 
expectations at the end of 2009, with the Egyptian stock index almost 
doubling since its low in early 2009. However, the performance of the 
Egyptian stock exchange was significantly worsened since the democratic 
revolution in January 2011, with the index falling 25% in the first three 
months of 2011. 
Tunisia’s index, as noted above, was hardly affected by the crisis, and 
went close to its record high in 2009. Furthermore, although volatility 
increased temporarily towards the end of 2010 to accompany a marked 
                                                     
2 See the MSCI website for the latest developments in the region’s performance 
(www.mscibarra.com/products/indices/international_equity_indices/acwi-imi/ 
performance.html). 
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trend reversal, the Tunisian stock index registered significant growth in the 
second half of 2011. 
Although the stock indices in Egypt and Tunisia have recovered 
some of their losses in 2012, the markets in Jordan, Lebanon, Syria and 
Morocco keep declining. The June 2013 revolution in Egypt was 
accompanied by impressive increases in the Egyptian stock exchange 
index, which might seem strange at first glance, but which many experts 
interpret as a sign that investors foresee more stability after the recent 
changes. 
2.3.3 Bank assets 
No major financial institution in the region has failed in the immediate 
aftermath of the crisis. In addition, credit growth has remained positive, in 
line with the subdued decrease in output. The region’s mainly bank-based 
financial systems were well capitalised and avoided significant exposure to 
US subprime or other structured securities. Moreover, reinforcing 
confidence, Jordan instituted a guarantee on bank deposits, while Egypt 
reiterated an existing implicit guarantee and in 2009 even announced plans 
to launch an explicit deposit insurance fund scheme (Al Jafari, 2009). 
Table 2.3 Financial soundness indicators in selective SEMCs, 2009 and 2011 
 Capital adequacy ratio 2009 
Ratio of non-performing loans 
to total loans 
2009 2011 
Algeria 18.4 22.1 n/a 
Egypt 15.3 14.7 10.9 
Jordan 19.6 6.7 8.5 
Lebanon 12.4 2.1 3.7 
Morocco 11.2 6.0 4.8 
Syria 20.8 5.1 n/a 
Tunisia 12.4 13.2 n/a 
Source: Author’s compilation based on IMF and WB databases. 
The banking systems have absorbed the initial systematic stress, 
helped by the authorities’ actions and strong profitability in the pre-crisis 
years. Overall, banks have remained solvent and profitable in 2008 and 
2009. Capital adequacy ratios have continued to be well above the required 
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regulatory norm, and in many countries, the ratio of non-performing loans 
has remained low. However, banking asset quality is reported to have 
decreased in 2012 in Jordan, Tunisia and Lebanon (IMF, 2012) (see Table 
2.3). 
Figure 2.17 Credit to private sector in selected SEMCs, 2006-12 (% in GDP) 
 
Sources: World Bank WDI and IMF WEO databases. 
With deposit growth and capital inflows regaining rapidly strength, 
funding conditions in the banking systems have also improved shortly 
after the crisis onset. Private sector credit in Algeria rose 19% year-on-year 
as of June 2009 (IMF, 2010) as shown in Figure 2.17. This indicator, 
however, has not improved significantly in other countries, reflecting 
increased risk aversion, difficulties in raising sufficient capital and 
increased supervisory scrutiny. The danger here today comes from the 
possible crowding-out effect due to the decreased availability of foreign 
financing for the cumulating government deficits that now have to be 
mostly domestically financed.  
2.3.4 Sovereign debt markets 
The costs of external debt for emerging countries on international financial 
markets started to increase in July 2007. The spreads remained moderate, 
however, until the beginning of the financial crisis. Tunisia was the first to 
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feel the burden of the crisis in its attempt to issue bonds on international 
financial markets in July and August 2007. Faced with debt spreads 
estimated at between 45 and 50 basis points, the country had to increase its 
offer by 25 basis points to attract investors (ADB, 2009). 
As the financial crisis kept unfolding, it amplified the increase in the 
margin applied to loans in the international financial markets for emerging 
countries. From October 2008, sovereign debt spreads rose by an average of 
250 basis points for emerging countries. The spread of the JPMorgan 
emerging countries equity index reached its highest level since 2002, 
increasing by 800 basis points in October 2008. Spreads increased by 100 
basis points for Egypt and rapidly increased to above 200 basis points for 
Tunisia during the toughest periods of bank failures in the United States 
(Figure 2.18).  
Figure 2.18 Sovereign credit spreads, 2008-09 (basis points) 
Source: Bloomberg. 
Tunisia’s sovereign spreads increased dramatically to more than 600 
basis points as of December 2008, reflecting higher country risk resulting 
from the volatile global financial environment. Still, Tunisia’s sovereign 
spread remained below the regional average (close to 900 basis points) and 
below Lebanon’s spread. 
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Table 2.4 Long-term sovereign credit issuer rating (as of end of 2011) 
Issuer 
Moody’s 
current 
rating 
Action Date S&P rating 
Fitch 
rating 
Government of 
Lebanon B2 
Upgrade 
from B3 
(2008) 
1-Apr-09 B- B 
Government of Egypt Ba2 Downgrade from Ba1 31-Jan-11 
BB 
 BB 
    (downgrade from BB+) 
Government of 
Morocco Ba1 New 25-Jun-07 BB+ BBB- 
Government of Libya -- -- -- BB B 
    Downgraded twice 
Government of Jordan 
Ba2 
Downgrade 
to negative 
outlook 
21-Aug-03 BB+  
Government of Tunisia 
Baa3 Downgrade 
19-Jan-11 
(was 
unchanged 
since 2003) 
BBB- BBB- 
Sources: Fitch, Moody’s and S&P. 
Spreads on sovereign credit issues in the region have fallen since their 
peak in the last quarter of 2008, and the sovereign credit ratings have 
generally improved throughout 2009 and early 2010. 
However, the Dubai debt restructuring in 2010 and the Arab spring 
in 2011 caused investors to re-evaluate the risk of SEMCs’ sovereign issues 
and to raise borrowing costs for the region. Thus, between January and 
March 2011, government bond spreads increased by 30-50 points in 
Lebanon and Morocco, and by over 100 points in Egypt and Tunisia. CDS 
spreads followed a similar movement, but remained narrower than their 
post-global financial crisis levels. 
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Credit ratings kept worsening starting from 2011 with numerous 
logical downgrades for Libya, Tunisia and Egypt, which also negatively 
affected their neighbouring countries’ outlooks (Table 2.4). 
In May 2012, Standard and Poor’s estimated that high political risks 
and limited monetary policy flexibility constrain the sovereign credit 
ratings of the MENA region, and gave negative outlooks to Egypt, Jordan 
and Tunisia. The average rating of the region today is close to BBB+. 
Table 2.5 Total gross external debt SEMCs, 2004-11 (% of GDP) 
  2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 
Algeria  25.6 16.7 4.8 4.2 3.3 3.3 2.8 2.2 
Egypt  37.9 32.2 28.8 23.0 20.8 16.8 14.6  
Jordan  66.1 56.5 49.3 43.6 22.6 21.7 19.1 16.5 
Lebanon  187.4 185.7 198.8 194.0 172 171 160 161 
Morocco  29.1 24.2 23.9 23.7 20.6 23 24.5 25 
Syria  73.3 23.4 19.2 14.5 10.4 10.4 9.1 8.1 
Tunisia  69.1 62.1 59.6 56.6 48.8 48.1 47.9 46,4 
Source: IMF International Financial Statistics (IFS) database. 
Historically, the volume of external financing has been relatively 
insignificant across the SEM region (Table 2.5). The total value of external 
bond issuance has been relatively low except in Lebanon. 
As of end 2011, Lebanon has been the only country in our sample to 
issue external bonds after the crisis. A big portion of the Lebanese issue 
was locally purchased. The country enjoyed a B3 rating by Moody’s and B- 
ratings by Standard and Poor’s and Fitch as sovereign debt issuer in 2006 
and 2007. As the crisis unfolded in 2008, its rating was reduced to CCC+ by 
S&P, but by December 2009 it was restored to its B- standing and even got 
an upgrade by Moody’s to B2 level.  
In Egypt, a Eurobond issuance scheduled for the first quarter of 2008 
was postponed to July 2008 and then postponed again until international 
markets stabilised. Although emerging-market bond issuance was 
recovering from a near-standstill at end-2008, none of the countries in the 
group – except probably Lebanon and Egypt – had plans to reach out to the 
international bond markets in 2009-10.  
While access to international capital markets remained limited, the 
cost of external borrowing had declined in 2010, as indicated by the 
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decreasing cost of insuring against default of the debt issued by our sample 
countries.  
Figure 2.19 Credit default swaps in selected SEMCs 
 
Source: Bloomberg. 
Nevertheless, the crises in Egypt, Tunisia and Syria in 2011, coupled 
with the euro-area debt crisis, inverted this trend, and by 2012 the credit 
default swaps in the region had widened significantly, although not as 
much as in some other regions of the world (Figure 2.19). 
The switch to domestic or official sources to finance the deficits 
appears to have taken place smoothly, in sharp contrast to what has 
occurred in some other emerging markets, where sudden stops of capital 
inflows have had severe consequences. This is not surprising, given the 
limited dependence on external private financing described above, and the 
relatively deep local debt markets. At the same time, as private credit 
growth has slowed, the relative ease with which most governments in the 
group have been able to finance fiscal deficits at home may reflect reduced 
competition for funds.  
Looking ahead, the SEMCs need to be cautious, however. If fiscal 
balances do not improve as the global and regional recovery progresses, 
interest rates are likely to rise with greater private-sector demand for 
capital. Given ambitious plans for bond issuance in industrial countries, the 
future cost of capital is also likely to go up with the anticipated increase in 
US treasury yields. 
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3. AN INVESTIGATION INTO FINANCIAL 
DEVELOPMENT AND CONTAGION  
RYM AYADI, EMRAH ARBAK 
AND WILLEM PIETER DE GROEN 
he direct impact of the financial crisis on the banks and capital 
markets in the Southern and Eastern Mediterranean countries 
(SEMCs) has been limited. Most banks in the region held only 
limited interests in the toxic assets that sparked the world financial crisis. 
On the other hand, however, financial institutions and the capital markets 
in the region were deeply impacted from the indirect effects of the financial 
crisis, such as the reduction in the capital inflows.  
This chapter begins with a review of the literature on the impact of 
asset bubbles on banks and capital markets in emerging economies. We 
then assess the impact of the financial crisis on the liquidity, performance, 
efficiency and fragility of the banking sectors in 10 selected SEMCs. 
Thereafter, the impact of the financial crisis on the capital markets is 
investigated using a state-of-the-art contagion analysis. The chapter 
concludes with a synthesis of the results. 
3.1 Literature review 
The literature on the impact of crisis conditions on the efficiency of 
financial institutions is relatively sparse. Studying the impact of the 
bursting of the asset bubble in Japan during 1990, Fukuyama (1995) 
provides some indirect evidence that the collapse of Japan’s bubble 
economy in 1990s had some (albeit limited) negative impact on bank 
efficiencies, mainly through the creation of bad loans. More directly, Isik & 
Hassan (2003) focus on the 1994 Turkish financial crisis to find that various 
measures of efficiency and productivity have declined in the midst of the 
crisis in the banking sector, especially for the foreign-owned banks and 
mostly due to a deterioration of the technological frontier. A more recent 
study by Sufian (2010) also provides evidence of increased inefficiency 
T 
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among Malaysian and Thai banks in the year following the 1997 East Asian 
financial crisis.  
Several reasons may be put forward to explain why the global 
financial crisis may have had a negative impact on the banking sectors. A 
substantial degradation in external demand may translate into increased 
credit risks, especially in export- or tourism-reliant economies, and a loss of 
collateral for borrowers, making it harder and ever-more costly for banks to 
screen and monitor borrowers, (Mishkin et al., 1997). Moreover, as 
macroeconomic weaknesses arise and banks find themselves in 
increasingly precarious positions, they may try to offset their own risks by 
curtailing credit and turning to more-liquid but lower-earning assets. A 
banking crisis is particularly more likely with large open currency positions 
or in economies that are dependent on external finance and may suffer 
severely by sudden stops in foreign funding (Calvo, 1998; Kaminsky & 
Reinhart, 1999).  
The theoretical literature on the promulgation of financial crises, on 
the other hand, is large and expanding (Claessens & Forbes, 2001; Pericoli 
& Sbracia, 2003; Dungey et al., 2004; Dungey & Tambakis, 2005). Apart 
from advanced-country studies, several studies have covered emerging 
markets, in many cases single countries. Regional or multi-country studies 
are only beginning to appear since the early 2000s, motivated by the fact 
that geographical proximity can be an important factor in the speed and the 
severity of the crises.3 
One of the main challenges in assessing the severity of financial 
spillover effects is defining exactly what contagion means. Arguably the 
simplest explanation is the consequence of shared risks and the ensuing 
cross-market portfolio rebalancing (Kaminsky & Reinhart, 1999; Kodres & 
Pritsker, 2002). In this manner, contagion is a rational response by cross-
border investors to hedge risks and limit exposures to common market 
fundamentals. In a similar vein, the recent financial crisis has amply 
demonstrated the spillover risks from cross-border linkages between 
                                                     
3 The recent studies have to a large extent focused on the transmission of emerging 
market crises, including the Mexican crash of 1994, the East Asian crisis of 1997-98, 
the Russian bond default of 1998, the Argentinean crisis of 2001-02 and more 
recently the global financial crisis of 2007-09. For examples of studies with large 
cross-country or regional samples, see Forbes & Rigobon (2002), Dungey et al. 
(2002), Longstaff (2010), Aloui et al. (2011) and Hwang et al. (2011).  
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financial institutions and large corporations. Allen & Gale (2000), Freixas et 
al. (2000) and Brunnermeier & Pederson (2009) show that idiosyncratic 
risks and rumours of fragility may drive financial institutions to vastly 
scale down their lending and liquidity support to institutions in troubled 
markets. A large crisis may also lead to wealth effects through heavy losses 
for traders, who then liquidate their positions in their portfolios, both 
domestic and cross-border, leading to a collapse in asset prices (Kyle & 
Xiong, 2001). Alternatively, Calvo & Mendoza (2000) show that global crisis 
may reduce the relative gains from information-gathering during troubled 
times, increasing information asymmetries and resulting in herd behaviour 
among investors. For example, declining asset prices for assets in one 
country can lead to margin calls for leveraged investors, which can 
intensify their sell-offs in other unrelated markets due to fears of further 
sell-offs (Calvo et al., 2004).  
The propagation of crises in the Middle East and North Africa 
(MENA) region has been the subject of several regional studies. Khallouli & 
Sandretto (2010) use a Markow-Switching generalised autoregressive 
conditional heteroscedasticity (GARCH) model to assess whether the US 
subprime crisis of 2007 has led to a significant bear markets for eight 
MENA countries. The results show that a persistent shift to a low-returns 
or a high-volatility regime did take place in many countries (except Jordan), 
especially after the fall of Lehman Brothers in September 2008. In 
particular, Bahrain and Egypt has experienced both mean contagion (i.e. 
lowering returns) and variance contagion (increasing volatility). In turn, the 
contagion to Morocco and Turkey has only resulted in lower returns. 
Meanwhile, Oman and Dubai have experienced significant increases in 
volatility without equivalent drops in returns.  
3.2 Impact of crisis on banking sectors 
Bank-based funding remains the primary source of external financing for 
private (and public) sectors across the Southern and Eastern 
Mediterranean. Nevertheless, the share of domestic credit to the private 
sector remains lowest among other global regions (Figure 3.1), ranging 
from a high of around 100% in Israel to a low of around 10% in Libya, 
(Table 3.1). An underdeveloped banking system may have two offsetting 
implications. On the one hand, banks in such systems often have more than 
adequate funding in the form of retail deposits, with little or no need for 
market funding. They often invest in safe assets, such as government bonds 
or debt, which carry little credit or liquidity risk. Indeed, as will become 
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clear below, credit to households does not constitute a smaller proportion 
of balance sheets than in more advanced systems. In short, despite some 
exceptions, an underdeveloped banking system implies that changing 
economic conditions have little impact on asset valuation or funding 
availability.  
On the other hand, firms in underdeveloped banking systems have to 
rely on funding from alternate sources, such as informal lenders, family 
and friends, or simply by retaining profits. The availability of funds from 
these sources is likely to be curtailed when economic conditions increase 
the credit risks faced by the informal lenders. The result is often a strong 
form of credit rationing, leading to a secondary rise in default likelihoods 
across all credit-needy firms. These self-fulfilling conditions will also 
enhance the risks borne by banks, more so than a more formal system that 
has the tools to diversify those risks and handle the information 
asymmetries, (Prasad, 2010). Thus, the secondary economic impact of a 
crisis to the banking system may be amplified in underdeveloped systems. 
 
Figure 3.1 Domestic credit to the private sector, regional comparison, 2001 and 
2011 (% of GDP) 
 
Note: OECD: Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development; EAP: East 
Asia and the Pacific; EU: European Union; ECA: Eastern Europe and Central Asia; SSA: 
Sub-Saharan Africa; SAS: South Asia; LAC: Latin America and the Caribbean; and 
MENA: Middle East and North Africa. 
Source: World Bank, World Development Indicators (WDI) database. 
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Table 3.1 Domestic credit to private sector, 2004-11 in selected SEMCs vs other 
countries (% of GDP) 
 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 
Algeria 11.2 12.1 12.3 13.4 13.2 16.5 15.6 14.8 
Egypt 54.0 51.2 49.3 45.5 42.8 36.1 33.1 31.3 
Israel 85.1 89.8 86.5 97.4 99.8 93.5 95.7 95.1 
Jordan 74.7 88.1 91.8 91.6 80.9 75.5 73.2 73.5 
Lebanon 75.9 68.5 70.5 73.4 73.8 73.6 85.5 89.6 
Libya 10.3 7.7 6.6 6.0 6.8 10.9 .. .. 
Morocco 42.6 46.2 48.6 58.4 63.2 64.7 68.6 71.2 
Syria 11.7 14.8 14.9 15.1 17.6 19.6 22.5 .. 
Tunisia 59.0 58.3 57.3 57.8 59.9 62.2 68.8 76.4 
Turkey 17.3 22.2 25.9 29.5 32.6 36.5 44.2 50.0 
France 90.6 92.7 98.4 105.6 108.8 111.5 114.2 116.2 
Greece 70.8 79.6 85.2 93.9 97.4 94.3 118.6 121.9 
Italy 84.8 89.0 94.5 100.6 104.8 111.0 122.8 122.4 
Spain 124.9 145.7 167.0 187.9 202.8 212.1 214.4 205.9 
Europe & 
Central Asia 21.9 26.4 32.0 38.7 42.9 46.0 46.0 47.3 
European 
Union 109.4 114.8 121.2 129.2 136.0 141.3 139.8 136.0 
Source: World Bank, World Development Indicators (WDI) database. 
A review of the economic and financial developments in the region 
during and following the 2007-09 global financial crisis and the ongoing 
sovereign crisis in many advanced countries, including the region’s chief 
trade partners such as the EU and the US, reveals three underlying themes, 
at times overlapping, during the years 2007 and 2012.  
First, many economies and financial systems have been saved from 
the initial negative impact of the crisis during the initial phase of the crisis 
between 2007 and 2008. Banks in the region had little direct exposure to the 
toxic products that weakened the balance sheets of many banks in the US 
or the EU. As noted above, the banking systems in the region are relatively 
small and external financing is not the principal form of funding, with 
many enterprises relying on own capital or retained earnings. Most banks 
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are almost exclusively deposit-funded, reducing their reliance on foreign 
markets. Lastly, several countries have a substantial proportion of publicly-
owned banks, for which credit provision is less elastic to underlying 
economic conditions but more on the well-connectedness of the borrowers. 
Second, for many SEMCs, the main impact of the global financial 
crisis came later, during 2009 and afterwards. As economic conditions in 
the EU – the region’s main partner – worsened, so did the external demand 
for the region’s products, leading to drops in exports, tourism receipts and 
remittances. In addition, bouts of risk-aversion among global investors 
lowered capital inflows. To cope with these external imbalances, local 
authorities devised economic stimulus programmes of their own. However, 
the responses remained relatively inadequate for most – but not all – 
energy importers across the region due to an inappropriate spectrum of 
available tools or restrictive fiscal space. The consequent current-account 
deficits and lower capital inflows led to crisis conditions through currency 
instability, undermined fiscal conditions and prepared the ground for the 
widespread civil unrest across the region. Many banking systems in the 
region contracted, facing increased currency risks (where such imbalances 
have built-up) as well as sharp drops in asset quality, profitability and 
solvency.  
Third, higher international commodity prices led to substantial 
hardship in the region. The price hikes were not entirely related to the 
global financial crisis. For example, a supply condition (i.e. bad weather) 
has been an important contributor in 2008 and in late 2010. However, 
economic stimulus programmes that led to resurging demand in several 
emerging economies, most notably China, has also been a key factor. Faced 
with higher commodity prices and a limited fiscal space, many 
governments in the region turned to modifying their energy and food 
subsidy programmes – exactly when they were needed. These conditions, 
especially the rapid rise in grain prices in late 2010, fed into the pre-existing 
mood of civil unrest and ignited the Arab spring events across the region. 
Concerns over political viability further undermined capital inflows, 
leading to heavy losses in foreign reserves. The turmoil saw the full-blown 
closing down of several banking systems, as in Libya and Syria. In other 
countries, the cumulative impact of rising prices, political instability and 
lower external demand further led to deleveraging and drops in asset 
quality.  
Turning to a country-by-country analysis, several patterns emerge. 
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Algeria has been largely unaffected by the global financial crisis. 
Bolstered by its healthy hydrocarbon exports, the country was able to build 
a substantial stabilisation fund, which it used as a general fiscal tool. 
However, the economy is highly dependent on international commodity 
prices, with Algeria being a leading wheat importer and natural gas 
exporter, which pose problems in times of increased volatility in 
international markets. The impact of the crisis on the country’s financial 
sector has been relatively mild. This has been partly due to the limited size 
of the banking system, with credit to the private sector representing only 
10% to 15% of national income between 2004 and 2011. In addition, most 
banks are publicly-owned, giving the public sector a direct role in the 
allocation of credit. Nevertheless, an underdeveloped financial sector 
should not be seen as a strength as it prevents the economy from reaching 
its fullest potential and diversifying into non-hydrocarbon sectors (IMF, 
2012a).  
The global crisis has had an important impact on Egypt. In particular, 
lower tourism receipts, lower exports and spikes in commodity prices 
adversely impacted the country’s external accounts. Fiscal conditions 
started worsening as the country’s generous energy and food subsidies 
kicked-in during 2009 and onwards. These external drivers have been 
partly responsible for the onset of violent civil strife that started in early 
2011 and culminated with the ousting of Hosni Mubarak. Turning to the 
financial system, although the Egyptian banking system remained 
relatively robust during the early phases of the global financial crisis, lower 
external demand and political instability have led to a substantial reversal 
of capital inflows. Anaemic domestic growth and reduced capital inflows 
have also undermined banks’ funding and liquidity conditions. Private 
credit as a percent of national income sharply contracted. Increased default 
rates due to economic hardship worsened asset qualities (IMF, 2012b).  
Israel’s economy faced a much milder challenge than many of its 
neighbours and its peers among advanced countries from the global 
financial crisis. Moreover, given Israel’s weak trade linkages to the MENA 
region, the Arab spring has had a limited first-degree impact. The banking 
system has proven particularly robust. The banks have had no direct 
exposure to troubled assets, including sovereign bonds. They are heavily 
reliant on domestic deposit-funding and although there is no explicit 
deposit insurance system, there is a strong backing in the form of implicit 
guarantees. This makes the system less reliant on funding conditions in 
international markets. The banking system is also well-capitalised due to a 
strong supervision culture (IMF, 2012c). A potential weakness, however, is 
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that banks have highly concentrated exposures to large domestic groups, 
which could be a challenge if global demand for Israel’s products slumps. 
Like many countries in the region, Jordan has experienced rapid 
growth in the decade leading up to the financial crisis, thanks to political 
stability and a relatively open economy. Nevertheless, its dependence on 
commodity imports, capital inflows and tourism receipts has been a source 
of considerable risk during the crisis. The regional unrest in neighbouring 
Syria is another major geopolitical risk impacting economic conditions. The 
banking system has proved resilient as it is relatively well-capitalised (IMF, 
2012d). However, asset quality has been persistently worsening since the 
beginning of the crisis due to poor performance of the domestic economy.  
Lebanon’s economy has not suffered much from the early phases of 
the global crisis, with annual growth remaining around 8% in 2007-10 on 
the back of a real-estate, tourism and retail trade boom. The positive 
conditions did not last, however, and worsened through 2011, most notably 
by a slowing domestic demand and increasing regional conflict risks. The 
banking sector has been relatively robust due to various reasons, including 
a dramatic improvement in non-performing loans, dropping to 4.0% of 
total loans in 2011, down from 17.7% in 2004 (IMF, 2012e). Nevertheless, 
the banks are heavily exposed to currency risks due to sizeable foreign-
currency lending and deposits.  
Thanks to structural and macroeconomic reforms, Morocco’s 
economy has gone through the global crisis relatively unscathed. However, 
since the country’s trading partners are predominantly European and due 
to a heavy reliance on commodities imports, the country is heavily exposed 
to external developments. Morocco signed a 24-month precautionary loan 
agreement with the IMF in the summer of 2012 to secure optional liquidity 
lines in case of heavy swings in external balances (IMF, 2012f). Amidst a 
relatively healthy economy and credible policy responses, the banking 
sector has grown considerably, despite the global crisis. Private credits by 
banks represented 71.2% of national income in 2011, up from only 42.6% in 
2004. Most of the bank funding is through local currency deposits, which 
contributes to the stability of the system (IMF, 2011). Moreover, the 
Moroccan authorities have successfully induced banks to improve asset 
quality, which resulted in a drop in the ratio of non-performing loans to 
total loans from nearly 20% in 2004 to 5% in 2011.  
Much like Libya, Syria has faced exceptional circumstances due to 
growing political conflict and eventually a full-blown civil war. The 
domestic conflict took off in early 2011, with nationwide demonstrations 
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demanding the resignation of President Bashar al-Assad, gradually turning 
into a bloody civil conflict. Prior to the civil war, the global financial crisis 
had a relatively modest impact on Syrian economy, mostly operating 
through reduced exports to Europe and the Gulf countries (IMF, 2010). The 
global crisis did trigger civil discontent, as the authorities moved to reduce 
energy subsidies in 2009. With international sanctions in place and the 
ongoing violence, it is unlikely that the economic conditions will improve 
in the near future. Within the financial services sector, several pre-existing 
conditions have limited the impact of the crisis. Credit to the private sector 
represented only 22.9% of national income in 2010. Like other 
underdeveloped systems, its banks were flush with liquidity, keeping 
substantial amounts of excess reserves. Despite privatisation efforts, nearly 
70% of all available credit was supplied by public banks in 2010, which 
distributed credit based on politically-oriented criteria.  
Much like other Maghreb countries, Tunisia has not been heavily 
impacted by the initial effects of the crisis. Nevertheless, its exposure to the 
EU through its exports, tourism and remittances has dealt a relatively 
heavy secondary shock to economic activity as early as 2009. Faced with 
lower external demand, the Tunisian government implemented a stimulus 
programme. The economic conditions once again worsened in late 2010, 
leading up to the overthrow of President Ben Ali. The political instability 
following the revolution and worsening economic conditions in the EU 
further challenged the economy. The widening current-account deficit (due 
to lower external demand) and lower capital inflows (due to political 
uncertainty) have put Tunisia’s fixed-rate currency policy in question, 
leading to a build-up of inflationary pressures and the erosion of official 
currency reserves. While Tunisia’s well-developed banking sector has 
remained relatively robust in 2009, it was put under severe stress in 2011. 
In particular, the improving tendency in the banking sector has slowed 
down considerably. Recent international assessments suggest that the 
conditions could be worse than what is reported due to inherent 
deficiencies in reporting (IMF, 2012g).  
Turkey has experienced both extremes of the global financial crisis, 
thanks primarily to its exposure to the EU, its open economy and its policy 
responses. It was one of the hardest-hit emerging economies by the global 
financial crisis in late 2008 and early 2009. The economy buoyed very 
quickly in subsequent years due to external and domestic developments. 
The low interest-rate regimes put into place in advanced countries 
increased portfolio inflows to many emerging economies, including 
Turkey. The domestic authorities responded by rate cuts as well as a short-
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lived fiscal expansion in 2009. These developments, along with the new 
mortgage law that was enacted in 2007, fed the country’s credit growth, 
with private credit bulging to 50% of national income at the end of 2011, up 
from only 17.3% in 2004. The growth of credit increased domestic demand 
for imports, which led to a worsening current-account deficit and rising 
inflationary expectations in 2011. Although banks are well-capitalised and 
asset quality remains healthy, the balance-sheet growth relied heavily on 
short-term foreign funding and not domestic savings, which can generate a 
sort of liquidity shortage should inflows suddenly stop. To prevent the 
unsustainable build-up of credit and ensure that capital inflows are 
oriented towards the long-term, the authorities have implemented – at 
times unorthodox – policies in 2011 and onwards. The policies have only 
been partly successful and led to a planned cooling of the economy in 2012, 
although there are indications that external risks remain (IMF, 2012h). 
3.3 Methodology and data 
The assessment of whether the financial crisis has had an impact on the 
banking systems is made by pre- and post-crisis comparisons of the 
following areas of interest and variables: 
- Liquidity 
o Loans-to-deposits (LTD = customer loans/customer deposits) 
- Performance 
o Net interest income margin (NIM = net interest income/total 
earning assets) 
o Return-on-equity (RoE = post-tax profits/total equity) 
o Return-on-assets (RoA = post-tax profits/total assets) 
- Efficiency 
o Cost-to-income ratio (CIR = non-interest expenditures/operating 
income) 
- Fragility 
o Non-performing loan ratio (NPL = impaired loans/total loans) 
o Capital ratio (CAR = total equity/total assets) 
o Z-score (Z= – [CAR + avg(RoA)]/stdev(RoA)).4 
                                                     
4 The calculation of the Z-score closely follows Boyd & Runkle (1993).  
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Due to data limitations on the maturity mismatches and the 
distribution of assets within the balance sheets, the evolution of liquidity 
conditions are assessed through the loan-to-deposit (LTD) ratio. In theory, 
in less-developed banking systems, most banks concentrate on retail 
activities. To that extent, a bank either has a choice between issuing local 
retail loans and buying government debt, which is more liquid than 
customer loans. On the other hand, if a bank has less customer deposits 
than customer loans (i.e. a retail funding gap), it will need to finance its 
retail activities through back-to-back market funding. Since market funding 
may dry out, as was clearly shown during the crisis, banks with a retail 
funding gap are more likely to run into liquidity problems. In either case, a 
low LTD ratio is indicative of a highly liquid position for the banks.  
Turning to the three performance indicators, the NIM determines 
how profitable a bank’s retail operations are. A lower value implies that the 
bank is paying too much for funding itself through deposits vis-à-vis the 
interest it charges on its loans. RoE (return on equity) is arguably the most 
popular indicator (for better or for worse) for assessing profitability. A 
greater value may imply that a bank is doing better in terms of net income 
generation. But it can also imply that it has less capital than its peers, which 
means that it should be interpreted with care. RoA (return on assets) 
performs the same function, but only with total assets as the denominator, 
thus not being subject to potential errors that RoE may have.  
For each one of the variables above, the importance of the impact of 
the crisis on the relevant variable is assessed by three complementary tests. 
First, the Wilcoxon signed-rank test is used to determine whether the pre- 
and post-crisis figures are from populations with the same distributions. 
Second, a k-sample test for equality of medians is used to complement the 
discussion to determine whether the samples are drawn from populations 
with the same central element, not focusing on other distributional 
attributes. Third, a simple first-order autoregressive regression AR(1) 
model with crisis dummies were run to account for trend growth. More 
specifically, the model is defined as:  
 tittiti CRISISYY ,1,,     (1) 
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Where Y is the indicator being tested and CRISIS is the crisis dummy. 
Furthermore, the tests were also repeated for two alternative crisis period 
specifications, 2008-11 and 2009-11, leading to a total of six separate tests.5 
The data were extracted from BvD’s Bankscope database 
encompassing the years 2003 to 2011 and nine of the 10 SEMCs covered in 
this study, namely Algeria, Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, Morocco, Syria, 
Tunisia and Turkey. Libya was eliminated due to inadequate number of 
observations (i.e. only two banks per year since 2007).  
Table 3.2 Descriptive statistics of the BvD’s Bankscope database 
 Obs. Mean St. dev. Min. Max. 
Loans-to-deposits (LTD) 982 93.77 482.83 5.65 9,166.00 
Non-performing loans (NPL) 624 6.67 7.63 0.00 58.67 
Net interest margin (NIM) 990 3.41 1.76 0.18 13.71 
Return-on-equity (RoE) 992 10.57 9.34 -94.87 34.17 
Return-on-assets (RoA) 992 1.07 0.94 -3.90 5.39 
Cost-to-income (CIR) 975 57.16 25.08 -324.48 355.57 
Capital ratio (CAR) 996 10.89 7.00 2.62 61.93 
Z-score (Z) 957 46.22 51.91 0.28 714.58 
Table 3.3 Key characteristics of sample coverage, 2003-11 
 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 
 Number of banks 
Algeria 7 10 9 9 14 10 12 13 11 
Egypt 20 16 13 13 17 14 17 21 18 
Israel 6 6 7 7 9 7 6 7 7 
Jordan 4 4 5 9 8 7 9 8 7 
Lebanon 28 22 24 24 25 27 28 27 22 
Morocco 6 7 7 8 7 8 9 9 8 
Syria  3 3 7 8 6 9 10 4 
Tunisia 11 10 10 11 11 11 12 11 10 
Turkey 16 18 21 22 23 23 20 21 22 
                                                     
5 An additional test was also conducted to ensure that the changing conditions 
were not due to an autoregressive trend evolution. It is important to highlight that 
since the time-series data are relatively short, this particular assessment will only 
be used to complement the discussion. 
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 Total assets (€ billions) 
Algeria 12.2 23.3 19.0 15.3 42.5 49.0 49.3 56.3 69.3 
Egypt 44.0 33.1 47.6 49.7 50.2 69.8 91.6 125.5 107.0 
Israel 135.5 100.1 167.5 120.4 182.4 133.4 161.4 236.0 248.2 
Jordan 4.4 4.1 27.6 30.9 31.5 35.1 38.4 41.0 44.8 
Lebanon 43.2 44.2 58.5 60.0 64.3 77.5 89.8 98.2 112.1 
Morocco 22.6 38.2 44.9 60.4 62.8 82.7 108.8 116.4 108.7 
Syria 0.0 11.9 1.3 14.7 15.5 18.4 19.4 22.1 3.3 
Tunisia 15.2 14.6 16.1 15.6 16.9 18.8 23.1 23.9 26.9 
Turkey 106.6 127.0 249.0 262.5 337.9 344.1 322.0 476.1 478.8 
3.4 Results 
3.4.1 Liquidity 
Anecdotal evidence and the prior literature amply show that the banks in 
certain SEMCs are flush with liquidity, (Ayadi et al. 2011; 2013 and 
references therein). Table 3.4 first shows the evolution of the LTD ratio (at 
the aggregate country-level). It then depicts the results of (W)ilcoxon 
signed-rank and (K)-sample equality of means tests, once under the 
assumption that the crisis started in 2008 and a second time under the 
assumption that it started in 2009. The figures confirm that the banks in 
Algeria, Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon and Syria collect more retail deposits than 
the retail loans issued, implying a potential abundance of liquid assets. It is 
important to highlight that while there is not much information on the 
liquidity of the rest of the assets, it is assumed that the rest of the assets 
mainly comprise relatively liquid government exposures, either in the form 
of bonds held or loans issued.  
While Algeria’s initial 2003 figure is heavily influenced by a single 
bank, customer loans represent only half of the customer deposits for the 
rest of the period, with no perceivable change over the entire period tested. 
The conditions also have not changed much in Israel, although the banking 
system appears to be better at diverting savings into loans for the general 
public. The LTD ratio has clearly improved in Jordan although not enough 
for the sampling tests to highlight a statistically significant change. The 
ratios for the Lebanese, Moroccan, Syrian and Turkish systems have also 
improved and significantly so. Interestingly, Tunisia is the only country in 
the sample whose banks regularly run retail funding gaps, i.e. less deposits 
than loans, requiring alternative forms of funding to fill the gap.  
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Table 3.4 Customer loan-to-deposits (LTD) ratio, 2003-11 (% of customer 
deposits) 
          
Significance of impact 
under crisis specification 
 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2008-11 2009-11 
          W K D W K D 
Algeria 102.2 57.6 35.8 64.2 35.9 39.6 54.0 52.1 51.6       
Egypt 56.9 51.9 48.9 48.0 42.3 43.3 40.7 40.3 40.9       
Israel 82.6 80.7 82.0 80.6 84.2 82.9 87.4 91.1 88.5       
Jordan 48.7 45.7 54.1 63.4 68.0 69.0 65.0 62.3 61.5       
Lebanon 24.1 24.1 23.9 26.4 28.7 32.1 30.3 39.1 33.8 +++ +++  ++ ++  
Morocco 64.4 58.2 60.4 66.5 71.9 82.5 86.9 91.7 100.6 +++ +++ +++ +++ +++  
Syria  32.9 25.1 45.7 57.0 78.0 69.8 68.9 63.0 +++ +++ + +++ +++  
Tunisia 110.3 103.9 101.1 99.2 94.7 97.6 91.3 97.9 105.7       
Turkey 55.9 53.6 63.2 73.0 81.7 84.1 87.7 86.9 100.6 +++ +++ --- +++ +++ -- 
Notes: The country-specific figures are calculated by aggregating the elements for the ratio, i.e. 
treating the entire system as a single bank, to ensure that the impact of larger banks is 
appropriately reflected. The significance tests for the impact of the crisis identify whether the 
changes have significantly improved or worsened at the 1% (identified with “+++” or “---“), 5% 
(“++” or “--”) or 10% (“+” or “-“) levels. “W” stands for Wilcoxon signed-rank test, “K” stands for 
k-sample test for equality of medians and “D” stands for the significance of the crisis dummy in 
the AR(1) model.  
Apart from a direct impact of the crisis, the improving LTD ratios 
may also reflect the trends in the relevant banking systems. A full-blown 
analysis is made difficult due to the unavailability of a long time-series. 
However, the AR(1) regressions produce relatively significant coefficients 
for the crisis dummies for Morocco and Syria for the 2008-11 crisis 
specification. For Turkey, the time-series analysis shows that the trend 
improvement in the ratio may have slowed down due to the crisis. These 
results imply that for Lebanon, the depicted changes are more likely to be 
due to trend improvements rather than an impact of the crisis.  
3.4.2 Performance 
The evolution of the performances of the banks was assessed through three 
related variables. Table 3.5 depicts the evolution of the net interest margin 
(NIM). A simple glance over the figures shows that the profitability of retail 
operations has improved in Egypt, especially following 2008. The results 
from AR(1) regressions show that the improvements are due to the crisis, at 
least according to the 2008-11 crisis specification. This paradoxical result 
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could be due to increased risk premia charged by banks in an increasingly 
uncertain environment (more on this below). In turn, the changes in the 
NIM for Lebanon, Morocco and Syria appear to be related to trend-growth 
rather than the crisis. Lastly, the AR(1) results hint at a significant negative 
impact of the crisis in Algeria and Jordan once trend growth is accounted 
for.  
Table 3.5 Net interest margin in selected SEMCs, 2003-11 (% of total earning 
assets) 
          
Significance of impact 
under crisis specification 
 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2008-11 2009-11 
          W K D W K D 
Algeria 3.5 2.8 3.8 4.6 2.8 2.7 2.4 2.2 2.1   -   - 
Egypt 1.3 1.6 1.8 1.6 1.7 1.8 2.2 2.3 2.6 +++ +++ +++ +++ +++  
Israel 2.6 2.7 2.6 2.6 2.3 2.5 2.2 2.5 2.3       
Jordan 3.3 3.4 3.0 3.2 3.3 3.5 3.5 3.3 3.2      -- 
Lebanon 2.8 2.4 2.5 2.7 2.2 2.6 2.2 2.3 2.3 -- --  --- ---  
Morocco 4.0 4.2 4.1 3.4 3.4 3.3 3.3 3.4 3.2 --      
Syria  0.0 1.7 3.4 4.0 3.7 2.9 2.4 3.7 ++      
Tunisia 2.7 2.3 2.4 2.6 2.9 3.0 2.8 2.7 2.6       
Turkey 5.6 6.6 4.6 4.6 4.9 4.6 5.7 4.4 3.8       
Notes: The country-specific figures are calculated by aggregating the elements for the ratio, i.e. 
treating the entire system as a single bank, to ensure that the impact of larger banks is 
appropriately reflected. The significance tests for the impact of the crisis identify whether the 
changes have significantly improved or worsened at the 1% (identified with “+++” or “---“), 5% 
(“++” or “--”) or 10% (“+” or “-“) levels. “W” stands for Wilcoxon signed-rank test, “K” stands for 
k-sample test for equality of medians and “D” stands for the significance of the crisis dummy in 
the AR(1) model.  
Table 3.6 gives the country-level RoE figures. The figures improve for 
Algeria (only for 2008-11 crisis specification), Lebanon, Syria and Tunisia. 
Deeper analysis, however, shows the trend improvements and not the crisis 
had a role in these developments. Moreover, in the case of Syria, the AR(1) 
results under the 2009-11 specification hint that the crisis actually slowed 
down these improvements. In turn, profitability worsened under the 2008-
11 crisis specification in Israel and (less strongly) in Turkey, while the drop 
in profitability in Jordan was a trend process and not due to the crisis. 
Egypt has also faced a slight drop in profitability under the 2008-11 crisis 
specification after controlling for trend growth. 
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Table 3.6 Return-on-equity in selected SEMCs, 2003-11 (% of total equity) 
          
Significance of impact 
under crisis specification 
 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2008-11 2009-11 
          W K D W K D 
Algeria 3.7 5.0 7.6 16.0 14.7 16.4 16.1 14.1 16.2  ++     
Egypt 7.0 10.4 10.8 8.2 14.1 8.7 13.4 14.3 12.4   -    
Israel 7.7 10.8 13.3 14.3 14.9 3.0 7.9 9.5 10.0 --- -- ---    
Jordan 11.7 10.7 12.7 9.8 10.2 10.6 7.3 5.9 8.1 --- ---  --- --  
Lebanon 11.7 10.1 11.5 10.8 11.8 13.7 12.9 14.8 14.2 ++ +++  ++ +++  
Morocco 7.5 8.5 13.2 13.9 14.5 14.3 13.2 12.3 12.5   ---    
Syria  -0.3 2.1 -5.0 13.0 19.9 12.0 10.8 8.1 ++ ++    -- 
Tunisia 6.3 4.0 5.9 6.2 7.4 9.2 8.8 8.2 4.6 ++ ++     
Turkey 16.5 16.9 18.3 19.6 21.8 17.2 18.3 18.4 15.1 --  -    
Notes: The country-specific figures are calculated by aggregating the elements for the ratio, i.e. 
treating the entire system as a single bank, to ensure that the impact of larger banks is 
appropriately reflected. The significance tests for the impact of the crisis identify whether the 
changes have significantly improved or worsened at the 1% (identified with “+++” or “---“), 5% 
(“++” or “--”) or 10% (“+” or “-“) levels. “W” stands for Wilcoxon signed-rank test, “K” stands for 
k-sample test for equality of medians and “D” stands for the significance of the crisis dummy in 
the AR(1) model.  
The results for RoA depicted in Table 3.7 tell a similar story. Indeed, 
profitability increases for Algeria, Lebanon, Syria and Tunisia. With the 
exception of Lebanon under the 2008-11 crisis specification, these appear to 
be entirely due to trend improvements. The strong performance of 
Lebanese banks despite the crisis will be a recurring theme below. The 
Israeli and Turkish banks appear to have lower profitability under the 
2008-11 crisis specification once the trend process was accounted for. The 
findings also highlight weakly worsening conditions not only in Egypt (as 
above) but also in Jordan and Morocco once the AR(1) term is included. 
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Table 3.7 Return-on-assets in selected SEMCs, 2003-11 (% of total assets) 
          
Significance of impact 
under crisis specification 
 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2008-11 2009-11 
          W K D W K D 
Algeria 0.2 0.2 0.4 1.1 0.8 1.0 1.6 1.4 1.6 +++ +++  +++ +++  
Egypt 0.4 0.6 0.7 0.5 0.9 0.5 0.9 0.9 0.9   -   - 
Israel 0.4 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 0.2 0.5 0.6 0.6   ---    
Jordan 1.3 1.3 1.4 1.6 1.6 1.6 1.1 0.9 1.2 --- --  --- --- - 
Lebanon 0.7 0.6 0.8 0.9 0.9 1.1 1.1 1.2 1.1 +++ +++ + +++ +++  
Morocco 0.7 0.7 1.2 1.2 1.2 1.1 1.1 1.2 1.1   -    
Syria  0.0 0.2 -0.6 2.2 2.2 1.3 1.2 0.9 ++      
Tunisia 0.7 0.4 0.6 0.7 0.8 1.2 1.1 1.1 0.5 +++ +++   ++  
Turkey 2.5 2.1 2.1 2.1 2.5 1.8 2.3 2.2 1.6 --  -    
Notes: The country-specific figures are calculated by aggregating the elements for the ratio, i.e. 
treating the entire system as a single bank, to ensure that the impact of larger banks is 
appropriately reflected. The significance tests for the impact of the crisis identify whether the 
changes have significantly improved or worsened at the 1% (identified with “+++” or “---“), 5% 
(“++” or “--”) or 10% (“+” or “-“) levels. “W” stands for Wilcoxon signed-rank test, “K” stands for 
k-sample test for equality of medians and “D” stands for the significance of the crisis dummy in 
the AR(1) model.  
3.4.3 Efficiency 
The country-level aggregate CIR figures and the corresponding 
statistical tests are depicted in Table 3.8. While the figures show substantial 
degree of variability, mainly due to heavy losses suffered in some countries 
(i.e. Syria in 2007), several common observations emerge. Israel has clearly 
faced increasing costs under the crisis specification 2008-11. This is the case 
even after controlling for trend growth. Actually, the coefficient estimate 
for the crisis dummy in the AR(1) regression for Israel was 4% (not shown 
here), which points to a remarkable deterioration.  
The CIR figures have dropped for several countries, including 
Lebanon, Morocco and Tunisia, which point to lower costs and increased 
efficiency. However, these improvements turn out to be related to trend 
developments, with the exception of Lebanon where efficiency gains 
actually became speedier during the crisis. This unexpected result attests to 
the strength of the Lebanese banking system during the crisis.  
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Table 3.8 Cost-to-income ratio (CIR), 2003-11 (% of operating income) 
          
Significance of impact 
under crisis 
specification 
 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2008-11 2009-11 
          W K D W K D 
Algeria 41.7 49.6 23.9 62.8 48.2 28.4 36.7 32.5 37.6       
Egypt 51.2 48.9 52.3 55.1 48.4 39.9 46.0 37.9 51.8       
Israel 61.2 57.6 65.8 66.3 64.9 76.5 64.5 68.4 70.4 +++ ++ +    
Jordan 52.5 35.7 57.1 45.2 44.0 46.7 46.3 45.0 47.9       
Lebanon 54.1 54.7 61.0 53.5 54.8 52.5 50.4 47.9 48.6  -- -- -- --- - 
Morocco 53.8 51.1 52.7 51.9 49.5 54.8 49.3 48.5 50.5  --   --  
Syria  144.0  1,444.5 -19.3 22.1 25.3 27.6 42.2       
Tunisia 62.9 55.9 71.3 57.6 53.9 47.9 52.1 49.3 53.6 -- --     
Turkey 72.0 43.3 54.4 50.6 48.1 50.6 43.1 47.8 52.8       
Notes: The country-specific figures are calculated by aggregating the elements for the ratio, i.e. 
treating the entire system as a single bank, to ensure that the impact of larger banks is 
appropriately reflected. The significance tests for the impact of the crisis identify whether the 
changes have significantly improved or worsened at the 1% (identified with “+++” or “---“), 5% 
(“++” or “--”) or 10% (“+” or “-“) levels. “W” stands for Wilcoxon signed-rank test, “K” stands for 
k-sample test for equality of medians and “D” stands for the significance of the crisis dummy in 
the AR(1) model.  
3.4.4 Fragility and risk 
Fragility and risks in the banking system are assessed through three 
distinct indicators. The evolution of the capital ratios of banks will be 
considered first in Table 3.9. It is clear from the figures that capital ratios 
have improved during the crisis in almost all of the sampled countries, 
except Turkey although this appears to be due to the trend.6 In particular, 
CAR increased in Algeria, Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, Morocco and 
Syria. Once trend developments are controlled by the AR(1) model, the 
crisis had a positive impact on CAR only in Egypt, Morocco and Syria.  
.  
                                                     
6 This result is possibly due to the increasing leveraging of the Turkish banking 
system through increasing reliance on foreign short-term debt, the principle force 
behind the spectacular loan growth.  
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Table 3.9 Capital ratio (CAR), 2003-11 (% of total assets) 
          
Significance of impact 
under crisis specification 
 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2008-11 2009-11 
          W K D W K D 
Algeria 6.6 4.5 5.5 6.8 5.5 6.3 9.7 10.2 9.7 ++ +++  +++ +++ + 
Egypt 5.7 6.2 6.2 5.8 6.6 5.8 6.8 6.6 6.9 +++ +++ + +++ +++  
Israel 5.4 5.5 5.6 5.9 6.2 6.1 6.6 6.5 6.0 ++   ++   
Jordan 10.7 11.9 11.4 16.4 15.9 15.0 15.3 15.4 15.1  ++   ++  
Lebanon 6.0 6.1 7.0 8.2 7.8 7.8 8.1 7.9 7.4 +++ +++  +++ +++  
Morocco 9.2 8.8 8.9 8.7 8.5 7.8 8.5 9.5 8.7   +++   ++ 
Syria  4.2 7.9 12.2 16.7 11.1 10.7 11.6 11.7   ++   ++ 
Tunisia 10.5 10.7 10.5 11.4 11.1 13.2 12.5 12.9 11.7       
Turkey 15.1 12.7 11.4 10.5 11.4 10.3 12.4 12.0 10.9     --  
Notes: The country-specific figures are calculated by aggregating the elements for the ratio, i.e. 
treating the entire system as a single bank, to ensure that the impact of larger banks is 
appropriately reflected. The significance tests for the impact of the crisis identify whether the 
changes have significantly improved or worsened at the 1% (identified with “+++” or “---“), 5% 
(“++” or “--”) or 10% (“+” or “-“) levels. “W” stands for Wilcoxon signed-rank test, “K” stands for 
k-sample test for equality of medians and “D” stands for the significance of the crisis dummy in 
the AR(1) model.  
The second fragility and risk indicator, summarised in Table 3.10, 
considers the share of impaired loans on banks’ loan portfolios. Although 
the data on impaired loans are highly incomplete (and incomparable due to 
distinct impairment standards), the figures show clearly worsening 
conditions for several countries. In particular, NPL ratios have increased in 
Jordan, Morocco, Syria and Turkey, in all cases even after accounting for 
trend growth. In the case of Morocco, the results are less reliable due to 
limited data; however, the NPL rates in Jordan have nearly doubled during 
the crisis. 
The last indicator considered in the section is a distance-to-default 
estimate, or the Z-score. More specifically, the figures show the size of a 
shock, in multiples of standard deviation for RoA for a bank, which can 
bring that bank to default. If the crisis has made banks weaker, the so-
called Z-score should drop, implying that the bank is closer to a default. 
Surprisingly, Overall, using indicators or liquidity, performance, efficiency, 
risk and fragility, the impacts of the crisis have been mild on the banking 
systems in the SEMCs, with some variation between countries under 
investigation.  
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Table 3.11 points at several improvements. In particular, banks have 
become less fragile in Algeria, Jordan and Syria. The results of the AR(1) 
model show that these improvements were due to the crisis in Algeria and 
Syria but not in Jordan. More expectedly, banks became more fragile in 
Israel and Tunisia, although in the later case the worsening conditions are 
part of the trend. Although the sample statistics point at increased fragility 
of Egyptian banks, the AR(1) model shows that the crisis has only slowed 
down the trend worsening, which has clearly hit the country’s banks as 
early as 2007.  
Table 3.10 Non-performing loans (NPL), 2003-11 (% of total loans) 
          
Significance of impact under 
crisis specification 
 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2008-11 2009-11 
          W K D W K D 
Algeria  0.5 2.8 3.2 2.3 1.7 1.8 3.4 2.7       
Egypt  8.1 10.1 11.7 1.7 2.5 7.0 11.2 8.3       
Israel 8.7 7.4 7.9 5.3 4.6 4.9 5.4 3.7 2.9 --- ---  --- ---  
Jordan 6.0 5.3 6.0 6.4 4.9 5.0 9.4 11.7 8.4 ++  +++ +++  +++ 
Lebanon 12.8 12.0 9.4 9.1 7.2 11.8 9.9 7.1 5.5 -- --  -- -- - 
Morocco    4.9 3.8 3.8 4.1 4.4 5.3   +++   +++ 
Syria    0.3 0.3 0.5 1.4 2.9 6.8 +++ ++ ++ +++ +++ + 
Tunisia  22.1 29.3 20.2 18.9 14.1 12.5 10.2 11.1 --- --  -- --  
Turkey 5.3 2.8 3.5 2.8 2.6 3.2 5.5 3.9 3.0 +++ +++ +++ +++ +++ ++ 
Notes: The country-specific figures are calculated by aggregating the elements for the ratio, i.e. 
treating the entire system as a single bank, to ensure that the impact of larger banks is 
appropriately reflected. The significance tests for the impact of the crisis identify whether the 
changes have significantly improved or worsened at the 1% (identified with “+++” or “---“), 5% 
(“++” or “--”) or 10% (“+” or “-“) levels. “W” stands for Wilcoxon signed-rank test, “K” stands for 
k-sample test for equality of medians and “D” stands for the significance of the crisis dummy in 
the AR(1) model.  
Overall, using indicators or liquidity, performance, efficiency, risk 
and fragility, the impacts of the crisis have been mild on the banking 
systems in the SEMCs, with some variation between countries under 
investigation.  
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Table 3.11 Z-score, 2003-11 (standard deviations of RoA) 
          
Significance of impact under 
crisis specification 
 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2008-11 2009-11 
          W K D W K D 
Algeria 19.3 20.8 22.1 20.6 29.8 30.6 42.3 39.9 38.5 +++ +++ + +++ +++  
Egypt 47.4 39.1 65.0 53.7 29.8 24.3 33.1 30.7 33.3 --- ---  --- --- +++ 
Israel 22.0 26.9 25.8 30.3 31.6 29.9 27.7 29.6 30.8   -    
Jordan 35.3 39.7 36.2 39.9 35.3 46.5 48.4 47.5 49.2 ++ +++   +++  
Lebanon 57.2 65.6 69.7 55.0 67.3 60.0 61.1 56.6 58.5       
Morocco 62.2 57.4 62.4 164.4 70.2 72.4 71.2 78.2 68.1       
Syria  24.6 10.9 16.1 17.1 36.2 39.8 39.6 58.4 +++ +++ +++ +++ +++ ++ 
Tunisia 110.2 56.3 59.0 108.8 58.8 69.9 43.6 47.5 47.4     --  
Turkey 29.9 31.6 29.4 31.0 33.9 31.3 34.2 32.6 28.5       
Notes: The country-specific figures are calculated by plain averages. The significance tests for the 
impact of the crisis identify whether the changes have significantly improved or worsened at the 
1% (identified with “+++” or “---“), 5% (“++” or “--”) or 10% (“+” or “-“) levels. “W” stands for 
Wilcoxon signed-rank test, “K” stands for k-sample test for equality of medians and “D” stands 
for the significance of the crisis dummy in the AR(1) model.  
3.5 The impact of crisis on capital markets 
The challenges in assessing the extent of cross-border contagion are related 
to identifying an estimation corresponding to the different modes of 
transmission while at the same time accounting for inherent statistical 
problems. The first challenge derives from the definition of the main 
concept. Contagion is often defined as a significant and persistent increase 
in cross-border linkages after a shock event. The concept should not be 
confused with interdependence, but should rather be seen as an uptick in 
stock market co-movements during the crisis. Since many (possibly non-
stationary) factors may explain the underlying processes, the challenge is 
using a methodology that clearly pinpoints the changing nature of linkages 
during the crisis periods. Second, and more technically, the unadjusted 
measures of stock co-variances suffer heavily from heteroscedasticity since 
volatility naturally increases during crisis periods. As first noted by Forbes 
& Rigobon (2002), this synthetic increase in correlations could lead to 
upward-biased assessments of contagion and should be appropriately 
controlled for. 
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The procedures used in this study respond to these challenges by 
using two alternative estimation techniques. First, a measure of the change 
in the responsiveness of stock market indices to global events is developed 
following the structural time series model of Moosa (2010). In essence, the 
structural time series models control for various forms of factors that may 
explain the evolution of stock market indices. Second, the dynamic 
correlation analyses based on Chiang et al. (2007) and more recently 
Hwang et al. (2011) are used to assess the extent to which stock market 
returns are correlated. Since returns display increasing volatility during 
negative shock periods, a generalised autoregressive conditional 
heteroscedastic (GARCH) model was used to control for volatility in error 
terms. Moreover, in order to assess whether the correlations have changed 
persistently following the default of Lehman Brothers and the Arab spring, 
the dynamic conditional correlations (DCC-GARCH) were calculated using 
Engle’s (2002) procedures.  
3.6 Stock market conditions from 2007 to 2012 
Figure 3.2 gives an overview of the evolution of the stock market indices in 
eight SEMCs, adjusted for US dollar terms. As is clear from the figures, the 
impact of the financial crisis varies from country to country. In particular, 
as of November 2012, the Israeli, Tunisian and Turkish stock exchanges 
have outperformed the US Dow-Jones index during the global crisis. At the 
same time, the Egyptian, Jordanian, Palestinian and Syrian indices 
remained below their January 2007 levels.  
The figures also highlight a positive linkage between commodity 
prices and stock markets in 2007-08. This is surprising since the countries in 
the sample are mostly commodity importers, which should suffer from the 
adverse wealth effects of high energy prices. The relationship is most likely 
a latent effect of growing production in emerging markets, including most 
notably Brazil, Russia, India and China (BRICs), and the consequent rise in 
global demand for oil (Hamilton, 2009). To put it simply, the rising oil 
prices probably serve as a proxy for growing output and consequently 
growing investment opportunities in emerging and frontier economies. For 
the years 2007-08, the rise in oil prices appear to have led to a substantial 
rise in stock market indices in many of the countries covered in the study. 
For those years, one can say that the close links with commodity prices is 
evidence that emerging markets have de-coupled themselves from the EU 
and the US capital markets, which fared worse. The more recent (and the 
more persistent) spike in commodity prices of 2011-12, however, has not 
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been equally beneficial for the SEMCs, which is most likely due to the Arab 
spring and the worsening of the eurozone crisis.  
Turning to a detailed analysis of each country, in Egypt the evolution 
of the EGX-30 index has been closely related to the price of commodities, at 
least prior to the onset of the Arab spring events. The rapid rise in the index 
has also overlapped with the merger of the Cairo and Alexandria stock 
exchanges (CASE) into the Egyptian Exchange in 2008. In May 2008, the 
decision of the government to increase domestic fuel prices, amidst the 
continuing rise in international prices, has led to a substantial drop of 70% 
in the local currency value of the index, from its peak on 5 May 2008 to its 
trough on 5 February 2009. The worsening global conjecture, especially in 
the aftermath of the default of Lehman Brothers in September 2008, has 
probably also contributed to this severe loss in value. The index has fallen 
around 25% during the first three months of 2011 in the midst of the Arab 
spring and the ousting of President Mubarak, resulting in the closing of the 
country’s stock exchange for around eight weeks. The losses continued 
after the exchange resumed its operations in March 2011, with the EGX-30 
reaching an historical low by the end of 2011. Since then, the exchange has 
been on an upward trajectory.  
Figure 3.2 Stock market indices in SEMCs, January 2007-November 2012 
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(b) Israel (TA-100) 
 
(c) Jordan (ASE Free float index) 
 
(d) Lebanon (MSCI, Large & Mid cap) 
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(e) Morocco (MSCI, Large & Mid cap) 
 
(f) Palestine (Al-Quds) 
 
(g) Tunisia (TUNINDEX) 
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(h) Turkey (ISE-100) 
Notes: All figures are normalised so that beginning January 2007 is set to 100. All figures are 
adjusted using weekly US dollar averages. For the US and the EU, the Dow Jones Composite 
Index (DJCI) and Euronext-100 have been used. In Morocco and Lebanon, the MSCI index 
was preferred to national sources due to the limited availability of data for earlier years. 
Sources: National stock exchange websites; MSCI. 
The evolution of Israel’s stock market more closely follows the 
international markets, with the exception of a phase of over-performance 
between early 2009 and early 2011, despite worsening global financial 
conditions and the Gaza Flotilla raid in May 2010. The sharp drop in the 
index in August 2011 overlapped with the Standard and Poor’s 
downgrading of the US sovereign debt and growing troubles in the 
eurozone periphery. Since then, the market evolution has closely followed 
the international markets and has failed to benefit from the re-emergence of 
investment flows to emerging and potentially high-growth countries, such 
as Israel.  
Jordan’s stock market has followed the evolution of oil prices prior to 
2009. Much like in Egypt, this most likely reflects growing interest in 
Jordan as a frontier high-growth economy. Indeed, the foreign interest has 
led to a rapid growth in Jordan’s financial services and real estate sectors 
prior to October 2008. Persistent losses thereon are most likely due to the 
impact of the financial crisis as well as growing tensions within the region.  
In the case of Lebanon, the stock market index closely follows the 
commodities markets prior to 2011. Once again, this is most likely due to 
growing interest among international investors in alternative emerging 
regions. It is important to note that the Lebanese market is one of the 
largest in the region, with a market capitalisation of nearly 30% of GDP in 
2011. Although the market has outperformed the EU and US indices for 
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most of the crisis, the growing regional tensions have led to persistent 
losses (much like in Jordan) since early 2010.  
Morocco’s stock market has followed a similar pattern of Jordan and 
Lebanon, inching up with increasing commodity prices, which highlight 
growing demand for oil from emerging economies, possibly on the back of 
an increased interest in emerging economies among investors. Much like 
the two countries, the index has remained relatively stable (in USD terms) 
and consistently outperformed the EU and US averages up until late 2011. 
The losses starting in the first half of 2011 are likely to be at least partly due 
to the Arab spring, although alternative issues, such as the slowdown in 
global demand, can also be at play.  
The Palestinian stock exchange also appears to have benefited from 
increased interest from international investors in early 2008. The re-
balancing act came swiftly, as in other stock exchanges in the region, with 
the fall of Lehman Brothers in September 2008 and in the months that 
followed. However, the USD-adjusted value of the index has remained 
relatively constant since then, which is significant given the substantial 
regional risks and ongoing conflict with Israel.  
Tunisia’s stock market appears to be the best-performing market in 
the sample, at least in terms of providing consistent excess returns over the 
US and EU markets. The Tunindex continued its upward trend in most of 
the financial crisis with the exception of a relatively small drop in the 
second half of 2008. The market was buoyant in most of 2009 and reached 
historical levels by the end of 2010. However, the Arab spring did have a 
short negative impact, albeit short-lived, with accumulated losses of 15% 
between January and February 2011. Following those dates, the index 
remained relatively stable up until November 2012.  
Much like that of Israel, Turkey’s stock market has been highly 
sensitive to the changing global conditions. In particular, the Istanbul Stock 
Exchange index (ISE-100) has dropped a staggering 60% in the second half 
of 2008 following the Lehman bankruptcy. After this event, the market 
index inched upwards until 2011. Turkey’s exposure to the EU could be the 
main force behind the drop in the stock market index in early 2011, 
corresponding to the eurozone crisis. Since early 2012, however, the ISE-100 
index has improved consistently, which is most likely due to the re-
emergence of the country as an alternative investment destination globally.  
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3.7 Methodology 
The data used in the contagion analysis are based on weekly averages from 
eight stock markets in the region and key commodity indices from 
beginning of 2006 until November 2012.7 Stock market indices are obtained 
from MSCI and national sources, with the latter being the preferred source 
whenever available. For commodity prices, the Dow Jones-UBS commodity 
indices on oil and wheat were used.8 
As noted above, two complementary methods are used to assess the 
presence of independence and contagion effects.  
3.7.1 Index trend model 
The first structural time series model relies on the techniques developed by 
Harvey (1989) and Harvey & Shephard (1993). The structural system is 
used to control for non-stochastic trends and stochastic attributes by 
representing the observed time series in terms of its unobserved 
components. The procedure allows for a better estimation of whether 
interdependence has taken place.  
More specifically, the model can be specified by the system of 
equations: 
 t
o
ttt pp   1lnln   (2) 
 ,1 ttt      (3) 
Where p is the stock market index (defined in US dollars), μ is the 
stochastic trend term, ε and η are normal and random walk errors and δ is 
the sensitivity of the considered market to the origin (i.e. US, EU or 
commodity) market. A sharp rise in the sensitivity coefficient from one 
period to the next one implies a stronger independence over time, 
suggesting that contagion could have taken place.  
                                                     
7 Although daily data were available for all countries, they were not used in the 
analysis due to different vacation days within each country. Note that all stock 
indices were adjusted in US dollar terms. 
8 The Dow Jones-UBS commodity indices are based on futures prices for physical 
commodities, which specify a pre-determined date for the delivery of the 
underlying physical commodity. In order to maintain a long position, expiring 
contracts must be sold and replaced by purchases of contracts that are farther from 
maturity, also known as rolling futures positions.  
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3.7.2 Return volatility model 
In addition to the structural time series model, the second approach 
considers the possibility that that market volatility may change over time, 
potentially biasing the correlation estimates for the market indices.  
 t
o
ttt rrr    12110   (4) 
Where r is the vector of index returns, ro represents the index returns 
in the origin country (i.e. US), and the error term is ),0(~1 ttt HN , 
conditional on information set in a prior period. In line with Engle’s (2002) 
dynamic conditional correlation (GARCH-DCC) model, the multivariate 
conditional co-variance matrix H is assumed to be decomposable into time-
varying standard deviation and correlation matrices:  
 tttt DRDH  .   (5) 
The estimation process follows a two-stage procedure. Intuitively, the 
first stage estimates the time-dependent standard deviations using a simple 
GARCH model. In the second stage, these estimates are used to adjust the 
error terms from the original regression to estimate dynamic motion to 
characterise the correlations. More specifically, in the first stage, 
GARCH(1,1) models are estimated for each one of the stock returns, 
resulting in estimates for standard deviations of the error terms, or: 
).(diag itt hD   
In the second stage, the stock return residuals are transformed by the 
estimated standard deviations:  
ititit hu / , 
Which are used to estimate the dynamic correlation parameters,
)( ,tijtR  .9 The evolution of the correlation parameters in the model is 
determined dynamically by a linear combination of the prior correlation as 
well as the unconditional and actual (lagged) covariances of u: 
 tttttt QuuuuEQ    ]'[]'[)1( 11   (6) 
Where .1   The dynamic correlations are then found by scaling 
)( ,tijt qQ  , so that  
                                                     
9 See Engle (2002) and Chiang et al. (2007) for more details on the GARCH-DCC 
model and its properties. 
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 ./ ,,,, tjjtiitijtij qqq  (7) 
As noted above, contagion has to be distinguished from a peak in 
correlations following a rare event. For that purpose, the dynamic 
correlations obtained by the procedure above are further regressed using 
time dummies. More specifically, the persistence of the contagion effect is 
assessed using an AR(1) model: 
 tijttijtij eD ,21,10,    ,  (8) 
Where ),,0(~1 ttt MNe  M is the conditional variance of e 
determined by a GARCH(1,1) process and D is the time dummies for crisis 
periods. The effect of contagion can then be deemed to be persistent if the 
estimates for 2  are significantly different than zero.  
3.8 Results 
3.8.1 Index-trend model 
The results for the index-trend model are provided in Table 3.12 and Table 
3.14. The correlations consider three distinct periods. The pre-crisis period 
runs from 1 January 2007 until the bankruptcy procedures of Lehman 
Brothers, 15 September 2008. The post-crisis period starts the day following 
the Lehman event until the ousting of Mubarak on 10 January 2011. The 
post-Mubarak period runs until the end of the sampling period on 5 
November 2012. 
The correlation coefficients between the region’s stock markets and 
commodity indices highlight several interesting findings. First, oil and 
grain prices are strongly and positively correlated with the stock markets of 
all countries except Lebanon, Morocco, Palestine and Syria. For Tunisia, 
grain prices have a positive impact on Tunisia’s stock market returns, 
although the impact is relatively small. The commodity prices heavily 
influence the market returns in the relatively advanced countries, such as 
Israel, Turkey, the US and Europe.  
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Table 3.12 Correlations with commodity indices 
 Brent oil Grains 
 
Entire 
period 
Pre-
crisis 
Post-
crisis 
Post-
Mubarak 
Entire 
period 
Pre-
crisis 
Post-
crisis 
Post-
Mubarak 
Egypt 0.17*** 0.24*** 0.24*** 0.16 0.23*** 0.12 0.25* 0.41*** 
Israel 0.23*** 0.09 0.28*** 0.24*** 0.18*** 0.04 0.32*** 0.12 
Jordan 0.08*** 0.01 0.08* 0.00 0.11*** 0.12 0.09 0.07** 
Lebanon 0.03 -0.1* 0.06 -0.0 0.04 -0.0 0.08 0.03 
Morocco -0.0 -0.0 -0.1*** 0.05 0.06 -0.0 0.07 0.10 
Palestine -0.0 -0.1** 0.00 0.02 0.03 -0.0 0.16* -0.0 
Syria 0.00 .. 0.02 -0.0 0.00 .. 0.07 -0.0 
Tunisia 0.01 -0.0 0.00 0.11 0.07** -0.0 0.03 0.14** 
Turkey 0.31*** 0.07 0.35*** 0.27*** 0.19*** 0.05 0.31*** 0.11 
US 0.22*** -0.0 0.31*** 0.29*** 0.24*** -0.0 0.42*** 0.21*** 
Europe 0.29*** -0.0 0.35*** 0.40*** 0.28*** -0.0 0.48*** 0.27*** 
Notes: Figures depict the sensitivity of the stock market returns to commodity prices, as defined in 
equation (2). ***,**,* stand for significance at 1%, 5% and 10%.  
Turning to how correlations evolved throughout the sampling 
period, the results show that the correlations clearly increased in Israel, 
Turkey, the US, and Europe after the crisis (up until the ousting of 
Mubarak). The same is also true only for grains in Egypt, especially after 
the onset of the Arab spring. The correlation with grains also increased in 
the post-crisis period, up until January 2011, for Palestine. The correlation 
of the market returns with Brent oil increased in Jordan, but only weakly 
so.  
The correlation of the market returns with the US and EU markets, as 
depicted in Table 3.13, highlight a close relationship between these 
countries. Clearly, the correlations with the US and EU are extremely 
strong for Egypt, Israel and Turkey. The results show that the relationships 
have not increased after the crisis for most cases, except for Egypt (with the 
US only), Tunisia (only weakly) and Jordan (relatively strongly so). Even 
though Israel and Turkey’s stock markets display the closest 
interdependence with both the EU and the US, the relationship has not 
become more sensitive after the crisis or the ousting of Mubarak.  
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Table 3.13 Correlations with the US and Europe 
 US EU 
 
Entire 
period 
Pre-
crisis 
Post-
crisis 
Post-
Mubarak 
Entire 
period 
Pre-
crisis 
Post-
crisis 
Post-
Mubarak 
Egypt 0.55*** 0.40* 0.57*** 0.62*** 0.64*** 0.75*** 0.66*** 0.59*** 
Israel 0.77*** 0.90*** 0.72*** 0.88*** 0.64*** 0.80*** 0.61*** 0.55*** 
Jordan 0.17*** -0.0 0.27*** 0.04 0.22*** 0.22** 0.30*** 0.05* 
Lebanon 0.19*** 0.19 0.17** 0.13 0.18*** 0.16 0.16** 0.15** 
Morocco 0.04 -0.2 0.02 0.21* 0.19*** 0.24 0.10 0.29*** 
Palestine 0.09 0.04 0.15 -0.0 0.21*** 0.33** 0.24*** 0.11* 
Syria 0.06 .. 0.09 0.05 0.11* .. 0.05 0.14 
Tunisia 0.12** 0.04 0.11* 0.15 0.19*** 0.17** 0.22*** 0.13 
Turkey 0.80*** 0.90*** 0.80*** 0.71*** 0.80*** 1.12*** 0.82*** 0.52*** 
USA .. .. .. .. 0.60*** 0.54*** 0.63*** 0.56*** 
Europe 1.07*** 0.96*** 1.03*** 1.22*** .. .. .. .. 
Notes: Figures depict the sensitivity of the stock market returns to European and US market 
returns, as defined in equation (2). ***,**,* stand for significance at 1%, 5% and 10%  
The ousting of Mubarak has little effect on the interdependence of the 
region’s markets with the EU or the US. Paradoxically, Egypt’s 
interdependence with the US has slightly strengthened and that with the 
EU weakened after the toppling of Mubarak, although the differences are 
too small to gauge significance. Morocco’s stock market became more 
sensitive to developments both in the EU and US during the Arab spring. 
So did Israel’s stock market, but only with the US market. Tunisia’s stock 
markets, on the other hand, became less related with the US and the EU. 
While these results are relatively vague, Turkey’s emergence as an 
alternative for global investors in the region contributed to its decoupling 
from the US and the EU markets.  
These results have to be interpreted carefully, since they simply show 
an increasing sensitivity, which may not be lasting and may not be 
significant. Moreover, inherent volatilities in the stock market returns are 
not clearly taken into account, which the next section turns to.  
3.8.2 Return volatility model 
The coefficient estimates for the GARCH-DCC model in equation (2) are 
summarised in the annex at the end of this chapter. The results show that 
the stock market returns are highly elastic to the developments in the US as 
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well as the ARCH/GARCH terms in all of the countries, justifying the use 
of the empirical analysis that is robust to the heteroscedasticity of error 
terms.  
The dynamic correlations with the US DJCI market returns are 
depicted in Figure 3.3. A visual examination reveals that the Lehman event 
has had a clear and persistent upward impact on market correlations for 
Europe and Turkey but not in other countries. A short-lived upward 
impact is also present in Egypt, Morocco, Palestine and Tunisia. In turn, 
Israel and Jordan’s correlation coefficients appear to be relatively random. 
The magnitude of correlation appears to be the highest in Europe, Israel 
and Turkey, which is most likely reflecting the closer linkages between 
these markets and the US. 
Figure 3.3 Dynamic correlations with US Dow Jones Composite Index (DJCI) 
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 (e) Morocco (MSCI, Large & Mid cap) (f) Palestine (Al-Quds) 
 
 (g) Tunisia (TUNINDEX) (h) Turkey (ISE-100) 
The dynamic correlation coefficients obtained from the GARCH-DCC 
were regressed using the AR(1) specification depicted in equation (8) to 
determine whether any changes that occurred in the two key events, i.e. the 
Lehman event on 15 September 2008 and the fall of Egypt’s General 
Mubarak on 10 January 2011, were permanent (Table 3.14). More 
specifically, the regression regresses the time series depicted in Figure 3.3 
using an AR(1) specification.  
The empirical tests lead to the following key findings.  
First, the correlation coefficients have strong persistent and dynamic 
factors. More specifically, all stock markets except Morocco exhibit a 
significant constant correlation term (0). For Israel, the constant correlation 
is surprisingly high at 0.48. This implies that almost half of the variance in 
the (dollar-denominated) returns of Israel’s Tel Aviv stock market index is 
persistently determined by the returns in US DJCI. Jordan’s stock market 
also has a relatively high stand-alone correlation with the US DJCI, 
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although the magnitude is much smaller. For other countries, the persistent 
term is smaller than 0.1.  
Table 3.14 AR(1) regression for dynamic correlation coefficients for US DJCI 
 Europe Egypt Israel Jordan Morocco Palestine Tunisia Turkey 
0 0.0803*** 0.0668*** 0.482*** 0.141*** 0.00442 0.0130*** 0.0290*** 0.0377*** 
 (0.0291) (0.0117) (0.0323) (0.0108) (0.00524) (0.00165) (0.00823) (0.0127) 
1 0.892*** 0.785*** 0.0863 0.0537 0.881*** 0.777*** 0.756*** 0.923*** 
 (0.0396) (0.0368) (0.0585) (0.0585) (0.0248) (0.0283) (0.0330) (0.0248) 
Lehman 0.0123** 0.0074* 0.0218** 0.0183*** 0.0078 0.0002 0.0136 0.0081* 
 (0.00534) (0.00385) (0.0102) (0.00689) (0.00756) (0.000236) (0.0110) (0.00445) 
Mubarak -0.00321* -0.00529 -0.0134 -0.00467 -0.00203 -0.000275 -0.0177 -0.0108*** 
 (0.00187) (0.00437) (0.00996) (0.00566) (0.00824) (0.000237) (0.0120) (0.00389) 
Obs. 301 296 305 305 305 305 301 301 
R² 0.957 0.655 0.026 0.035 0.767 0.611 0.595 0.915 
 
Second, the dynamic correlation coefficients of most countries exhibit 
a strong autocorrelation term. Indeed, the AR(1) coefficients (1) of all 
countries except Jordan and Israel are in the vicinity of 0.8-0.9. Thus, while 
the correlations are persistently high in Israel and to a lesser degree in 
Jordan, they follow a positive reinforcing pattern in the other countries. In 
other words, a higher correlation in one period implies a higher correlation 
in the next one as well. Thus, correlations appear to be self-supporting, 
possibly highlighting the strong two-way trade and investment linkages.10 
Third, and perhaps most importantly for our purposes, the Lehman 
event has increased correlations in several countries. This is especially the 
case for Europe, Israel and Jordan, where the event has led to a general 
increase of over 1% of correlation. The correlation has also increased in 
Egypt and Turkey, although only by 0.7-0.8%. It should not be surprising 
                                                     
10 There is some indication that many countries in the region have two-way flows 
with the US. The US has been running a trade surplus and an investment deficit 
(i.e. more flows from the region to the US than the other way around) with most 
countries in the region. This two-way dependency may explain the self-supporting 
nature of capital market co-dependencies. In turn, the US has run a large and 
consistent trade deficit with Israel since the late 1990s while capital inflows from 
the US into Israel have also been very strong. Jordan’s trade and investment 
linkages with the US remain relatively small. 
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that the correlations have increased significantly for these traditional US 
allies in the region. 
Fourth, the departure of Mubarak and the following political 
uncertainty have reduced the correlations in the entire sample, although 
the level of significance differs from one country to another. In particular, 
the Arab spring events appear to have reduced the US-Europe and US-
Turkey correlations significantly. Turkey has decoupled from the US as its 
stock exchange increasingly drew more investors searching for yield 
among emerging markets due to the country’s emergence as a stable 
alternative to the rest of the region. In turn, the (much-smaller) drop in 
correlation with Europe may be explained either by the concurrent home-
grown issues in the EU (i.e. the eurozone sovereign debt crisis in 2011). 
More generally, the lower correlation coefficient may also mean that the 
troubles faced by the EU and the Arab spring might have led to a 
decoupling of the European economy.11 
3.9 Synthesis and conclusions 
Most of the SEMCs have been saved from the negative impact of the crisis 
during the initial phase of the crisis between 2007 and 2008. Banks in the 
region had little direct exposure to the toxic products that weakened the 
balance sheets of many banks in the US or the EU. However, the main 
impact of the global financial crisis came later, during 2009 and onwards. 
As economic conditions in the EU – the region’s main partner – worsened, 
so did the external demand for the region’s products, leading to drops in 
exports, tourism receipts and remittances. In addition, bouts of risk-
aversion among global investors lowered capital inflows. The economic 
stimulus programmes of the local authorities did not succeed in offsetting 
these reductions in capital inflows. Moreover, higher international 
commodity prices were even severely worsening the fiscal problems in 
several SEMCs.  
                                                     
11 Although not shown here, the correlation coefficient between Egypt and 
European capital markets have increased significantly after the departure of 
Mubarak. However, the results need to be interpreted with care since the data for 
Egypt are highly incomplete, with long gaps, which makes it a poor explanatory 
variable.  
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The impact of the financial crisis on the banking systems were 
assessed by pre- and post-crisis comparisons of the liquidity, performance, 
efficiency, risk and fragility.  
The liquidity position, measured by the loan-to-deposits ratio, has 
clearly improved in Jordan although not enough for the sample tests to 
highlight a statistically significant change. The LTDs for Lebanon, Morocco, 
Syrian, and Turkish systems have also improved significantly. 
Interestingly, Tunisia is the only country in the sample whose banks 
regularly run retail funding gaps, i.e. fewer deposits than loans, requiring 
alternative forms of funding to fill the gap.  
The evolution of the performance of the region’s banks was assessed 
through three related variables. The profitability measured by net interest 
margin (NIM) of retail operations has improved in Egypt, especially 
following 2008. This paradoxical result could be due to increased risk 
premiums charged by banks in an increasingly uncertain environment. In 
turn, the changes in the NIM for Lebanon, Morocco and Syria appear to be 
related to trend-growth rather than the crisis. Lastly, the results hint at 
significant negative impact of crisis in Algeria and Jordan once trend 
growth is accounted for. The profitability measured by RoE improved for 
Algeria (only for 2008-11 crisis specification), Lebanon, Syria and Tunisia. 
Deeper analysis, however, shows that the trend improvements and not the 
crisis had a role in these developments. In turn, profitability worsened 
under the 2008-11 crisis specification in Israel and (less strongly) in Turkey 
while the drop in profitability in Jordan was a trend process and not due to 
the crisis. Egypt has also faced a slight drop in profitability under the 2008-
11 crisis specification after controlling for trend growth. The results for RoA 
tell a similar story.  
The cost-income ratios measuring efficiency have dropped in several 
countries, including Lebanon, Morocco and Tunisia, which point at lower 
costs and increased efficiency. However, these improvements turn out to be 
related to trend developments, with the exception of Lebanon where 
efficiency gains actually became speedier during the crisis. In turn, heavy 
losses were suffered in some countries (e.g. Syria in 2007). Israel has, for 
example, clearly faced increasing costs under the crisis specification for the 
period 2008-11. This is the case even after controlling for trend-growth.  
Fragility and risks in the banking system are assessed through three 
distinct indicators. It is clear from the figures that the first indicator, capital 
ratios, have improved during the crisis in almost all of the sampled 
countries, except Turkey although this appears to be due to the trend. 
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Moreover, the figures for the second indicator, impaired loans, show 
clearly worsening conditions for several countries. In particular, NPL ratios 
have increased in Jordan, Morocco, Syria and Turkey, even after accounting 
for trend growth in all cases. In the case of Morocco, the results are less 
reliable due to limited data; however, the NPL rates in Jordan have nearly 
doubled during the crisis. The last indicator considered in the section is a 
distance-to-default estimate, or the Z-score. Surprisingly, the results show 
several improvements. In particular, banks have become less fragile in 
Algeria, Jordan and Syria. The results of the trend-adjusted model show 
that these improvements were due to the crisis in Algeria and Syria but not 
in Jordan. More in line with expectations, banks became more fragile in 
Israel and Tunisia, although in the latter case the worsening conditions are 
part of the trend.  
Overall, the results underline that the impact of the financial crisis on 
the banking sectors in the SEMCs was limited. As shown in Table 3.15, 
most of the measures were only weakly affected or following the (positive) 
trend. The more developed banking sectors of Israel and Turkey formed 
the only exceptions. In Israel both the performance and efficiency 
deteriorated, while the system became more fragile. In the case of Turkey, 
both liquidity and performance worsened and the banking system became 
more fragile. 
As is clear from the figures, the impact of the financial crisis on the 
capital markets varies from country to country. In particular, as of 
November 2012, the Israeli, Tunisian and Turkish stock exchanges have 
outperformed the US Dow-Jones index during the global crisis. At the same 
time, the Egyptian, Jordanian, Palestinian and Syrian indices remained 
below their January 2007 levels. 
The correlation coefficients between the region’s stock markets and 
commodity indices highlight several interesting findings. The results show 
that the correlations clearly increased in Israel, Turkey, the US and Europe 
after the crisis (up until the ousting of Mubarak). The same is also true only 
for grains in Egypt, especially after the onset of the Arab spring. The 
correlation with grains also increased in the post-crisis period, up until 
January 2011, for Palestine. The correlation of the market returns with Brent 
oil increased in Jordan, but only weakly so.  
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Table 3.15 Overview of the impact of the financial crisis on banking sector and capital market 
 Impact on banking sector Capital market correlation 
 Liquidity Performance Efficiency Fragility Commodities US EU 
Algeria Weak Strong ↑ (due to trend?) Weak 
Strong ↑ (weakened 
with trend) .. .. .. 
Egypt Weak Mod. ↓ Weak Strong ↓ (due to trend) Mod.; ↑ (grains) 
Strong; ↑ (post-
crisis) 
Strong; ↑ (post-
crisis) 
Israel Weak strong↓ Mod. ↓ Mod. ↑ Strong; ↑ (post-crisis) 
Strong; ↑ (post-
crisis) 
Strong; ↑ (post-
crisis) 
Jordan Weak Mod. ↓ Weak Mod. ↑ (due to NPL) Weak 
Mod.; ↑ (post-
crisis) 
Mod.; ↑ (post-
crisis) 
Lebanon Weak 
Strong ↑ 
(weakened with 
trend) 
Mod. ↑ Weak Weak Moderate Moderate 
Morocco Strong ↓ (due to trend) 
Mod. ↓ (only 
with trend) 
Mod. ↑ (due 
to trend) 
Mod. ↑ (due to 
NPL) Weak Moderate Moderate 
Palestine .. .. .. .. Weak Moderate Moderate 
Syria 
Strong ↓ 
(weakened with 
trend) 
Mod. ↑ (due to 
trend) Weak 
Mod. ↑ (due to 
NPL) Weak Moderate Moderate 
Tunisia Weak Mod. ↑ (due to trend) 
Mod. ↑ (due 
to trend) Weak Weak Moderate Moderate 
Turkey  xx↓ (reversal with trend) Mod. ↓ Weak 
Mod. ↑ (due to 
NPL) 
Strong (oil); ↑ 
(post-crisis) 
Strong; ↑ (post-
crisis); ↓ (Arab 
Spring) 
Strong; ↑ (post-
crisis) 
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The correlation of the market returns with the US and EU markets 
highlight a close relationship between these countries. Clearly, the 
correlations with the US and EU are extremely strong for Egypt, Israel and 
Turkey. The results show that the relationships have not increased after the 
crisis for most cases, except for Egypt (with the US only), Tunisia (only 
weakly) and Jordan (relatively strongly so). Even though Israel and 
Turkey’s stock markets display the closest interdependence with both the 
EU and the US, the relationship has not become more sensitive after the 
crisis or the ousting of Mubarak.  
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ANNEX 
REGRESSION RESULTS OF RETURN VOLATILITY MODEL 
(GARCH-DCC) 
The return volatility is estimated by the following model: 
 
Where r is the vector of index returns, ro represents the index returns 
for the Dow Jones Composite Index (DJCI) in the US, and the error term 
follows a dynamic GARCH(1,1) process that is assumed to be 
decomposable as defined in equations (5) to (7).  
Table 0.1 GARCH dynamic conditional correlation (GARCH-DCC) estimates 
 Europe Egypt Israel Jordan Morocco Palestine Tunisia Turkey 
 0.231* 0.158 0.214* -0.106 0.0402 -0.207** 0.299*** 0.391** 
 (0.119) (0.176) (0.113) (0.0672) (0.121) (0.100) (0.0888) (0.163) 
 0.178*** 0.133** 0.134*** 0.234*** 0.149*** 0.202*** 0.244*** 0.320*** 
 (0.0484) (0.0557) (0.0514) (0.0574) (0.0571) (0.0534) (0.0604) (0.0453) 
 0.244*** 0.557*** 0.574*** 0.172*** 0.0734 0.338*** 0.257*** 0.445*** 
 (0.0929) (0.104) (0.0796) (0.0348) (0.0620) (0.0512) (0.0408) (0.104) 
ARCH 
term 0.0933*** 0.136*** 0.143*** 0.331*** 0.150** 0.168*** 0.611*** 0.103*** 
 (0.0256) (0.0476) (0.0460) (0.0839) (0.0585) (0.0495) (0.131) (0.0350) 
GARCH 
term 0.843*** 0.789*** 0.800*** 0.645*** 0.731*** 0.823*** 0.180** 0.847*** 
 (0.0471) (0.0758) (0.0618) (0.0704) (0.0910) (0.0435) (0.0762) (0.0632) 
Obs. 349 344 352 352 352 352 349 349 
 
The results show that with the exception Morocco, DJCI is a 
significant determinant in all markets. It is important to note that according 
to the specification of this model, the coefficient estimates do not imply 
directly a correlation 
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4. DEBT SUSTAINABILITY ASSESSMENT IN 
EGYPT AND TUNISIA 
DAMYANA BAKARDZHIEVA AND BASSEM KAMAR 
ebt sustainability occurs when a country can meet its current and 
future debt service obligations in full, without recourse to debt 
relief, debt rescheduling or the accumulation of arrears and 
without compromising growth. Assessing debt sustainability in the first 
instance means forming a view of how outstanding stocks of liabilities are 
likely to evolve over time. This requires projecting the flows of revenues 
and expenditures, including those for servicing debt, as well as the 
exchange rate changes (given the currency denomination of the debt). 
Projections of the debt dynamics thus depend, in turn, on macroeconomic 
and financial market developments, which are intrinsically uncertain and 
highly variable (IMF, 2002).  
An increase of the debt ratio to unsustainable levels not only 
constitutes additional constraints on the government and a need for fiscal 
tightening at times when perhaps such a policy is not optimal, but it also 
worsens the perceptions of market participants of the economy and could 
lead to many negative outcomes, such as capital outflows, scarce financing 
possibilities of the budget deficit and interest rate spikes due to higher 
country risk. Therefore, there is a need to provide policy-makers with 
several scenarios about the macroeconomic and financial perspectives, in 
order to raise their awareness related to any possible increase in the debt-
to-GDP ratio.  
In recent years, the Southern and Eastern Mediterranean countries 
(SEMCs) were facing several shocks that could have seriously affected their 
debt sustainability. In 2009, the global financial crisis affected several 
countries, leading to an unexpected economic slowdown, capital flight and 
loss of reserves. Since then, the Arab spring erupted in several countries 
leading to even more serious challenges that need to be taken into 
consideration when assessing debt sustainability.  
D 
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The uprisings in the SEMCs were mainly driven by the claim of the 
populations to receive more social justice. They led to the change of the 
regimes in Tunisia, Egypt and Libya; and the situation in Syria, even 
though still unclear at the time of writing, will most probably lead to a 
change in the economic regime in the same vein. This situation can 
encourage some governments to increase public spending without 
necessarily an equivalent increase in revenue, leading to a larger budget 
deficit and an increase in the overall level of debt. 
In order to assess fiscal sustainability in the SEMCs, we design three 
different scenarios: 1) a realistic scenario that would take a stance on the 
plausible evolution of the economic situation in each country; 2) an 
optimistic scenario where the new government succeeds in improving the 
economic situation significantly; and 3) a pessimistic scenario, in which 
growth will decline for an extended period of time.  
We will apply these three scenarios to the cases of Tunisia and Egypt, 
as they represent distinguished and insightful examples for the other 
SEMCs. The same can be applied to the other countries.  
While Tunisia entered the global crisis and the Arab uprisings with 
an acceptable level of debt and a healthy economy, Egypt had a much 
higher debt level and significant macroeconomic instability. On another 
front, Tunisia seems closer to achieving a democratic transition towards a 
political system that might positively affect its economic performance. 
Egypt, however is still struggling to achieve this after the Mubarak 
transition, the failure of the Muslim Brotherhood to anchor democracy and 
the return of the military to power, and significant signs of a stable regime 
change are not yet in evidence. 
Following this introduction, section 4.1 introduces the debt 
sustainability assessment model and template, highlights the shortcomings 
in the way in which the Article IV consultation implements the framework 
and presents our three scenarios. Sections 4.2 and 4.3 present the 
applications on Tunisia and Egypt respectively. The final section of this 
chapter offers conclusions and highlights some important policy 
implications. 
4.1 The debt sustainability framework 
This section starts by presenting the IMF approach to debt sustainability, 
which we rely upon as the foundation of our analysis. We depart from the 
IMF approach mainly in the underlying assumptions used for forecasting 
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the different variables that affect debt sustainability. At the end of this 
section, we present our scenarios that reflect our view on the economic 
prospects for Tunisia and Egypt. The exercise can then be reproduced for 
any other country with particular attention paid to tailoring the forecasts to 
the economic reality on a case-by-case basis.  
4.1.1 The IMF approach to debt sustainability 
It is useful to start with a definition of debt sustainability as a situation, in 
which a borrower is expected to be able to continue servicing its debt 
without an unrealistically large future correction to the balance of income 
and expenditure (IMF, 2002). Sustainability rules out any of the following: a 
situation in which debt restructuring is already needed (or expected to be 
needed); a situation where the borrower continues indefinitely to 
accumulate debt faster than the growth rate of its capacity to service this 
debt (a Ponzi game); or a situation in which the borrower lives beyond its 
means by accumulating debt in the knowledge that a major retrenchment 
will be needed to service this debt (even if nothing in the external 
environment changes). The cost of financing is a key factor influencing debt 
accumulation (i.e. the present value budget constraint), and thus debt 
sustainability. Sustainability therefore incorporates the concepts of solvency 
and liquidity, without making a sharp demarcation between them. 
Moreover, the assumption that major corrections in income or 
expenditure are not expected captures the notion that there are social and 
political limits to adjustment that determine willingness (as opposed to 
ability) to pay. This factor may be especially important in the context of 
sovereign debt. 
There are a number of related concepts used in the discussion of debt 
dynamics, as presented below.  
Solvency 
An entity is solvent if the present discounted value (PDV) of its current and 
future primary expenditure is no greater than the PDV of its current and 
future path of income, net of any initial indebtedness. 
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Where E is expenditure, Y is revenue, r is the discount rate and D is 
the stock of debt. 
Solvency needs to be viewed in relation to the adjustment path that is 
not only economically feasible, but also socially and politically acceptable, 
such that default is not a preferred option. 
Liquidity 
An entity is illiquid if, regardless of whether it satisfies the solvency 
condition, its liquid assets and available financing are insufficient to meet 
or roll-over its maturing liabilities.  
The distinction between solvency and liquidity is sometimes blurred 
because illiquidity may be manifested in rising interest rates – in the 
limiting case that no further financing is available, the marginal interest 
rate becomes infinite – which eventually calls into question the entity’s 
solvency. 
Accordingly, it is useful to define sustainability and vulnerability (see 
below).  
Sustainability 
An entity’s liability position is sustainable if it satisfies the present value 
budget constraint without a major correction in the balance of income and 
expenditure, given the costs of financing it faces in the market. 
Vulnerability 
Vulnerability is simply the risk that the liquidity or solvency conditions are 
violated and the borrower enters a crisis. 
More generally, assessments of sustainability must be predicated on 
the path of both policy variables (such as expenditure or tax rates) and of 
endogenous variables, such as interest rates and growth rates. But around 
this central projection there will be a number of risks. For instance, the 
balance of income and expenditure may deteriorate to an extent that the 
debt dynamics are no longer sustainable. On the income side, this would 
typically reflect a prolonged downturn or adverse developments in export 
markets. On the expenditure side, there may be increases in outlays that are 
unforeseen or difficult to avoid – such as demographic changes that impose 
a rising burden on (unfunded) social security systems.  
Assessments of sustainability are thus inherently probabilistic and no 
framework can dispense with the need for making judgments; at best, it can 
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help inform such judgments. What constitutes a ‘major correction’ may 
depend very much on the particular history and circumstances of the 
country.  
4.1.2 The IMF template 
The IMF fiscal sustainability template12 analyses the behaviour of the debt-
to-GDP ratio, with all variables expressed in domestic currency. In 
formulating the baseline projection, several issues need to be considered, 
including the definition of debt, the coverage of the public sector and the 
treatment of contingent liabilities. In general, it is recommended that the 
definition of debt be based on gross liabilities, and that the coverage of 
public debt be as broad as possible, including, where feasible, public 
enterprises as well as local governments.  
The underlying equation for the evolution of public debt is: 
 
Where  is the total stock of debt at time t+1, and PB is the 
primary balance. The debt stock is composed of debts denominated in both 
domestic and foreign currencies. Domestic-currency debt  evolves 
according to the interest rate in the market , while the evolution of the 
foreign-currency debt , expressed in domestic currency, is affected 
not just by the foreign interest rate but also by changes in the exchange 
rate (  with e defined as units of local currency per US dollar). 
A depreciation of the local currency  leads to an increase in 
foreign currency debt, expressed in local currency terms. In the template all 
foreign-currency debt is assumed to be in US dollars. However, if this is not 
an appropriate assumption in a particular country, one could feasibly 
derive (ε) as a weighted average, or express it in terms of the dominant 
currency in the debt stock, if this is not the US dollar. 
                                                     
12 This section draws exclusively on the IMF’s 2008 “Staff Guidance Note on Debt 
Sustainability Analysis for Market Access Countries” (www.imf.org/external/ 
np/pp/eng/2008/070308a.pdf). 
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The analysis looks at debt stocks relative to GDP. Therefore, we 
define lower-case variables and upper-case variables expressed as a 
proportion of GDP (e.g. ). The above equation can be expressed, 
in percent of GDP, as: 
 
With (π) representing the change in the domestic GDP deflator, and g 
the real GDP growth rate. Simple algebra yields: 
 
Expanding terms and rearranging, with  
We get: 
Since data on domestic and foreign interest rates may not be consistently 
available, the equation is further simplified. Letting (α) be the share of total 
public sector debt incurred in foreign currency, that is , the third term 
on the right-hand side of the equation can be rewritten as  , where  is 
a weighted average of domestic and foreign interest rates 
. 
Adding and subtracting to the right-hand side, 
allowing ( ) to be approximately equal to ( ), and rearranging the 
equation leads to the following equation, which forms the basis for the 
fiscal template:  
 
The fiscal template identifies different channels that contribute to the 
evolution of the debt-to-GDP ratio: the primary deficit and the 
endogenous/automatic factors, which include the real interest rate, real 
GDP growth and exchange rate movements. The contribution of the real 
interest rate to the evolution of the debt ratio is defined in the template as 
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, the contribution of the real growth rate as 
 and that of the exchange rate depreciation as
. 
The separation of the different factors allows us to assess their 
relative importance for the evolution of the debt ratio. It also serves as the 
basis for stress tests, which consist of a number of permanent shocks to 
these variables.  
The template also includes other debt-creating or debt-reducing 
flows, e.g. from recognition of contingent liabilities or privatisation 
receipts. Changes in gross debt arising from other below-the-line 
operations, such as repayment of debt financed by a reduction in financial 
assets, and cross-currency movements are included in a residual. 
In addition to the debt-to-GDP ratio (and the implicit path of the 
debt-to-revenue ratio), the template pays explicit attention to the gross 
financing needs of the public sector (defined as the public sector deficit, 
plus all maturing debt) deriving it for the baseline in percent of GDP and in 
billions of dollars.  
The template also calculates the debt-stabilising primary balance: this 
is the primary balance required to keep the debt level (as a ratio of GDP) 
constant if all the relevant variables in the debt dynamics equation stated 
earlier remained at the level reported in the last year of projection.  
The historical average scenario presents an alternative evolution of 
the debt ratio under the assumption that all key variables are at their 
respective historical averages throughout the projection period. The 
template calculates averages over the ten-year period, and uses that 
information to project debt dynamics five years ahead. 
This scenario is a rough test of the ‘realism’ of baseline projections; 
the baseline projections may be argued to be overly optimistic when they 
differ remarkably from predicted debt evolution if historical patterns were 
followed. Of course, this scenario may be somewhat misleading if 
significant changes in economic policies have taken place in recent history – 
using the early years of transition, for instance, would bias the ‘historical’ 
value of certain parameters and thus might result in too high a debt ratio.  
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More generally, circumstances reflecting credible changes in policies 
(and thus lower baseline debt ratio projections) may look anomalous in 
comparison. In any case, using this scenario – and justifying any large 
anomalies – could usefully discipline baseline projections.  
4.1.3 Shortcomings in the IMF sensitivity tests 
In addition to the baseline projections based on the IMF staff forecasts of 
the economic situation predicted to prevail in the coming five years, and 
the historical scenario based on the 10-year averages of the main economic 
indicators, the IMF also presents in its Article IV consultation report for 
every member country a set of sensitivity analyses (also called stress tests). 
These sensitivity analyses are standard for all countries, and are based on 
introducing negative shocks using a permanent 1/4 of a standard deviation 
shock to the 10-year historical real interest rate, growth rate and primary 
balance, in addition to a real depreciation shock to contingent liabilities of 
30% and 10% of GDP. 
We have some concerns regarding the appropriateness of introducing 
standardised shocks to the historical values, but also regarding the 
accuracy of IMF forecasts. Applying the exact same shock to all countries 
will never reflect the reality of a specific economy and the severity of any 
potential turmoil the country might be facing in the future. In addition, 
IMF forecasts are often overly optimistic and hardly match the reality with 
regards to growth and inflation. 
Indeed, the advantage of the standardised shocks is that they might 
allow for easy cross-country comparisons, and are also simple and easy to 
implement by the desk economists, who just have to enter some basic data 
in the template already preset to provide them automatically with elegant 
graphs and tables. However, the latter are often meaningless and 
misleading. 
The following graphs show how biased the IMF forecast of the debt 
can be, and this could turn out to be catastrophic for the countries that 
follow the IMF assessment and incur more debt when the reality is much 
gloomier; the outcome is often a debt explosion. Clearly, the actual debt-to-
GDP ratios in all four countries depicted in Figure 4.1 were far more 
significant than those projected in the respective Article IV consultation 
reports. 
Our objective is to perform more reasonable and targeted stress tests 
for two SEMCs, i.e. Tunisia and Egypt, starting from the IMF baseline 
scenario, but using motivated country-specific and context-appropriate 
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assumptions for the future development of the respective macroeconomic 
variables. 
Figure 4.1 Projections of public debt-to-GDP ratio: Selected emerging market 
countries 
 
 
Source: IMF (2002). 
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4.1.4 Our scenarios for the debt sustainability of Tunisia and Egypt  
In order to assess the fiscal sustainability in the two countries chosen, three 
different scenarios are designed:  
1. A realistic scenario that would take account of the plausible evolution 
of the economic situation in each country.  
2. An optimistic scenario, in which the new (post-revolutionary) 
government succeeds in improving the economic situation 
significantly.  
3. A pessimistic scenario, in which growth will decline for an extended 
period of time. 
Scenario 1. The realistic assessment 
The realistic scenario is mainly based on the interpretation of the latest 
signs of economic recovery (or turmoil) that we receive from each country 
based on the latest data available. It will assume a low growth rate for the 
years 2012 and 2013, followed by a steady recovery in 2014 and 2015. 
Inflation and exchange rate movements will remain close to their 2011 and 
2012 levels. Revenues will be a function of GDP growth, but expenditures 
will witness a noticeable increase to reflect the governments’ commitments 
to respond to the populations’ claims for higher social transfers and public 
jobs. Budget deficits will increase, but the authorities will not have 
difficulties in finding sources of financing, especially foreign financing in 
the form of aid or loans from international organisations and the G20 
countries. In the external sector, trade will continue to be subject to the 
main trading partners’ economic conditions, and tourism will start reviving 
if the political transition is confirmed and security is established. Foreign 
direct investment and portfolio investments will remain low for 2012 and 
2013 but might start increasing after that, conditional on the 
accomplishment of the political transition, the stability of the 
macroeconomic indicators and the establishment of security. The local 
banking systems have already proved themselves to be crisis-proof, both 
during the global financial crisis and the revolutions, so no particular signs 
of a banking crisis in any of the two countries are foreseen. 
The scenarios might differ in each country, based on their historical 
economic situation and the potential realistic outcomes that we perceive for 
the coming four years. 
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Scenario 2. Optimistic perspectives 
Assuming that the newly elected governments succeed in convincing their 
partners to support them with aid or low interest loans (as was promised 
by the G20), financing budget deficits will no longer be an issue. This in 
itself can be very comforting for the business community which will be 
more inclined to reinvest. Households will also feel less concerned and will 
resume a normal consumption pattern. The optimistic perspectives also 
include the recovery of the main trading partners (e.g. the EU) and the 
increase of their demand for SEMCs’ exports.  
As a result of these positive perspectives, the region’s GDP will grow 
at a higher and sustainable rate, generating higher revenue for the 
government. Expenditure will still increase to respond to the people’s 
needs but not as much as in the two other scenarios. Should the private 
sector play its role in reducing unemployment, the public sector will have 
less to spend on job creation and wage increases. With available foreign 
financing, exchange rates will not suffer from depreciation pressures, and 
the pass-through to inflation will be limited, decreasing the need for 
increasing subsidies for some goods (usually oil and wheat). 
With less deficit-financing needed, interest rates will remain low and 
the banking sector will be able to play its role in providing credit to the 
private sector, especially to small- and medium-sized enterprises. It’s also 
relevant to mention that the feeling among the people that they have 
succeeded with their revolutions will boost their morale and will increase 
their productivity, even further enhancing GDP growth and the overall 
economic activity. 
Scenario 3. The pessimistic outlook 
It is very important to try to come up with a coherent ‘worst case’ scenario, 
so that we can identify all the challenges and let policy-makers be ready to 
face some of them, or at least to understand what can be the outcome if the 
situation gets worse. In this simulation, we will assume that the political 
transition is not taking place smoothly, which negatively affects the 
business environment in the two countries. Investment will decline, both 
foreign and domestic, and consumption will also decline as savings 
increase in times of uncertainty. It might even lead to capital outflows and 
pressures on the exchange reserves, especially since we will also assume an 
extended economic slowdown of the trading partners. This situation will 
lead to a sharp and extended decline in GDP growth, which would be 
combined with an increase in inflation should the exchange rate depreciate. 
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Budget revenue will decline as a result of the drop in investment and 
consumption, but the government will keep increasing its current spending 
to sustain the economy and satisfy the people’s demand for higher social 
transfers, subsidies, wages and public jobs. Financing might become an 
issue as markets, international organisations and partners (G20 among 
others) will be reluctant to lend to what is perceived to be a transitory 
and/or as illegitimate government, and will prefer to wait until the 
political transition is over to lend to a new government. This will make it 
harder for the country to borrow and will put strong pressure on the 
interest rates, as seen in the case of Greece, imposing a higher burden on 
the budget and debt levels. 
4.2 Debt sustainability assessment for Tunisia 
The IMF publishes a DSA (debt sustainability assessment) for all countries 
in its Article IV consultation report, which is available on the IMF website. 
The latest DSA publication for Tunisia is dated 2012, but the latest report 
for Egypt is from 2010, so, in order to be able to compare the pre-
revolutionary data and projections with the post-revolutionary ones, we 
have decided to use as initial benchmarks the IMF 2010 baseline scenarios 
(see case studies on Tunisia and Egypt in the annex to this chapter).  
In this section, we reproduce exactly the same template for Tunisia 
using the same data and same assumptions used in the IMF Article IV 
consultation reports in 2010. The aim of this exercise is to make sure that 
our template works properly, that all the cells in the Excel file are correctly 
linked and all data we are using are accurate (coming from identical 
sources).  
We then move to the second step where we adjust our template by 
updating the data whenever available with the IMF’s 2011 WEO (World 
Economic Outlook) data. The following steps reflect our own assumptions 
for the relevant indicators in the template, based on our realistic, optimistic, 
and pessimistic scenarios. 
4.2.1 Replication of the IMF 2010 Article IV consultation’s DSA 
Figure 4.2 presents our calculation of the debt level and the gross financing 
needs used for the IMF 2010 Article IV consultation. This is an exact 
replication of the baseline and gross financing needs published in the figure 
(“Baseline and historical scenarios”) in the IMF report (Appendix 1), except 
that the shaded area is expanding until 2010.  
88 | DEBT SUSTAINABILITY ASSESSMENT IN EGYPT & TUNISIA 
 
The outcome of the several calculations that allowed us to reach these 
results are presented in Table 4.1, where all the numbers are very close (yet 
not exactly the same) to those presented in the IMF 2010 Article IV 
Consultation report (Appendix 1), with a marginal difference not exceeding 
0.2 points. The errors could be ours, due to rounding, but can also be due to 
some errors in the IMF report. For example, in the Article IV report we are 
using as reference, we found two different measures of nominal GDP, as 
the GDP deflator used to calculate each one of them is not exactly the same. 
The GDP provided in the report on p. 20 (Table 1. Selected Economic and 
Financial Indicators, 2008-2015) is different from the one reported on p. 22 
(Table 3. Central Government Financial Operations, 2008-2015). Forced to 
make a choice, we decided to use the data provided in Table 1 as they seem 
to be based on a more plausible GDP deflator (see Figure 4.2 and Table 4.1 
below).  
Figure 4.2 Baseline scenario using the data from the IMF’s 2010 Article IV 
consultation report for Tunisia 
 
Source: Authors’ own calculations .  Source: IMF Article IV consultation 2010. 
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Table 4.1 Authors’ replication of the DSA for Tunisia published in the IMF 2010 
Article IV Consultation 
 
4.2.2 Baseline using World Economic Outlook (WEO) 2011 data 
Once we replicated the DSA published in the IMF 2010 Article IV 
consultation report, we can start updating the template with more recent 
data, like the one published in the 2011 WEO. The aim of this step is to 
construct a baseline for a DSA that would incorporate IMF data reflecting 
the debt level in the aftermath of the Tunisian revolution, bearing in mind 
that the IMF forecasts are often overly optimistic.13 We will include the 
                                                     
13 The optimistic bias is actually recognised by the IMF itself on p. 9 of the 2003 
“Sustainability Assessments—Review of Application and Methodological 
 
Projections
2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015
1 Baseline: Public sector debt 1/ 52,4 48,7 45,9 43,3 42,8 43,1 42,8 42,3 41,7 40,8 39,8
o/w foreign-currency denominated 33,5 29,1 26,8 26,4 25,0 24,2 22,8 21,2 19,8 18,2 16,8
2 Change in public sector debt -1,2 -3,7 -2,8 -2,6 -0,6 0,3 -0,3 -0,6 -0,6 -0,9 -1,0
3 Identified debt-creating flows (4+7+12) 2,9 -9,7 -3,8 -2,3 0,2 -1,3 -0,8 -1,0 -1,1 -1,3 -1,4
4 Primary deficit 0,2 0,4 0,3 -1,3 0,6 1,0 0,6 0,7 0,8 0,6 0,5
5 Revenue and grants 26,5 26,6 27,4 29,9 29,3 28,4 28,5 28,2 27,9 27,8 27,8
6 Primary (noninterest) expenditure 26,7 26,9 27,8 28,6 30,0 29,4 29,1 29,0 28,7 28,5 28,3
7 Automatic debt dynamics 2/ 3,1 -3,5 -3,3 -0,7 -0,4 -2,0 -1,4 -1,6 -1,8 -1,9 -1,8
8 Contribution from interest rate/growth differential 3/ -1,4 -1,9 -1,7 -2,5 -0,5 -2,0 -1,4 -1,6 -1,8 -1,9 -1,8
9 Of which contribution from real interest rate 0,8 0,8 1,1 -0,7 0,7 -0,5 0,6 0,3 0,4 0,3 0,4
10 Of which contribution from real GDP growth -2,2 -2,7 -2,8 -1,9 -1,3 -1,5 -1,9 -2,0 -2,2 -2,2 -2,2
11 Contribution from exchange rate depreciation 4/ 4,5 -1,6 -1,6 1,8 0,1 ... ... ... ... ... ...
12 Other identified debt-creating flows -0,4 -6,6 -0,8 -0,3 0,0 -0,3 -0,1 -0,1 -0,1 -0,1 -0,1
13 Privatization receipts (negative) -0,4 -6,6 -0,8 -0,3 0,0 -0,3 -0,1 -0,1 -0,1 -0,1 -0,1
14 Recognition of implicit or contingent liabilities 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0
15 Other (specify, e.g. bank recapitalization) 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0
16 Residual, including asset changes (2-3) 5/ -4,1 6,0 0,9 -0,2 -0,8 1,6 0,6 0,4 0,5 0,4 0,4
Public sector debt-to-revenue ratio 1/ 198,0 183,5 167,4 144,9 145,8 151,8 150,3 149,7 149,6 146,8 143,1
Gross financing need 6/ 5,4 6,7 5,7 2,3 4,6 5,1 5,2 4,9 4,5 4,2 3,9
in billions of U.S. dollars 1,8 2,3 2,2 1,0 2,0 2,2 2,3 2,3 2,2 2,2 2,2
Key Macroeconomic and Fiscal Assumptions Underlying Baseline
Real GDP growth (in percent) 4,0 5,7 6,3 4,5 3,1 3,8 4,8 5,0 5,6 5,7 5,8
Average nominal interest rate on public debt (in percent) 5,2 5,3 5,2 4,7 5,0 4,9 4,6 4,2 4,0 3,7 3,8
Average real interest rate (nominal rate minus change in 1,6 1,9 2,6 -1,4 1,9 -1,0 1,5 1,0 1,2 1,0 1,3
Nominal appreciation (increase in US dollar value of local -12,0 5,1 6,3 -6,8 -0,6 ... ... ... ... ... ...
Inflation rate (GDP deflator, in percent) 3,7 3,4 2,6 6,1 3,1 5,9 3,0 3,2 2,8 2,7 2,5
Growth of real primary spending (deflated by GDP deflato 4,1 6,7 9,5 7,6 8,1 1,8 4,0 4,4 4,7 4,8 5,3
Primary deficit 0,2 0,4 0,3 -1,3 0,6 1,0 0,6 0,7 0,8 0,6 0,5
1/ Indicate coverage of public sector, e.g., general government or nonfinancial public sector. Also whether net or gross debt is used.
2/ Derived as [(r - (1+g - g + (1+r]/(1+g++g)) times previous period debt ratio, with r = interest rate;  = growth rate of GDP deflator; g = real GDP growth rate; 
a = share of foreign-currency denominated debt; and  = nominal exchange rate depreciation (measured by increase in local currency value of U.S. dollar).
3/ The real interest rate contribution is derived from the denominator in footnote 2/ as r - π (1+g) and the real growth contribution as -g.
4/ The exchange rate contribution is derived from the numerator in footnote 2/ as (1+r). 
5/ For projections, this line includes exchange rate changes.
6/ Defined as public sector deficit, plus amortization of medium and long-term public sector debt, plus short-term debt at end of previous period. 
7/ The key variables include real GDP growth; real interest rate; and primary balance in percent of GDP.
8/ Derived as nominal interest expenditure divided by previous period debt stock.
9/ Assumes that key variables (real GDP growth, real interest rate, and other identified debt-creating flows) remain at the level of the last projection year.
Actual 
(In percent of GDP, unless otherwise indicated)
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main determinants of the debt level one after the other to underline the 
impact of the change in each determinant, in a way such that each change 
in an additional determinant includes the changes already implemented in 
the other determinants. 
The first update concerns the real GDP growth, considered one of 
the most important indicators in the debt analysis. It will allow us to 
calculate the nominal GDP, from which we calculate our debt-to-GDP ratio, 
as well as all other macroeconomic indicators expressed as a percentage of 
GDP. 
The IMF 2010 Article IV Consultation Report published before the 
revolution predicted a growth rate of 4.8% in 2011, and 5%, 5.6%, 5.7% and 
5.8% respectively in the following four years. 
Based on the available information on the Tunisian economy 
published by the WEO 2011, Tunisia had no growth in 2011 (0%), as a 
direct result of the revolution that erupted at the beginning of the year. 
Nevertheless, the WEO expectations for the following years seem highly 
optimistic, reaching 3.9% in 2012, and 5.2%, 5.7% and 6.5% in the following 
years.  
Figure 4.3 Baseline and real GDP growth data for Tunisia from WEO 2011 
 
Source: Authors’ own calculations. 
                                                                                                                                       
Refinements”, authorised for publication by Timothy Geithner, who was then 
Director of the IMF’s Department of Policy Development and Review. 
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As can be seen in Figure 4.3, the debt-to-GDP level increases by 2.5 
points from 39.8% to 42.3% in 2015. This illustrates clearly the strong 
impact of an economic slowdown on the debt sustainability and the need 
for all governments to pay particular attention to the impact of growth on 
debt. 
The second determinant that we correct for is the GDP deflator. An 
increase in inflation leads to a decrease of the debt ratio, which decreases to 
40.8%, as seen in Figure 4.4. 
Figure 4.4 The impact of the new GDP deflator data for Tunisia from WEO 2011 
 
Source: Authors’ own calculations. 
The next determinant is the central government’s revenue. 
Surprisingly enough, the WEO 2011 data doesn’t take into account the 
negative impact of the revolution on revenue. The forecasts are either 
similar or higher than those projected in the 2010 Article IV Consultation 
Report, leading to a decline in the debt level from 40.8% to 39.3% by the 
end of the period (see Figure 4.5). 
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Figure 4.5 Revenue forecasted for Tunisia in data from WEO 2011 
 
Source: Authors’ own calculations. 
When we add to the above the forecasted expenditures in WEO 2011, 
the outcome changes considerably. Indeed, the forecasted budget deficit 
and expenditures increase significantly, which reflects the expenditures 
related to the reconstruction and compensations related to the revolution 
(Figure 4.6).  
Figure 4.6 Increase in expenditure projected for Tunisia in the WEO 2011 
 
Source: Authors’ own calculations. 
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The data for public expenditures combined with the WEO figures for 
real GDP growth, GDP deflator, and revenue, cause the debt level to 
increase significantly, reaching 44.1% of GDP by 2015. This is another very 
important determinant of debt that governments will need to monitor, 
given its significant impact on debt sustainability. 
The next indicator is the interest rate. Since we couldn’t find the data 
in the WEO 2011, we decided to keep the same values that were used in the 
IMF 2010 Article IV consultation report. This can also be justified by the 
fact that no major changes occurred during this period in the interest rates 
neither domestic or foreign. 
The last determinant is the exchange rate. The IMF 2010 baseline 
scenario is based on the assumption that the nominal exchange rate vis-à-
vis the US dollar will be perfectly stable with no change. This is a very 
strong assumption for a country that historically adjusted its nominal 
effective exchange rate to target competitiveness.  
Since exchange rate data are available for 2010 and 2011 (two years 
for which the IMF 2010 template records no exchange rate movement) we 
will use these values in our template (Figure 4.7). 
Figure 4.7 Changes in Tunisia’s exchange rate from IMF 2010 
 
Note: Baseline adjusted by the observed exchange rate in 2010 and 2011. 
Source: Authors’ own calculations. 
If we keep our focus on the IMF assumptions in the WEO 2011, we 
find nominal GDP both in local currency and in US dollars. This clearly 
indicates that the IMF has an assumption for the exchange rate 
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dinar/dollar, which was used to come up with the Tunisian GDP in US 
dollars. By dividing the two series, we can get the forecasted values of the 
exchange rate. The rate of depreciation is on average 2.5% between 2012 
and 2015 (for the period 2007-11, the depreciation vis-à-vis the US dollar is 
2% annually). 
Therefore, in order to finalise our baseline using the WEO 2011 data, 
we will include an annual depreciation of the Tunisian dinar by 2.5% vis-à-
vis the US dollar (Figure 4.8).  
Figure 4.8 Annual exchange rate depreciation of 2.5% in Tunisia between 2012 
and 2015 
 
Source: Authors’ own calculations. 
Taking into account the WEO 2011 forecasts of the main determinants 
of debt, we can see that the final outcome is worrisome. The debt level 
increases from a forecasted 39.8% of GDP to 47.9% of GDP. These figures, 
yet alarming, represent the ‘overly optimistic’ assumptions of the IMF in 
the WEO publications. In the following section, we will present our own 
assumptions that we consider to be more realistic.  
4.2.3 Assumptions for the realistic scenario 
Moving from the baseline scenario that uses the WEO 2011 data, we will 
now build our own first scenario, which we qualify as realistic.  
As previously discussed, there is evidence that the IMF forecasts are 
usually too optimistic and hardly met in reality. This is due to the 
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assumptions on which the IMF is building its forecasts. They are based on a 
specific ‘set of recommendations’ the IMF prescribes to the government, 
which, if implemented properly, will lead to the positive outcome 
predicted in the IMF forecasts. However, governments don’t really follow 
the IMF’s recommendations strictly, and the forecasts are hardly met. 
Therefore, we will have less optimistic assumptions in our ‘realistic’ 
scenario.  
GDP growth 
As we know, the Tunisian economy is highly dependent on the economic 
performance of its European partners, which don’t seem to be firmly on the 
recovery path. Even if we consider that the very low 2011 growth can give 
way to high growth in the following year, we are still not convinced that 
Tunisia will achieve the very optimistic rates that the IMF predicts. The 
newly elected government never practiced economic management on a 
national level and will most probably need some time to learn and adapt 
before it becomes capable of implementing the right policies that would 
bring strong growth. We should also take into consideration the fact that 
tourism, even though recovering fast, needs essentially a stable and secure 
environment to prosper and get back to its previous levels in order to play 
its important role in enhancing growth. 
Based on the above, we expect Tunisia to grow at a 2.5% rate in 2012, 
3.5% in 2013, 4.5% in 2014, reaching 5.5% in 2015. 
Figure 4.9 shows the impact on the debt level of our realistic 
assumptions about GDP growth, which increases by 2.4 percentage points 
by 2015, from 47.9% of GDP in our baseline scenario to 50.3% of GDP.  
GDP deflator 
The second variable required for the calculation of the GDP is the deflator. 
The deflator’s inflation predicted in the WEO 2011 is a little higher than the 
one in the IMF 2010 report. This reflects some inflationary pressures 
building-up that we need to take into consideration. We decided therefore 
to use the same assumptions as in the WEO 2011, which were confirmed by 
a recent announcement of the Tunisian Central Bank Governor in Jeune 
Afrique, 27 December 2011. 
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Revenues, expenditures and deficits 
The data we use in our template to calculate the budget deficit are 
composed of revenues (including grants) and expenditures. Historically, 
Tunisia’s budget deficit was under control and didn’t exceed 3% of GDP in 
the immediate years preceding the revolution. The IMF’s 2010 report shows 
that the ratio of budget deficit to GDP including grants and privatisation 
receipts will range between 2.5% in 2012 and 2.1% in 2015. In WEO 2011, 
the deficit is expected to widen (taking into consideration the new GDP 
figures) to reach 5.5% of GDP in 2011, and the government is targeting a 
deficit of 6.5% of GDP for 2012.14 For the following years, we expect the 
deficit to decline by 1% of GDP each year to reach 5.5% in 2013, 4.5% in 
2014, and 3.5% in 2015. 
On the revenue side, we expect less revenue for 2011 to match the 
announced budget deficit of 5.5%, with a growth rate of 6.4% instead of the 
8.8% projected by the WEO 2011. Thereafter, we expect revenues to start 
growing at an annual rate of 13.5% in 2012 and 12% in 2013, to stabilise 
around 11% in 2014 and 2015. This will reflect two important aspects. The 
first is the determination of the population to sustain the country’s 
economy after the revolution by paying taxes without evasion due to the 
surge of patriotic feelings. The second is that the Islamic government will 
toughen the anti-corruption and tax evasion laws that will help collect 
more tax revenue. 
On the expenditures side, 2011 and 2012 are exceptional years where 
expenditures surged due to the need to finance some reconstructions and 
repair some damages that the revolution created. Some of the cost was 
covered in the 2011 budget but there are still significant expenditures 
planned in 2012. We expect expenditures to grow by 16.1% in 2011 (as per 
the data in the WEO 2011) and 16% in 2012 (as announced by the 
government), which matches the expected deficit (taking the revenue 
projections into account). In the following years, expenditures will grow at 
a normal pace, close to that recorded before the revolution (around 8% per 
year). These growth rates in expenditures are much higher than those 
forecast by the WEO 2011, at 5.9%, 7.3%, 6.4%, 7.8% respective for the years 
between 2012 and 2015. 
                                                     
14 As announced by the Tunisian government in the Complementary Finance Law, 
in March 2012. 
CRISIS MANAGEMENT IN THE SOUTHERN AND EASTERN MEDITERRANEAN | 97 
 
When simulating these assumptions, the debt level increases again 
from 50.3% to 52.6% of GDP (Figure 4.9). We are getting far away from the 
39.8% level in the 2010 Article IV consultation report.  
Interest rates 
The increase in budget deficit requires financing, both domestic and 
foreign, which may drive borrowing interest rates up. 
The domestic interest rates on government borrowing might increase 
due to crowding-out, if the government borrows massively domestically. 
On another front, inflationary pressures that we expect to build up will also 
contribute to an increase in interest rates.  
Therefore, it seems realistic for us to predict an increase in the 
domestic interest rate in comparison to the one used in the baseline, by 
about 200 basis points in 2012 and 2013, and 100 basis points in 2014 before 
they resume their normal level in 2015. 
Borrowing from the international market is not easy nowadays, as 
could be seen in the case of Greece (among other European countries). 
Many countries struggled in the past to raise funds on the international 
markets when they were facing economic turmoil. If the creditors perceive 
an increasing country risk, this will be automatically reflected in the 
premium they ask to lend money, and the interest rates Tunisia might have 
to pay can possibly increase, especially after the country was downgraded 
by the rating agencies in 2011.  
Therefore, we expect the foreign interest rates to increase by about 
200 basis points in 2012 and 2013, 100 basis points in 2014 and be back to 
their normal level in 2015. 
As seen in Figure 4.9, the debt level increases from 52.6% to 55.2% of 
GDP under these assumptions. This exercise can be repeated using other 
assumptions for interest rates in order to emphasise the sensitivity of debt 
levels to changes in interest rates. 
Exchange rate  
In our baseline, we used the WEO 2011 forecasts of 2.5% annual 
depreciation starting from 2013. Historically, Tunisia has always allowed 
its currency to depreciate by the same level as inflation, to compensate for 
any loss of competitiveness. We assume the new government will maintain 
the same policy. Keeping in mind that we project an increase in inflation in 
our realistic scenario, it would be appropriate to build our assumptions on 
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an exchange rate around an annual depreciation of 5% per year starting 
from 2013. 
Figure 4.9 The realistic scenario for Tunisia 
Source: Authors’ own calculations. 
As could be seen from Figure 4.9, the debt level significantly increases 
by 2015, reaching the alarming level of 57.7% of GDP in comparison with 
47.9% of GDP in the same year using our baseline assumptions based on 
the WEO 2011.  
4.2.4 Assumptions for the optimistic scenario 
Some might find our realistic scenario too pessimistic to be reliable. Indeed, 
the Tunisian economic prospects might end up showing faster signs of 
recovery and stronger indicators. This is conditional on the government’s 
success in establishing a stable and secure environment and well-
functioning institutions capable of reassuring investors that the business 
climate is healthy and attractive. 
In comparison with our benchmark presented in the realistic scenario, 
most of our indicators will witness some, yet pragmatic, improvement. 
Our optimistic scenario is based on the assumption that the Tunisian 
real GDP will grow at 3.5% in 2012, 4.5% in 2013 and 6% in 2014, reaching 
7.5% in 2015. The GDP deflator will remain the same as in the WEO 2011 
(the same as in our realistic scenario), as we didn’t see any particular 
reason to modify it.  
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The budget deficit in 2011 was 5.5% of GDP, as provided in the WEO 
2011 and was confirmed by the government. In an optimistic scenario, we 
expect the government to perform better, and to limit the budget deficit to 
4.5% of GDP in 2012. For the following year, we assume the deficit will 
decline by 1% of GDP to reach 3.5%, and stabilise at around 2.5% in 2014 
and 2015. 
In this case, we expect revenue to grow at a higher rate than the one 
assumed in the realistic scenario, for the same reasons presented above. 
One can’t really tell the exact impact of the will of the population to sustain 
the country’s economy after the revolution by paying their taxes without 
evasion due to the surge of patriotic feelings, or how the expected tougher 
anti-corruption and anti-tax evasion laws will help collect more tax 
revenue.  
Therefore, our assumptions for revenue growth are slightly higher 
that the realistic scenario, projected to reach 16% in 2012, to stabilise 
around 11% in 2013 and 2014, and to go back to 9% in 2015. 
In the same vein, we assume that expenditure growth will slightly 
decline, due to a lower-than-expected cost of reconstruction and 
compensation due to the revolution, but also due to a more conservative 
government policy that will resist the temptation to make large 
expenditure increases. Hence, we expect expenditures to grow by only 12% 
in 2012, and to return close to their pre-revolutionary growth level, at 
around 8% per year in the following years. 
Given these optimistic assumptions, we expect less crowding-out 
pressures on domestic interest rates, and better perceptions on the part of 
foreign creditors of the country’s economic prospects, which would also 
limit the increase in interest rates. Therefore, we use in our DSA template a 
minor increase in interest rates, both domestic and foreign, by 100 basis 
points in 2012 and 2013 only. 
Finally, we believe that an optimistic scenario should reflect, among 
other factors, limited inflationary pressures. This assumption is in line with 
the limited increase in the interest rates and with the assumptions related 
to the GDP deflator. Given the fact that the Tunisian authorities have been 
successfully targeting competitiveness in the past 15-20 years, by allowing 
the exchange rate to depreciate by a percentage equivalent to the inflation 
differential vis-à-vis the main trading partners, we consequently assume a 
2% annual depreciation. 
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Figure 4.10 Optimistic scenario for Tunisia 
 
Source: Authors’ own calculations. 
In comparison with the WEO 2011 baseline scenario, we can see a 
limited impact on the debt level in 2015 of our assumptions of real GDP 
growth. The optimistic assumptions for the budget revenue and 
expenditures will lead to a significant decline in the debt level forecasts for 
2015, which decrease from 47.9% to 43.9% of GDP. Of course, the expected 
increase in interest rates will drive the debt level slightly higher to 44.6% of 
GDP, but the assumption of a lower rate of depreciation will contain this 
increase to establish the debt level at around 44.2% of GDP by 2015 (Figure 
4.10). 
These results are still higher than those contained in the 2010 IMF 
report, but are much lower than our realistic scenario, which forecasts a 
debt-to-GDP ratio at 57.7%. The fact that the difference in the outlook of the 
two scenarios is so large (13.5% of GDP) is another indicator of the 
necessity to perform our exercise with even more scenarios and using 
alternative assumptions to present all possible evolutions of the debt ratio. 
4.2.5 Assumptions for the pessimistic scenario 
As presented in section 4.1, it is very important to try to come up with a 
coherent ‘worst case’ scenario. In this simulation, we will assume that the 
political transition is not taking place smoothly, which negatively affects 
the business climate. Investments will decline, both foreign and domestic, 
and consumption will also decline as savings increase in times of 
uncertainty. We therefore expect a sharp and extended decline in GDP 
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growth, to reach 1% in 2012 and 2013, and a mild increase to 2% in 2014, 
reaching 3% in 2015. 
One can be tempted to see increasing inflation as another pessimistic 
indicator in an economy’s outlook. Nevertheless, the GDP deflator is more 
linked to the demand of producers than consumers, and therefore can be in 
line with the expected evolution of the real GDP. Given our pessimistic 
scenario for real GDP growth, we see limited room for inflationary pressure 
on the GDP deflator. Therefore, we decided to use the same assumptions as 
in the WEO 2011. 
As can be seen in Figure 4.11, the debt-to-GDP ratio reaches 54.8% in 
2015, compared to 47.9% in the WEO 2011 baseline scenario and 50.3% and 
47.8% in the realistic and optimistic scenarios, respectively. 
On the budget side, because GDP is lower than what we would 
observe in our realistic and baseline scenarios (because of lower real GDP 
growth), the ratio of the budget deficit-to-GDP will automatically increase, 
if we keep the revenues and expenditures at their levels forecast by the IMF 
WEO 2011. In this case, the budget deficit given the pessimistic real GDP 
growth will reach 6.7% in 2012, 5.7% in 2013, 4.9% in 2014 and 3.9% in 2015.  
The first assumption we will implement is that the revenues and 
expenditures are not at the WEO 2011 levels but at our realistic scenario 
levels. In this case, the debt ratio increases from 54.8% to 57.4% by 2015 
(Figure 4.11). 
However, when we forecast the revenue perspectives with a 
pessimistic view, we might expect a lower growth of revenue receipts in 
comparison with the realistic scenario for two main reasons: on one hand, 
the government might fail to implement the necessary reforms for tax 
collection and might also have a more limited access to foreign grants. On 
another hand, the economic slowdown usually negatively affects the tax 
receipts, as companies’ profits are squeezed and personal and VAT taxes 
usually decline. We decided to use 2% lower growth rates of revenue than 
those used in the realistic scenario, so the numbers become 11.5% in 2012, 
9.8% in 2013 and 9% in 2014 and 2015. 
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 Figure 4.11 Impact on debt of a pessimistic outlook for growth and budget 
revenues in Tunisia 
Source: Authors’ own calculations. 
In this case, and while keeping expenditures at their realistic scenario 
levels, the debt ratio increases again to reach 63.6% of GDP (Figure 4.11). 
Expenditures are the main discretionary fiscal policy and the 
government might be tempted to increase expenditures as a stimulus to a 
slowing economy, and for the reconstruction of the impact of the 
revolution, for unemployment benefits, subsidies, employment in the 
government agencies and government investments in infrastructure 
projects in several cities that were neglected by the former government 
before the revolution. It has also been observed that some newly elected 
governments run larger-than-average fiscal expenditures in order to get re-
elected (a phenomenon known as the ‘political budget cycle’), which might 
also be the case here.  
In order to simulate such behaviour, we will implement three 
different scenarios: a 1% increase in public expenditure growth compared 
to the growth of expenditures in our realistic scenario, a 2% increase and a 
3% increase of the growth of expenditures. The impact on debt, ceteris 
paribus, compared to our latest assumptions on GDP and revenues, is an 
increase of the debt ratio reaching respectively 67.2%, 70.8% and 74.5% 
(Figure 4.12). 
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Figure 4.12 Impact on debt of a pessimistic outlook for budget expenditures in 
Tunisia 
 
Source: Authors’ own calculations. 
In the following steps of the pessimistic scenario, we will keep only 
the assumption of a 2% increase in expenditure growth, which reaches 18% 
in 2012 (compared to 16% in the realistic scenario). Between 2013 and 2015, 
the expenditures will grow by 10% per year, which is the average growth 
rate before the revolution. The debt level in 2015 is therefore 70.8% as seen 
above (Figure 4.12).  
Interest rates are expected to increase in reaction to a larger budget 
deficit, which requires both internal and external financing, putting 
pressure on the interest rates. Should the government decide to finance part 
of the deficit from domestic banks, it will lead to crowding-out and will 
increase the interest rates. On the foreign side, an increase in the deficit is 
often perceived as a worrisome sign that increases the country risk and the 
premium on the borrowing rates.  
In our pessimistic scenario, we decided to increase the interest rates 
by 100 basis points more than in the realistic scenario, which leads to an 
increase by 300 basis points in 2012 and 2013, and 200 basis points in 2014 
and 2015. In reaction, the debt ratio increases from 70.8% to 76.1% (Figure 
4.13).  
We also simulated a sharper increase in interest rates, both domestic 
and foreign, by increasing them by 200 and 300 basis points compared to 
our realistic scenario, which lead to an increase in debt to 78.4% and 80.8% 
respectively (Figure 4.13). 
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Figure 4.13 Impact of interest rate increase in Tunisia 
Source: Authors’ own calculations. 
The assumption of an increase in interest rates by 500 basis points 
compared to those that prevailed before the revolution pushes the Tunisian 
debt level for the first time above the psychological threshold of 80% of 
GDP, which is more than double that forecast by the IMF 2010 Article IV 
consultation of 39.8%. It is worth highlighting that interest rates can easily 
increase by much more than the levels simulated here, reaching in some 
cases more than 20% (Greece recently), which might be a serious disaster 
for the Tunisian economy (Figure 4.14). 
Figure 4.14 Sharp increase in interest rates in Tunisia 
 
Source: Authors’ own calculations. 
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The last determinant of the DSA is the exchange rate. In our baseline 
scenario (WEO 2011), we assumed an annual depreciation rate of 2.5%, 
which is the rate used from the beginning of our pessimistic scenario until 
now. When we apply the 5% depreciation per year that we used in our 
realistic scenario, the debt level jumps from 76.1% to 79.1% of GDP. If the 
depreciation increases to 7% annually, the debt level increases to 81.5% 
(Figure 4.15). 
Figure 4.15 The impact of different levels of depreciation of the Tunisian dinar 
 
Source: Authors’ own calculations. 
In our view, the government shouldn’t proceed with a devaluation of 
7% annually, as this might trigger speculative attacks. Agents in the 
economy might be tempted to buy dollars as they are almost sure they will 
get a 7% annual return due to the depreciation, which might amplify the 
demand for dollars and lead to an even-larger depreciation. Therefore, we 
recommend that the government proceeds with a one-time large 
depreciation and maintains the exchange rate fixed thereafter. This will 
provide exports with a strong boost that will help generate a higher GDP 
growth (the J-curve theory), and will prevent any speculative attacks 
against the currency. We simulated three levels of devaluation – 20%, 25% 
and 30% – that takes place only in 2013, and the debt level reaches 
respectively 79.5%, 80.9% and 82.2% (diagrammed in Figure 4.15). It would 
be highly advisable to proceed with the devaluation of the Tunisian dinar 
when the world, and particularly Europe, is witnessing a confirmed 
recovery in order to maximise the benefits of the devaluation on the 
Tunisian economy.  
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4.2.6 Conclusions for the Tunisian economy 
It is clear that the outlook for the debt sustainability in Tunisia is 
worrisome. The four scenarios we presented – the baseline scenario using 
the WEO 2011 data, our realistic, optimistic and pessimistic scenarios – all 
reflect some possibilities for the debt level to increase in the coming years 
(Figure 4.16).  
Figure 4.16 Recap of the four scenarios for Tunisia 
 
 Source: Authors’ own calculations. 
According to our results, the most important factor that could make 
the debt level unsustainable is growth. Lower growth is automatically 
increasing the debt-to-GDP ratio, ceteris paribus.  
In addition, with lower growth, public revenues decline, public 
expenditures increase, leading to a widening budget deficit and a higher 
debt level. The debt sustainability is exacerbated by an increase in interest 
rates due to crowding-out and due to the negative outlook perceived by 
foreign creditors, pushing the debt level even higher. Therefore, focusing 
on growth is essential for debt sustainability.  
4.3 Debt sustainability analysis for Egypt 
Just like for Tunisia, the IMF regularly publishes the debt sustainability 
assessment (DSA) for Egypt in its Article IV consultation report. Given the 
uncertainty and insecurity in the country, however, the latest such report 
dates back to 2010 and we use it as our benchmark. We will proceed in 
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exactly the same sequence as we did for the case of Tunisia, starting with 
the replication of the baseline available in the 2010 Article IV Report. 
4.3.1 Replication of the IMF 2010 Article IV consultation’s DSA 
Figure 4.17 shows the outcome of our exercise reproducing the Public 
Sector Debt Sustainability Framework template and graphs as per the latest 
published Egypt Article IV consultation report, which is based on WEO 
2010 data.  
Figure 4.17 Baseline scenario for Egypt using the data from the IMF’s 2010 Article 
IV report 
  
 Source: IMF Article IV consultation 2010. Source: Authors’ own calculations. 
The debt-to-nominal GDP ratio ends up at 61% in 2015 as given in the 
IMF projections (Table I.1, p. 36 of the IMF report). In the case of Egypt, our 
calculations coincide perfectly with those of the IMF, so we don’t need to 
present the detailed data table and we can directly proceed with the 
adjustments of our baseline with more recent IMF data for Egypt, 
published in the WEO 2011 and 2013,15 respectively. 
                                                     
15 Data available as of April 2013. 
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4.3.2 Baseline using World Economic Outlook (WEO) 2011 and 
2013 data 
In this section, we started modifying one debt sustainability determinant 
(input variable) at a time. First, we updated the real GDP time series with 
the data available in the WEO 2011 database, which demonstrated the very 
first adjustments of the data after the Arab spring. With the lower forecasts 
for the national output, the resulting debt/nominal GDP ratio increases to 
67.5% in 2015, as shown in Figure 4.18, and this is already beyond the 
comfort zone of 60%. 
Figure 4.18 Baseline scenario for Egypt using the data from WEO 2010 and real 
GDP update from WEO 2011 
 
Source: Authors’ own calculations. 
Using the latest published projections (WEO 2013) for real GDP only, 
the ratio rises further to 68.7% (thicker line in Figure 4.19). 
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Figure 4.19 Baseline scenario for Egypt using the data from WEO 2010 and real 
GDP update from WEO 2013 
 
Source: Authors’ own calculations. 
If we are to use both the real GDP and the deflator data and forecasts 
from WEO 2013, the ratio in 2015 falls all the way down to 57.4% (blue line 
on Figure 4.20). However, the GDP deflator data are complicated to 
calculate and are often obtained by dividing the nominal GDP by the real 
GDP numbers, which by themselves are hard to calculate accurately and 
are subject to the IMF’s judgmental approach. If we ‘judgmentally’ assume 
very high deflator numbers, this will generate a high nominal GDP, and 
thus a low debt-to-nominal-GDP ratio, which might represent a 
misleadingly reassuring indicator.  
The reason why we opt to change these two variables first (real GDP 
and deflator) is in order to obtain the most recent nominal GDP variable, 
which is essential as most indicators we are working with are expressed as 
ratios out of nominal GDP. 
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Figure 4.20 Baseline scenario for Egypt using the real GDP and deflator updates 
from WEO 2013 
  
Source: Authors’ own calculations. 
Next, we add to the updates the information about the budget 
revenue and grants, which depend on GDP growth. If we expect lower 
economic growth, we can expect lower sales, lower profits and therefore 
lower tax revenue (all forecasts of budget revenue by the IMF are based on 
the assumptions on revenue/GDP ratio, where GDP matters a great deal). 
Using WEO 2013 revenue data and forecasts, the debt-to-GDP ratio falls to 
51.3% in 2015 (see Figure 4.21).  
Figure 4.21 Baseline scenario for Egypt using the real GDP, deflator and revenue 
updates from WEO 2013 
 
Source: Authors’ own calculations. 
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Nevertheless, we have to keep in mind that the average projected 
revenue growth rate in WEO 2013 from 2012 onwards is 19.7% annually, 
which sounds too optimistic compared to the average growth rate of 11.5% 
projected in WEO 2010, and also compared to what Egypt had achieved 
before the revolution, which was an average of 15.7%. 
The fourth update concerns the general government’s total 
expenditures and is presented on Figure 4.22. Using WEO 2013 data, we 
obtain a debt/GDP ratio of 71.8% in 2015. 
Figure 4.22 Baseline scenario for Egypt using the real GDP, deflator, revenue and 
expenditure updates from WEO 2013 
Source: Authors’ own calculations. 
Next, we updated the information regarding the exchange rate. We 
used the actual IFS 2013 data until 2012, when the exchange rate was 6.3 
Egyptian pounds for one dollar (end of period), and we kept it constant at 
this level until 2015, since the WEO’s general assumption is to keep the 
exchange rate constant for future periods. With that, the debt-to-GDP ratio 
rose to 73.8%, as seen in Figure 4.23. 
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Figure 4.23 Baseline with real GDP, deflator, revenue, expenditure and exchange 
rate in Egypt from WEO 2013 
 
Source: Authors’ own calculations. 
Finally, we kept the forecasts for the debt interest rates and the 
government’s interest payment expenditures unchanged as per WEO 2010. 
We could find updated numbers for 2010-12 published by Egypt’s Ministry 
of Finance, but we couldn’t find any forecasts until 2015, so the series 
would have been inconsistent if we had only changed several observations 
in the middle of it. 
Thus, our ‘baseline WEO 2013’ scenario corresponds to Figure 4.23, in 
which the debt-to-GDP ratio increases steadily in the future until it reaches 
73.8% in 2015. Now we can proceed with our realistic, optimistic and 
pessimistic scenarios. 
4.3.3 Assumptions for the realistic scenario 
Under this scenario, we try to identify the most probable future situation, 
given the constraints of the current economic and political environment.  
Real GDP growth rate assumptions  
The lingering insecurity and political instability remaining in Egypt in 2013 
are not at all promising in terms of returning tourism flows or growing 
economic activity, so during the year we expect that the economy will 
perform only as well as it did in 2012 (i.e. a growth rate of 1.96% versus the 
projected 3.03% in WEO 2013). Next, we project slow recovery and add an 
extra 1% of GDP growth each year – 3% for 2014 and 4% for 2015. With this 
first assumption and all other variables kept at their ‘baseline WEO 2013’ 
levels, the debt-to-GDP ratio reaches 77.1%. 
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GDP deflator assumptions 
We believe that the WEO 2013 data are acceptable as realistic, especially 
taking into consideration the recent depreciation of the Egyptian pound, 
which might put upward pressures on deflator inflation. 
Government revenues assumptions 
First, we expressed the revenues as a percentage of GDP. Next, we adjusted 
the forecasts by assuming that 2013 will be identical to 2012 and that 
revenues will start picking up slowly afterwards to reach 23.5% of GDP in 
2014 and 25% in 2015 – the same level it had in 2010 before the revolution. 
Accordingly, the debt-to-GDP ratio keeps on rising to 83.2%. 
Government total expenditures assumptions  
Given the strong social tensions, numerous strikes and active social justice 
claims, we believe the government will find it very hard to cut 
expenditures drastically. Thus, since expenditures rose by 10.1% in 2011 
and by 17.3% in 2012, we expect them to grow at a slower pace of 15.7% in 
2013 (the average growth between 2003 and 2010), slowing even further to 
14.7% in 2014 and 13.7% in 2015. The budget deficit in this case will climb 
to 11.5% of GDP in 2013, and will then decline to 10.6% in 2014 and further 
to 9.2% in 2015. The effect on the debt-to-GDP ratio is a further increase to 
84.9% in 2015. 
Interest rate assumptions 
We replicated the evolution of interest rates on Treasuries between 2010 
and 2013, and then assumed rates will remain constant until 2015. The 
debt-to-GDP ratio continues rising to reach 89.5% in 2015. 
Exchange rate assumptions  
The exchange rate has been under serious pressure since the revolution and 
the depletion of the official reserves, pushing the central bank to allow the 
Egyptian pound to depreciate continuously – reaching 6.85 pounds per 
dollar on 10 April 2013 (the black market has a much higher rate that we 
will consider in the pessimistic scenario). Our final realistic scenario 
forecast for the debt-to-GDP ratio is 91.1% in 2015, as presented in Figure 
4.24. 
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Figure 4.24 Egypt’s realistic scenario 
 
Source: Authors’ own calculations. 
4.3.4 Assumptions for the optimistic scenario 
We start this simulation using the realistic scenario (presented in Figure 
4.24 above) as ‘initial input’ for our template and graphs. 
Real GDP growth rate assumptions. Should the economic situation 
stabilise promptly, the political situation clarifies and peaceful 
parliamentary elections create a stable government, this will improve the 
country’s attractiveness and generate growth. Thus, our projections are for 
growth of 2.5% in 2013, 3.5% in 2014 and 5% in 2015. The debt-to-GDP ratio 
improves to 88.5% in 2015 instead of 91.1% in the realistic scenario. 
GDP deflator assumptions. Although higher growth could have 
implied slightly higher inflation, we believe that the current under-
utilisation of economic resources will control the inflationary pressures, so 
we keep the data equivalent to that in the baseline and the realistic 
scenario, leaving the debt ratio unchanged at 88.5% at the end of the 
period. 
Government revenue assumptions. If we assume that the 
government will be able to improve tax collection and toughen tax evasion 
laws, we could expect budget revenues equal to 23% of GDP in 2013, 24.5% 
in 2014 and 26% in 2105. This will further improve the debt-to-GDP ratio to 
86% by 2015.  
Government total expenditures assumptions. If the government is 
able to successfully tackle the issues with the food and energy subsidies, if 
it can limit waste and rationalise and optimise fiscal spending, we expect 
expenditures to grow at a slower pace of 14% in 2013, slowing even further 
to 13% in 2014 and 12% in 2015. As a percentage of GDP, these 
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expenditures will amount to respectively 33.3% in 2013 (down from 33.6% 
in 2012), 32.8% in 2014 and 32.1% in 2015. This would reduce the budget 
deficit from 10.3% in 2013, to 8.3% in 2014 and to 6.1% in 2015. Finally, the 
debt-to-GDP ratio will thus fall to 83.1% by the end of the forecast period.  
Interest rate assumptions. Due to an improved security climate, we 
can expect the cost of borrowing to be one percentage point lower in 2013 
and remain stable over the forecast period, resulting in a debt-to-GDP ratio 
of 82.1% by 2015. 
Exchange rate assumptions. We have no reason to believe that the 
exchange rate will appreciate in the coming three years, so we shall keep 
the data the same as in the realistic scenario.  
Figure 4.25 Egypt’s optimistic scenario 
 
Source: Authors’ own calculations. 
Thus, the final debt-to-GDP ratio optimistic forecast presented in 
Figure 4.25 is for 82.1% by 2015, which is still higher than the WEO 2013 
baseline projection of 73.8%, confirming our intuition that the IMF forecasts 
are overly optimistic. 
4.3.5 Assumptions for the pessimistic scenario 
Coming back to the realistic scenario (Figure 4.24) as ‘initial conditions’ for 
our last simulation, we first adjust lower our real GDP growth rate 
assumptions to keep growth at 1.8% in 2013, 2% in 2014, allowing it only to 
pick up to 3% in 2015. Compared to our realistic scenario, this increases the 
debt-to-GDP ratio by more than 2.5 points to 93.8%. 
GDP deflator assumptions. Even if the lower GDP growth would 
cause lower pressure on factors of production, this downward pressure on 
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prices will be offset by the assumption that the exchange rate will further 
depreciate during 2013-14. Thus, we shall again keep the realistic scenario 
data, which reproduced the WEO 2013. 
Government revenues assumptions. Revenues will grow at a slower 
pace than in the realistic scenario at 13.5% annually (the average growth 
rate for the 2002-10 period; equivalent to the 2012 growth rate). This results 
in revenues as a share of GDP of respectively 22.3%, 22.4% and 22.6% for 
2013-15, which corresponds to the projected GDP growth rates and is a fair 
assumption. The value of debt approaches dangerously the value of 
national output with 97.4% by 2015. 
Government total expenditures assumptions. Because of even 
stronger claims for more social justice, salary adjustments, infrastructure 
projects, etc., the government might be unable to keep its expenditures 
under control given the imminent threat of social unrest. Thus, for 2013 we 
project the same growth rate as 2012 of 17.3% (resulting in an expenditures-
to-GDP ratio of 34.5%). For 2014 and 2015, we input the same growth rate 
as the average between 2002 and 2010 of 15.7%, giving a ratio growth-to-
GDP of 35.4% and 36.4% respectively. Accordingly, the budget deficit will 
reach 12.2% in 2013, 12.9% in 2014, and 13.7% in 2015. The debt will reach 
the dangerous threshold of 100% in 2015. 
Interest rate assumptions. The higher budget deficit will lead to 
private investment crowding out and upward pressure on interest rates. 
We will look at three sub-scenarios as a sensitivity test: 
 Interest rates are 1% point (100 basis points) higher in 2013 and 
constant in 2014 and 2015; this gives us a debt-to-GDP ratio of 102.3% 
in 2015. 
 Interest rates are 1% point higher in 2013 and additional 1% point 
higher in 2014, stabilising in 2015; debt-to-GDP is at 104% in 2015. 
 Interest rates are 1% point higher in 2013, an additional 1% point 
higher in 2014 and an additional 1% point higher in 2015 = 104.8% in 
2015. 
The first and third scenarios are presented in Figure 4.26. 
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Figure 4.26 Egypt’s pessimistic scenario – Interest rate simulations 
 
Source: Authors’ own calculations. 
Exchange rate assumptions. Keeping the intermediary interest rate 
scenario 2 (104% debt-to-GDP ratio), we decide to explore again three 
alternatives (from the least to the most pessimistic): 
 The exchange rate will first depreciate by 20% by the end of 2013 as 
compared to the 2011 level to reach 7.25 pounds per dollar and 
remain stable at this level in 2014 and 2015. Debt reaches 105.1% of 
GDP in 2015. 
 The actual level of the exchange rate catches up with the rate on the 
black market, which in the first week of April 2013 is 8 pounds per 
dollar. It remains at this level for the three projection years. Debt 
climbs further to 107.5% of GDP. 
 Speculation and more pressure cause the exchange rate to depreciate 
even further than the current black market rate to reach 8.4 pounds 
per dollar in 2013, and 9 pounds per dollar in 2014 and 2015. The 
debt-to-GDP ratio explodes at 110.3% in 2015. 
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Figure 4.27 Egypt’s pessimistic scenario – Exchange rate simulations 
 
Source: Authors’ own calculations. 
No matter which of the three exchange rate sub-scenarios we might 
choose, the pessimistic outcome for the Egyptian debt-to-GDP ratio 
indicates it will go above 105% only two and a half years from the time of 
writing (see Figure 4.27). 
4.3.6 Conclusions for the Egyptian economy 
After carefully analysing all stress tests for the Egyptian debt sustainability 
framework, we can conclude that the situation in Egypt is significantly 
more worrisome that of Tunisia.  
Even in the worst-case scenarios, Tunisia’s debt-to-GDP ratio reaches 
only the 80% threshold, which is alarming but still much more manageable 
than the ratios that the Egyptian authorities will have to handle. Figure 4.28 
clearly shows that Egypt’s debt goes beyond that threshold even in the 
most-optimistic scenario, going way above those 80% in any other 
circumstance.  
However, our analysis also clearly shows that each scenario for both 
countries, even the most optimistic ones, still looks quite pessimistic 
compared to the latest available IMF forecasts. This is an important policy 
lesson for the two countries’ authorities, requiring their particular 
attention. Unless they understand clearly the possible threats, the sources 
of these threats and the need to properly manage the respective 
macroeconomic variables at the origin of the threats, the debt-to-GDP ratio 
can go way beyond control in a little over two years. 
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Figure 4.28 Summary of the four scenarios for Egypt 
 
Source: Authors’ own calculations. 
4.4 Conclusions and Policy Implications 
The research reveals several vulnerabilities of the Tunisian and Egyptian 
economies that clearly undermine their debt sustainability. 
It is evident that both governments should be extremely careful with 
the evolution of their country’s debt, especially since the world, mostly the 
advanced part of it, is suffering from debt crises, and since financing 
deficits and refinancing debt is becoming more and more difficult and 
costly. 
One important conclusion we can draw from our different scenarios 
is that political instability has significant implications for debt 
sustainability. Political stability is crucial for investments – both domestic 
and foreign – in Egypt and Tunisia, as investors seek a predictable business 
environment (Kamar & Bakardzhieva, 2002). With political uncertainty, 
investments will decline, remain low and will take time to pick-up. This 
means lower production (lower GDP), which might also translate into 
higher unemployment (as the population and the labour force increase 
every year). Lower production also means lower profit for investors and 
lower income for workers, leading to lower revenues for the government. 
This is the first major concern we urge the governments in Tunisia and 
Egypt to pay attention to. As we have seen from their budgets, tax revenues 
are forecasted based on highly optimistic assumptions that do not really 
take into account the possibility of a lower level of private investment and 
therefore a lower level of tax revenue. The direct implication of such an 
optimistic assumption is an increase in the budget deficit and in the debt 
ratio, beyond the level the government expected. Therefore, we strongly 
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recommend to the governments in Tunisia and Egypt that they adopt a 
pessimistic approach to forecasting revenue to be on the safe side and that 
they make their expenditure plans based on careful revenue assumptions. 
Another implication of the political instability is the loss of trust from 
the international community in the ongoing political transition. This can 
lead to downgrades of the countries’ credit ratings and an increase of their 
interest rates for borrowing on the international markets. The case of 
Greece is a fresh example with borrowing rates jumping to 28% when the 
markets lost confidence, despite the strong commitment of the European 
Union and the eurozone to stand by the country. This can also make it 
much more difficult for the government to finance its deficit or to refinance 
its existing debt, putting further pressure on debt sustainability. 
A second important conclusion is related to expenditures. Indeed the 
revolutions claimed more social justice and more employment 
opportunities, but increasing current expenditures would be one big 
mistake. Any government that is freshly elected or seeks re-election or 
more power would be tempted to satisfy the public by increasing wages 
and public-sector employment. Such actions will create a heavy weight to 
carry for years to come. The situation in Tunisia is much better than in 
Egypt, where the deficit and the debt ratio are already very high, but the 
implications on debt sustainability are the same. Therefore, we strongly 
advise the governments to avoid any unnecessary current expenditures (in 
the economic, not the political or social sense), and to try to minimise and 
rationalise all areas of spending, e.g. subsidies and purchases of goods and 
services. If any kind of public expenditure is required to stimulate growth, 
it should be oriented mainly towards capital expenditure (government 
investment), particularly in infrastructure projects that could yield a 
significant impact on growth, and preferably oriented towards “Public-
Private Partnership” projects, which could also stimulate domestic private 
investments. 
Finally, it is clear that the exchange rate could be an issue for debt 
sustainability. On the one hand, maintaining a fixed exchange rate at an 
overvalued level is harmful for the whole economy and is obviously 
unsustainable. On the other hand, the devaluation of the currency can lead 
to serious implications for debt sustainability. Tunisia is again in a much 
healthier position than Egypt. The sharp decline in the official reserves in 
Egypt, combined with an appreciation of the real effective exchange rate 
over the past ten years, reflect the urgent need for an exchange rate 
correction. The recent depreciation is a step in the right direction, but the 
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continuous interventions from the Central Bank are both irrational and 
harmful. The Gulf countries’ deposits in the Central Bank are absorbed by 
the market right away, leading to the need for more borrowing. The 
mismanagement of the exchange rate in Egypt is only leading to higher 
debt without any stabilisation of the market. Therefore, and in the absence 
of alternatives, the government should authorise the Central Bank to allow 
the exchange rate to float and depreciate. This will increase the debt ratio, 
indeed, but it will avoid accumulating more and more foreign debt, and 
ultimately the need to devalue the pound, and incur an even higher debt. 
Finally, which scenarios seem the most plausible given the most 
recent data and events in both countries? 
Tunisia. When we implemented our assumptions for Tunisia, final 
data for 2012 were not yet published, so we used 2011 data and we 
implemented our own assumptions for 2012 and thereafter. Now that we 
have the most recent data published in 2013, we can make a comparison 
with our assumptions to see in which direction the debt is heading. In 
order to clarify our comparison, we summarised our assumptions, the 
IMF’s baseline and the most recent data in Table 4.2 below. 
Table 4.2 Summary of the assumptions and results for the different scenarios for 
Tunisia, 2012 
 
Real 
GDP 
Growth 
Fiscal 
revenue 
 % 
growth 
Fiscal 
expenditure 
% growth 
Interest 
rate 
Exchange 
rate 
Debt 
to 
GDP 
Baseline 3.9% 8.8% 5.9% 0 -2.5% 47.9% 
Realistic 2.5% 13.5% 16% +200 -5% 53.2% 
Optimistic 3.5% 16% 12% +100 -2% 48.6% 
Pessimistic 1% 11.5% 18% +300 -7% 55.3% 
IMF 2013 3.6% 6.6% 12.3% 0 -10% 44.0% 
 
When comparing the numbers published in 2013 for the indicators 
we used in our different scenarios, we can see that real GDP growth in 2012 
is 3.6%, which is lower than the IMF’s previous forecasts of 3.9%, but very 
close to our realistic forecast of 3.5%. Fiscal revenue’s growth is lower than 
the IMF’s forecasts and also much lower than our three scenarios, where 
the pessimistic forecasts we used were 11.5%. Growth in expenditures is 
much higher than the IMF’s forecasts of 5.9%, reaching 12.3%, which is 
122 | DEBT SUSTAINABILITY ASSESSMENT IN EGYPT & TUNISIA 
 
very close to our optimistic scenario of 12%. Interest rates on public debt 
seem not to have changed, leading to a better outcome than our three 
scenarios, while the exchange rate depreciated by 10%, which is much 
worse than our three scenarios, but closer to some of our pessimistic 
scenarios. 
Overall, the IMF publication of public debt dynamics shows a 
stagnation of the debt-to-GDP ratio at 44%, which is an improvement 
compared to their previous estimations for 2012 at 47.9%, which is 
puzzling. In analysing the assumptions, we find that we arrive at a lower 
GDP growth than previously expected, a lower growth of revenue, a higher 
growth of expenditures and higher exchange rate depreciation. Each of 
these facts alone leads to a higher debt-to-GDP ratio, and combined, they 
should lead to a noticeable increase in the debt-to-GDP ratio. A closer look 
into the assumptions shows that the IMF incorporated a residual corrective 
number of 3.5% to offset the impact of all those variables on debt, which is 
why the debt remains constant, and no explanation for this correction is 
given. In our scenarios, we set this residual item to 0% to avoid any 
manipulation of the results, as nothing can make us predict what would be 
a residual in the future.  
Therefore, if we decide to exclude the residual figures, the debt-to-
GDP ratio would be 44% + 3.5% = 47.5%. This result is very close to our 
optimistic scenario, reflecting the fact that overall the Tunisian economy is 
doing well and has a strong potential of a fast recovery. Taking into 
account the dependency of the Tunisian economy on the European 
economy, and given the very low current growth of its main partners 
(France and Italy), the outlook for Tunisia is very positive in our view, as it 
would certainly benefit from a future recovery in the EU, which will 
contribute to strengthening most of the Tunisian economic indicators and 
significantly improving its debt levels. 
Egypt. The analysis of the case of Egypt is different as we used the 
2012 final data published in 2013, so we implemented our assumptions 
only from 2013 onward. However, what we have to focus on is the recent 
“Revolution 2”, which took place on 30 June 2013, when the former elected 
President Mohamed Morsi was overthrown by street protests supported by 
the army. 
Beyond the ongoing debate on whether this major political event was 
justified or not, we will try to set aside any personal judgment and look at 
the potential implications for the debt dynamics in the coming years. 
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Clearly, Egypt is today at a crossroad and we can’t tell which scenario is 
more plausible. 
Without a doubt, the economic situation in Egypt worsened in 2012, 
on both the fiscal and monetary level. In our view, this is due to the 
political instability and insecurity, but mainly due to the lack of 
implementation of reforms by the former government. The significant 
issues with subsidies were not tackled, leading to an increase in the budget 
deficit, in the additional financing needs and in the debt. On the monetary 
front, the official reserves continued to decline, leading to additional 
borrowing to finance the balance-of-payment needs, which also contributed 
to an increase in debt. 
Looking ahead, and as we write this conclusion, a new government is 
in place composed of experts and technocrats, not representing any 
particular party or fraction. At the same time, supporters of the former 
President Morsi are still gathering and violence is escalating with the 
armed forces. 
If this situation deteriorates and mutates into street fighting between 
Morsi’s supporters and the police and military forces, the economic 
situation will deteriorate even further and we will clearly move towards 
the pessimistic scenario, at least in the short term. If the Muslim 
Brotherhood comes back to power (even though there is a very low 
probability for that), the outlook will remain gloomy for a long period as 
the society will be clearly fractured and the business community will be 
reluctant to invest. 
But if the new government stays in power and the transition takes 
place smoothly, without violence, and the new ministers take action very 
fast and begin implementing sound policies that would have a positive and 
immediate effect on people’s daily lives, like handling the fuel, electricity 
and bread shortages, then even Morsi’s supporters will be tempted to give 
them a chance. This, in itself, will help create a healthy environment for 
introducing the right reforms, and will also reassure both domestic and 
foreign investors that a new era of stability is dawning in the country. The 
first sign of a positive reaction to the recent political changes is the 
commitment by several Arab countries to financially assist Egypt by 
providing billions of dollars of donations and deposits that will certainly 
help to stabilise the foreign exchange market. In this case, perhaps we 
could move towards the optimistic scenario by 2014. 
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ANNEX 
CASE STUDIES: TUNISIA AND EGYPT 
Tunisia 
With unchanged policies, Tunisia’s gross public debt-to-GDP ratio is 
projected to decline slowly, from 43% in 2009 to below 40% by 2015. This 
assumes a primary deficit of 0.9% of GDP over the period 2010–15, with the 
average nominal interest rate on public debt declining from 4.9% to 3.8% 
over the same period. The public debt profile is in line with the 
government’s objective to reduce the ratio to below 40% over the medium 
term. 
At the same time, the government is intending to undertake major fiscal 
reforms over the medium term, but this is not likely to result in a noticeably 
different path for the public debt-to-GDP ratio. In particular, the authorities 
are proceeding with a major reform of the tax system, while maintaining 
strict controls over public spending, as outlined in the main text of the IMF 
staff report. As a result, the central government deficit (excluding grants 
and privatisation receipts) is projected to decline from 3.0% of GDP in 2009 
to just over 2.0% of GDP by 2015. Moreover, the authorities intend to 
submit a draft law to the Parliament in the coming months that will 
guarantee the financial viability of pension schemes by changing their main 
parameters. 
If key assumptions are held over the next five years at their historical 
averages, the general government primary deficit would be on average 
slightly lower than the implied primary deficit underlying the 
government’s current fiscal strategy. This mainly reflects conservative 
revenue projections in the context of the government’s intended tax reform 
measures. Thus, under the scenario with the key variables at their historical 
averages, the decline in public debt would be somewhat more rapid and 
reach just over 38% of GDP by 2015. 
The debt outlook is moderately vulnerable to adverse shocks. 
Standard bound tests reveal the following: 
 As almost 60% of public debt is denominated in foreign currency, 
30% real exchange rate depreciation would increase the public debt-
to-GDP ratio by around 9½ percentage points of GDP relative to the 
baseline in 2015. 
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 With a contingent liabilities shock, the debt path would also increase 
throughout the projection period, raising the gross public debt-to-
GDP ratio by around 9 percentage points of GDP above the baseline 
scenario. 
 A one-half standard deviation shock to real GDP growth over the 
projection period will add just over 4 percentage points to the public 
debt-to-GDP ratio relative to the baseline projection by 2015. 
 Smaller shocks – including individual one-half standard deviation 
shocks to interest rates and to the primary balance, and a combined 
one-fourth standard deviation shock – would all result in a public 
debt-to-GDP ratio of under 42% by the end of the projection period. 
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Egypt 
Under current policies, Egypt’s gross public debt-to-GDP ratio is expected 
to remain broadly unchanged at 73% of GDP by FY2014-15. This public 
debt-to-GDP ratio – slightly lower than that recorded during the previous 
two years – is based on the FY2009-10 budget and assumes largely 
unchanged policies thereafter, involving primary deficits for the general 
government and the budget sector as a percent of GDP of about 3% and 
2.3%, respectively, over the medium term. 
However, Egypt’s gross public debt could decline by 15 percentage 
points to about 61% of GDP in FY2014-15, if the government adheres to its 
fiscal consolidation strategy (baseline). The government’s consolidation 
strategy entails a reduction of 5% of GDP both in the general government 
and budget sector deficits over the next five years, bringing them down to 
about 3.7 and 3.3% of GDP by FY2014-15. The strategy also seeks to turn 
the general government and budget sector primary deficits into surpluses 
of about 1.52% of GDP by FY2014-15. 
If key assumptions are held over the next five years at their historical 
averages, the general government primary deficit would be on average 
higher than the implied primary deficit in the government’s consolidation 
strategy. Thus, the decline in gross public debt would be slightly more 
moderate at 62.4% of GDP by FY2014-15. 
The debt outlook remains vulnerable to adverse shocks. Standard 
bound tests reveal the following: 
 As a quarter of the debt is denominated in foreign currency, a 30% 
real exchange rate depreciation would increase the debt-to-GDP ratio 
by around 9 percentage points relative to the baseline in FY2014-15. 
 With a contingent liabilities shock, the debt path would also increase 
throughout the projection period, raising the gross public debt-to-
GDP ratio by about 9 percentage points above the baseline. 
 Even under smaller shocks – individual one-half standard deviation 
shocks to real growth, interest rates and the primary balance and a 
combined one-fourth standard deviation shock – the debt-to-GDP 
ratios would exceed the projections in the baseline scenario by 5.8% 
over the projection period. 
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5. MONETARY POLICY PRE AND POST-
CRISIS  
SAMI MOULEY 
he global financial crisis has called for a rethinking of monetary 
policies and role of central banking in the southern and eastern 
Mediterranean countries (SEMCs). This chapter assesses the 
challenges of the conduct of monetary policies and explores new elements 
in the evolving roles of central banks in the aftermath of the crisis and the 
changing macroeconomic environment in the region.  
5.1 Operational frameworks of monetary policies conduct 
An analysis of the tools for implementation of monetary policies by central 
banks in Mediterranean countries in both the pre- and post-crisis periods 
reveals an apparent homogeneity in their operational frameworks, albeit 
with differences in detail and varying degrees of progress (Table 5.1). 
Although price stability remains the announced final objective, their 
weaknesses in terms of regulation and control of interest rates as an 
operational objective mean that the monetary authorities also adopt 
quantitative approaches based on targeting monetary and credit aggregates 
as intermediate objectives.  
Differences are nevertheless discernible in the oil-exporting countries 
(Algeria and Libya in particular), with restrictive monetary policies in place 
to control the monetary base and absorb the structural liquidity surplus in 
the banking system. In the other countries, restrictive monetary policies are 
used by raising key interest rates in order to maintain positive real interest 
rates in the money market. Generally, one can discern a lower level of 
interest rates in the dynamics of growth, except in the case of crisis exit 
strategies (Tunisia, Egypt), and measures for diversification of the 
instruments of monetary policies, with gradual recourse to underlying and 
core indicators. 
Limited operational independence and slow migration to systems for 
formal inflation-targeting characterise most of the central banks, with the 
T
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exception of Turkey and Morocco. The excessive use of subsidies and price 
control mechanisms seems to be the main obstacle to the adoption of 
explicit inflation targets.  
Regarding exchange rate policies, targeting the real effective 
exchange rate is the operational rule in the case of countries choosing 
managed floating schemes, while fixed anchoring of the nominal exchange 
rate is the primary instrument in the pegging regimes to the dollar or to 
Special Drawing Rights (SDRs). 
Programmes aimed at restructuring of banking systems (supervision, 
prudential norms, etc.) for better resilience have been initiated, but 
recurring vulnerabilities remain concentrated in the portfolios of non-
performing loans with insufficient provisioning (except in the particular 
case of Morocco). In addition, the attractiveness of foreign investment in 
most countries is diminished by several constraints, in particular the slow 
pace of capital accounts liberalisation and the lack of management 
structures for systemic liquidity.  
Table 5.1 Operational frameworks for monetary policy in selected SEMCs  
 Final objective Intermediate  objective (target) 
Instruments  
of control 
Operational 
framework 
Algeria Inflation rate Stability of real exchange rate 
Central bank’s key 
interest rate Liquidity rate control 
Egypt Inflation rate 
Stability of nominal 
exchange rate 
Core inflation index 
Central bank’s Key 
interest rate  
Rules of broad money 
control  
Monetary targeting 
Implicit mechanism of 
inflation targeting 
Jordan Inflation rate Monetary base Reserve requirement ratios 
Nominal exchange rate 
targeting 
Lebanon Inflation rate Stability of nominal exchange rate Liquidity rate 
Sterilisation 
mechanism 
Control of treasury 
bonds rate 
Morocco Inflation rate Stability of real exchange rate 
Central bank’s Key 
interest rate  
Formal mechanism of 
inflation targeting 
Tunisia Inflation rate 
Stability of real 
exchange rate 
Monetary base 
Reserve requirement 
ratio 
Central bank’s key 
interest rate  (call for 
bids rate)  
Monetary targeting 
Turkey Inflation rate Stability of real exchange rate 
Central bank’s key 
interest rate  
Formal mechanism of 
inflation targeting 
Source: Compilation by authors. 
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In Algeria, a cautious monetary policy has been pursued in line with 
the official objective of controlling inflation. Hence, the Bank of Algeria has 
continued to absorb the structural liquidity surplus of the banking system 
through auctions to counterbalance budgetary stimulation and the rapid 
growth in bank deposits by the national oil company. The expansion of 
credit in the economy has slowed significantly. 
Egypt had an extremely high rate of inflation, reaching 16.2% in 2008-
09, before falling to 11.7% in 2009-10, because of the rise in the price of 
wheat, increases in salaries and a partial reduction of subsidies on fuels. At 
the end of August 2008, the consumer price index reached a peak of 23.6% 
on a year-on-year basis. Monetary policy was thus accommodative and 
reactive, as it was during the global financial crisis when in 2009 the central 
bank introduced six increases of the key interest rate to contain inflationary 
pressures and ensure macroeconomic stability. In fact, the central bank has 
begun a gradual process of migration towards a formal system of inflation-
targeting by developing new monetary instruments to allow a new target 
rate to be set. In 2009, the central bank launched a core inflation index 
based on the unadjusted Consumer Price Index (CPI). 
In Jordan, the annual average inflation rate, determined by the 
Consumer Price Index (CPI) reached 13.9% in 2008,1 in response mainly to 
the trend in oil and food prices. Also, the depreciation of the US dollar 
partially contributed to the increase of the inflation rate during this period 
due to the pegging of the local currency to the dollar. In order to manage 
inflationary pressures, the Central Bank of Jordan adopted a monetary 
policy based on price stability. In 2009, it lowered its key interest rate three 
times (by 0.5% each time), decreased the reserve requirement rate and 
suspended the depositary certificate’s issues to strengthen the liquidity of 
the country’s financial system. 
During the first half of the last decade, Lebanon had low inflation 
rates. However, due to the hike in world food and oil prices observed since 
2006, inflation rose sharply to reach 10.8% in 2008 before dropping to 4.5% 
in 2010. The Central Bank of Lebanon is pursuing a monetary policy totally 
oriented towards stabilising the exchange rate of the local currency against 
the dollar by controlling the volume of liquidity. Against this backdrop a 
                                                     
1 In 2008, Jordan ended subsidies on petrol and gas products. This led to a sharp 
rise in the prices of these products in the local market and contributed to the rise in 
inflation. 
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downward trend in the level of interest rates was recorded, combined with 
measures to combat the inflationary effects of capital inflows. The 
monetary sector performed well, reflecting the positive trend in the real 
sphere and recording a massive reconversion of assets into local currency, 
estimated at more than $10 billion in 2009 (against $8 billion in 2008), 
resulting in a de facto reduction in the dollarisation rate of deposits at 63.2% 
in 2010 (the lowest level in 10 years). Moreover, these reconversions 
considerably strengthened the foreign currency assets of the central bank, 
which reached an envelope of $29.6 billion in 2010 (i.e. 10.3 months of 
imports and roughly 80% of GDP) against $28.3 billion in 2009 and $19.7 
billion in 2008. However, this generated an abundance of liquidity in 
Lebanese pounds, hence lowering the interest rates on local currency 
deposits. The banking system is structurally supported by the increase in 
deposits at a steady pace (approximately 11% in 2010) due to the 
attractiveness of the remuneration rates and the confidence inspired in 
depositors from tying the Lebanese pound to the dollar. Nevertheless, 
Lebanese banks prefer to cover the major part of the financing needs of the 
State rather than grant credits to the private sector. This means they are 
exposed to sovereign risk and also vulnerable to strong dollarisation of 
deposits. 
In Morocco over the last two years, inflation trends were marked by a 
significant easing of the pressures inherent in the demand. The inflation 
rate stabilised in 2009 as well as in 2010 at only 1%, compared to 3.7% in 
2008. This moderate trend can mainly be explained by the weak pressure 
from internal demand, by the performance of monetary policy as well as 
the continuous intervention by the government through social welfare 
funds. Trends in the monetary sector have been characterised by a marked 
slowing in the money supply and credit. Indeed, the growth of the M3 
money supply slowed down in 2010 at 4.8% compared to 7% in 2009 and 
13.5% in 2008. Bank loans to the economy followed the same trend, 
increasing by only 10% in 2010, compared to 12% in 2009 and 23.4% in 
2008. This downswing shows a return to levels in compliance with the 
fundamentals of the economy and this took place after the strong growth of 
these two indicators observed during the period 2005-07. 
Monetary policy is based on the mechanisms of quantitative 
regulation. Its main objective is to control inflation in line with economic 
development. It was a major factor in maintaining the inflation rate at a low 
level, in conserving foreign balances and strengthening the stability of the 
real exchange rate of the Dirham. According to the IMF, the Central 
Moroccan Bank now generally satisfies the prerequisites for inflation 
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targeting: it has operational independence, the expertise and the necessary 
statistical resources as well as a full range of monetary policy instruments 
which it continues to improve. Its analytical and operational framework is 
very close to that of the central banks that have adopted explicit inflation 
targets.  
In Tunisia, the implementation of monetary policy is characterised by 
a trend in the interest rate that is dependent on the mechanism of 
managing banking liquidity. Thus, in spite of the amendment to the 
statutes of the Central Bank of Tunisia (CBT) in May 2006, which sets price 
stability as the ultimate objective of monetary policy implementation, the 
current operational framework is still dominated by a two-fold device. The 
first is a result of targeting the real effective exchange rate with the 
objective of achieving a competitive depreciation of it. Therefore the CBT 
intervenes daily in a discretionary manner, even by way of indication, in 
order to correct the value of the nominal effective exchange rate in a band 
of 1% between the bid price and the selling rate of the dinar vis-à-vis the 
main foreign currencies. The second device focuses on a system of 
intermediate control of monetary aggregates in the broad sense as a stage 
to be later transformed into a system that formally targets inflation, but 
where the factors and prerequisites are far from being verified.2 In 
particular, since the key interest rate is not fully under control as an 
operational objective, the CBT continues using, as a temporary measure, a 
quantitative approach based on monetary aggregates (M3) targeting as an 
intermediate objective, by influencing the monetary base as the operational 
objective and essentially by controlling the instruments of the key interest 
rate (call for bids rate) and the required reserve rate. At the same time, the 
problems inherent in the mechanism in place related to the predictability of 
banking liquidity do not allow sufficient flexibility in the money market 
rate because the existing scheme of financial programming used by the CBT 
is based on monetary targeting for the purpose of projecting an annual, and 
later a monthly, target for M3 monetary aggregate (intermediate objective).  
As needed for the refinancing operations purposes of the CBT, a 
target for the monetary base (operational objective since 2004) is deducted 
at the end of December, by applying the monthly multipliers observed 
                                                     
2 Due firstly to several obvious obstacles, in particular the practice of managed 
prices and the absence of economic and institutional independence of the CBT, and 
secondly, the necessary migration at first to a system of a fully flexible exchange 
rate regime, which is not technically possible at present.  
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between M3 and the monetary base throughout the current year. This 
allows a ratio between the estimated M3 monthly target and the monthly 
target for the monetary base (used as a control variable for fine-tuning 
monetary policy operations)3 to be established. In particular, the current 
system for controlling banking liquidity and projections of refinancing 
operations undertaken by the CBT is based on forecasts of the autonomous 
liquidity factors, with the objective of preserving the short-term average 
money market interest rate (TMM) in a band of more or less 12 basis points 
of variability only. 
Moreover, at the level of the institutional framework for controlling 
banking liquidity, the choice of monetary policy mechanisms has 
privileged indirect fine-tuning instruments in the form of call for bid’s 
operations. The other instruments are only minimally operational and have 
limited efficiency.4 Indeed, and since the genuinely operational instrument 
the central bank uses is liquidity volume, the equilibrium in the interbank 
money market and control of the money supply are ensured by daily 
injections (or repurchasing) of liquidity. Managing liquidity needs in this 
way permits adjustment of supply to the demand for central bank money 
without a significant variation in the interest rate.  
The forecast mechanism for banking liquidity is based on monetary 
targets and is constrained by the inherent difficulties in the current system. 
In fact, the financial programming plan used as a basis for setting the 
annual target for M3 monetary aggregate (intermediate objective) and for 
projecting banking liquidity depends on the estimation of a money demand 
function which integrates specifically the annual projections for GDP5 and 
                                                     
3 Nevertheless, the multipliers of the monetary base (and of the adjusted monetary 
base) for the M3 aggregate were, especially in recent years, higher than the 
projected multipliers, without correcting the accumulated differences on a monthly 
basis. Therefore the divergence between the monthly target for the monetary base, 
which is estimated from the target for M3 monthly growth, and monetary policy 
interventions are not eliminated from one month to the next, from whence derive 
the increasing cumulative differences between M3 and its intermediate target. 
4 Such as, for example, open-market transactions, repurchase options repo, 
allowances uptakes, credit standing facilities or deposit standing facilities.  
5 But also of some of its internal components including national savings, the 
external debt, the balance of payments outcome as well as the parameters for 
public finances – all provided by specialised agencies (namely ITCEQ, on the basis 
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those of bank credits stemming from macroeconomic development plans 
and annual budgets.6 Once the parameters of the money demand function 
are stable,7 it is then a question of deriving the profile or the monthly target 
for M3 aggregate from the estimate of its cyclical trend, its seasonal 
component and its irregular (residue) component.  
For the refinancing needs of the Central Bank of Tunisia (CBT), a 
target for the monetary base (operational objective since 2004) is deducted 
at the end of December by applying the monthly multipliers between M3 
and the monetary base throughout the current year; this allows a ratio 
between the estimated monthly target for M3 and the monthly target for 
the monetary base to be established. This latter estimated variable is used 
as a control variable for fine-tuning monetary policy operations. In 
particular, projections of banking liquidity and consequent refinancing 
operations are made on the basis of forecasts of autonomous liquidity 
factors, with the objective of maintaining an average short-term interest 
rate for the money market band within a band of +/- 12 basis points of 
variability.  
Nevertheless, the current forecasting mechanism shows some 
weaknesses. In particular the multipliers of the monetary base (and of the 
adjusted monetary base) for M3 aggregates8 were higher compared with 
the forecast multipliers,9 especially in recent years; and the accumulated 
deviations were not subject to any monthly corrections. Therefore, the 
deviations between the monthly target of the monetary base, which is 
estimated from the M3 monthly growth target and monetary policy 
interventions, are not eliminated from one month to the next. This results in 
increasing cumulative differences between M3 and its intermediate target, 
                                                                                                                                       
of its computable general equilibrium model used for the compiling 
macroeconomic forecasts). 
6 The target may be revised regularly according to occasional intra-annual updates 
on the development plan. 
7 In particular, econometric studies on this question show that income and interest 
elasticities, which are estimated on the basis of this money demand function, 
although positive, reveal the relative weakness of the second parameter compared 
to the first, due to the continuing incapacity of monetary policy to use interest rates 
as an operational objective. 
8 Intermediate target used by CBT since 1989. 
9 Regarding projected multipliers. 
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which were the cause of increasing excess liquidity in the banking system. 
Furthermore, the cumulative differences between growth rates of the 
monetary base and the M3 aggregate, have led to large deviations since 
2004 between forecasted compared with the observed target of monetary 
aggregates, and which therefore contributed to excess of liquidity.10 
The money market rate responds to the management of the banking 
liquidity by CBT and in particular to the evolution of the call for bids rate, 
which represents the central bank’s key interest rate (TDAO). Nevertheless, 
in practice, the evolution of the money market rate (TMM) was 
characterised by three tendencies: i) initially, full indexation to the TDAO 
previously fixed at 5%; ii) then, partial de-indexation of the key interest rate 
raised to 5.25% and finally iii) the beginning of a full de-indexation of the 
key rate reduced in February 2009 by 75 basis points to settle at 4.50%. 
In fact, this de-indexation is not only linked to the drop in the key 
interest rate but above all to the introduction of two new money market 
instruments during the same period in accordance with CBT circular to 
credit institutes No. 2009-07, dated 19 February 2009. It concerns credit and 
deposits standing facilities for 24 hours for banks allowing them to cover 
their needs or place temporary liquidity surpluses. The deposit facility is 
remunerated at a rate equal to the CBT’s key rate minus a margin.  
A band (corridor) of 100 basis points is set between the interest rate 
on the deposit facility (TFD 24h) set at 4% and the interest rate on the credit 
facility (TFP 24h) set at 5%. Since the CBT turned away from fine tuning in 
February 2009, convergence between the money market rate and TFD 24h 
occurred. Therefore, instead of inferring a flexibility to a drop in the money 
market rate, these new instruments totally de-indexed the money market 
rate of the CBT’s key rate (call for bids rate, TDAO) and led to a de facto and 
gradual convergence of it with the interest rate on deposit facilities, which 
remains high considering the financing needs of companies by structurally 
inducing disproportionate loan costs (Figure 5.1). 
                                                     
10 At the M3 level, the average deviation in the period 2004-10, for example, was 
1,301 MDT, which also coincides with the global surplus liquidity in the banking 
system.  
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Figure 5.1 Convergence of deposit rates 2006-2009 in the case of Tunisia 
  
 
Finally, despite a context of strong growth in food and energy prices, 
Turkey enjoyed in 2009 its best performance regarding inflation for years. 
The inflation rate stabilised at 6.3%. In 2010 inflationary pressures were 
highly exacerbated due the global hike in prices for basic products and also 
due to the increase in locally managed prices (the price of gas in particular). 
Consequently inflation reached 8.6%. At the same time, as part of its efforts 
to cope with the world crisis and its global repercussions, an 
unprecedented softening of the monetary policy was noted from November 
2008 until December 2009, with a drop in the key rate of 1,025 basis points. 
5.1.1 Transmission channels of monetary policies post crisis  
Although the trends in inflation in the post crisis period are globally 
dependent on the international prices for energy and food as well as 
pressures inherent in domestic demand in the Mediterranean region, the 
transmission channels for monetary policies depends on other factors. The 
determinants of inflation address simultaneously i) inflationary 
components of monetary origin, ii) inflationary components induced by 
internal demand (or cyclical factors) and iii) early indicators linked to 
exogenous factors. In our case practice, the non-availability of all data on a 
monthly basis (specifically for GDP, import prices index11 to detect 
                                                     
11 These data are available only on an annual and quarterly basis (since 2000). In 
particular the use of monthly values for the output gap calculated from filtered 
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imported inflation and pass-through or other specific qualitative indicators) 
means that valid proxies must be selected.  
A modelling based on VAR and VECM systems and on simulations 
of impulse shocks led to the conclusion of the primacy of monetary 
channels (bank loans and nominal effective exchange rate) in the 
transmission of monetary policies. Generally it illustrates the difficulty of 
using the interest rate as an operational objective (except in certain 
countries). Notwithstanding the anticipatory mechanisms, the theoretical 
determinants of inflation can be divided into three groups:  
First of all, taking Tunisia as the reference case, an evaluation of the 
impacts of specific economic determinants on the behaviour of inflation 
was made on a monthly frequency basis for the period 01:2004 – 12:2009. In 
particular the following battery of determinants for inflation in Tunisia was 
used:12 
- At the level of structural factors or inflation components of monetary 
origin, behaviour of loans to the economy (CREDEC) and the trend in 
the nominal effective exchange rate (TCEN)13 were selected to 
determine the mechanism ascribed to the exchange rate pass-through 
effect.  
- At the level of domestic demand components or cyclical inflation 
factors, initially imported inflation was used. In this context we 
referred to fluctuations in the international price for energy imports 
(PENERGI).14 Generally speaking, variability of international prices 
of main imported raw materials (energy and non-energy) is 
                                                                                                                                       
trends of an industrial production index (as a proxy for monthly GDP) does not 
allow satisfactory econometric estimations to be established. All the data are from 
Central Bank of Tunisia.  
12 To this is added, of course, price inflation for foodstuffs as a determinant of 
inflation in Tunisia, and incidentally visible from the comparison between inflation 
(headline inflation) and underlying inflation (core inflation). See supra. 
13 A specific methodology was used to calculate the TCEN on a monthly basis. For 
details, see Mouley (2011). 
14 We have used the international Brent oil price in dollar. The volatility of 
imported energy prices (Brent oil price) can in fact be used as a valid proxy for 
imported inflation. 
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considered as a proxy not only for imported inflation but also of 
exogenous supply shocks.15  
- Finally, the cyclical position of the economy is evaluated based on 
variance in real GDP at constant prices approximated by the 
industrial production index (IPI)16 base 100:2000. Because of a high 
correlation rate between the growth rate of quarterly GDP and the 
growth rate of the industrial production index (IPI), the latter was in 
fact used as a direct proxy for monthly GDP.17 Also, using the IPI 
means agriculture can be excluded from production since it is a sector 
that is heavily dependent on the vagaries of the weather and would 
tend to distort the results of the econometric estimations.18  
The inflation rate (TINF) is based on monthly inflation with year-on-
year rates and is calculated from the monthly consumer price index (IPC).19 
We have added the trend in the monetary market rate (TMM) to these 
determinants, to allow for monetary policy intervention in the interbank 
market, as well as the trend in the stock market index (TUNINDEX) base 
100:2000. On the other hand, at the level of exogenous variables, besides the 
price for energy imports (PENERGI), we have added variability of foreign 
supply, approximated by the fluctuation in the industrial production index 
                                                     
15 Previous studies have already demonstrated that these are the obvious causes of 
inflation in Tunisia (see, in particular, IMF, 2010). 
16 This is a suitable approximation of the cyclical position of the economy due to 
the absence of data on a monthly or quarterly basis for productivity. 
17 Globally, the same results for estimates are obtained when the IPI is used to 
establish a monthly frequency from the quarterly GDP according to the Chow and 
Lin method. 
18 The output gap, calculated from the gaps between the industrial production 
index on a monthly basis compared with its potential value (confirming the 
argument of Stock & Watson, 1999), can also provide a determinant for the 
behaviour of aggregate demand where data are available only on an annual basis 
but which, however, are nevertheless fundamental to detect inflationary 
movements due to the rise in demand. However, the consideration of the output 
gap on a monthly basis did not provide appropriate statistical adequation in the 
models used. 
19 The IPC is an index of Laspeyres (base 100:2000) calculated from a basket 
containing 952 products divided into six groups (food, housing, clothing, health, 
transport, services and others) and 43 subgroups of products. The weightings are 
linked to the last survey on budget and household consumption. 
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of the eurozone (IPIZE). All the data used are expressed as logarithms in 
terms of levels except for the interest rate. 
The procedures of augmented Dickey-Fuller tests (ADF) applied to 
variables converted into logarithms (except for money market rate) enabled 
us to reject the null hypothesis of the unit root for all variables which are 
therefore non-stationary in level. However, first differences show a 
stationary behaviour. A non-stationary state of variables in level means 
making econometric estimates in a multivariate frame. In the absence of co-
integration relationships between the variables used, a VAR model in terms 
of level is estimated without restrictions on the estimated coefficients.20 
Since all variables are I(1) in level and thus I(0) in first difference, the 
VAR(p) model estimated in level is expressed as follows: 
 
Where  is the vector of endogenous variables, a vector of 
exogenous variables and  a residual vector. The structure of the lags or 
the number of optimal lags in the VAR model was determined using 
Akaike’s AIC information criterion as well as using the likelihood ratio test 
(LR), which consists of comparing two alternative lags according to the 
following set of hypotheses: 
 
The test statistics can be expressed as follows: 
                                                     
20 The restrictions on the estimated coefficients deducted from a co-integration 
relationship allow us in fact to construct a structural model based on estimating a 
VECM shape with errors correction. The imposition of long-term restrictions 
deducted from a co-integration relationship improves the quality of VAR estimates 
appreciably. We can convert the model to VAR-S by using a Cholesky 
decomposition applied to the residual vector 
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 and , respectively are the log likelihoods relating to the 
estimation of  and  models.  are variance-
covariance matrices of the residual estimation of  and  
models respectively which are expressed as follows: 
 
 indicates the determinant of , i=0,1.  indicates the 
number of restrictions under a null hypothesis . (n) is the number of 
equations or endogenous variables. By comparing specifications of VAR(1) 
and VAR(2), the preceding tests enabled us to conclude that dynamics are 
better expressed by the specification VAR(1).21  
The effects of the impulses and the implementation of monetary 
policy on the level of inflation are generally transmitted through the 
following channels:  
 Interest rate channel: In the sense that a variation in the real interest 
rate affects the decisions of economic agents through higher costs of 
financing consumption and investment. 
 Exchange rate channel:22 A modification of the intervention measures 
of the monetary policy acting on the interest rate results in a 
reallocation of financial portfolios, which impacts on the exchange 
rate23 in an open economy with capital mobility. It results in price-
effects of the exchange rate on foreign trade. 
                                                     
21 Akaike’s AIC criterion increases when passing from VAR(1) to VAR(2), which 
considerably reduces the number of statistically significant parameters. The 
number of degrees of freedom does not allow us to go beyond VAR(1). To evaluate 
the strength of the model, we modified the order of introduction of endogenous 
variables in the VAR model. The results obtained did not change significantly.  
22 Impacts of volatility of exchange rate on prices (pass-through).  
23 In what follows, this will be the nominal effective exchange rate because of the 
specificities of the exchange arrangements and restrictions in Tunisia (basket of 
currencies with managed floating) and daily interventions managed by Central 
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 Bank credit channel: In an economy where financing is dominated by 
banking intermediation, intervention measures of monetary policy 
act directly on the potential volume of loans offered by the banking 
system, and consequently modify the amount of deposits and 
reserves.  
 Price of financial assets channel: Modification of the instruments of 
monetary policy impacts the price of financial assets as a result of 
portfolio arbitration that companies carry out between prices of 
equities and bonds24 or wealth arbitration, which consumer 
households perform between holding currency and holding securities 
(liquidity effect).25  
 Balance sheet channel: By affecting the value of guarantees (or 
collateral) due on bank loans, the decisions of monetary policy affect 
the profitability of companies and the solvency of consumers, which 
leads banks to adjust their volume of loans.26  
With the VAR(1) level model27 estimated, the impulse response 
functions or the domestic shock effects28 of monetary policy equivalent to 
an innovation of one standard deviation at the level of domestic prices with 
a confidence interval of 95 % are given as follows: 
- A monetary shock of a temporary and unexpected increase of credit 
to the economy will lead to an immediate inflationary impact on the 
level of prices which will stabilise and become permanent from the 
fifth month: 
                                                                                                                                       
Bank of Tunisia, although specialised literature generally uses the real effective 
exchange rate. 
24 Or regarding investment decisions (q of Tobin). 
25 This effect returns to the approach of portfolio selection from Tobin. J. 
26 The repercussions of this transmission channel cannot be established without 
data on the volume of collateral required by banks in Tunisia. According to 
inquiries made on the competitiveness of Tunisian companies (essentially SMEs), it 
seems that the main obstacle to private investment in Tunisia mainly consists of 
constraints posed by the volume of collateral required by banks for loans. 
27 In particular, in an analysis of the transmission mechanisms of monetary policy, 
the use of VAR level models is justified due to the fact that transmission 
mechanisms of monetary policy are by essence short-term phenomena.  
28 See in the following impulse response functions instead of variance’s 
decompositions. 
CRISIS MANAGEMENT IN THE SOUTHERN AND EASTERN MEDITERRANEAN | 145 
 
 
 
- At the level of the pass-through effect, a temporary and unexpected 
drop in the nominal effective exchange rate will induce a temporary 
rise in the inflation. This is accompanied by the same effect, but of a 
more limited extent, of an increase in the price of energy imports:  
 
  
 
- A rise in the interest rate (restrictive monetary policy) temporarily 
reduces inflation but induces a subsequent contraction of short-term 
activity, which then helps to stabilise the level of medium- and long-
term prices (sacrifice ratio). Conversely, any real supply shock, and 
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thus an expansion of activity, will lead to inflationary pressures on 
the general level of prices (augmented Philips curve) which 
nevertheless tend to become neutral from the 10th month and end 
with a non–accelerating inflation rate of unemployment (NAIRU). 
Although the interest rate channel appears to be verified, the 
amplitude of the reaction of prices to a temporary and unexpected 
shock of a rise in the interest rate is low and short-term and the 
restrictive effect tends to become neutral at the end of the 4th month. 
 
 
- As a consequence, it seems that the standard mechanism of action via 
the interest rate collides with an inverted phenomenon of the 
Keynesian trap to liquidity, in the sense that implementation of a 
restrictive monetary policy that involves an increase in the interest 
rate proves ineffective by generating disinflation only in the very 
short term. In the medium term, however, the supply of liquidity 
specifically via bank loans will tend to increase in spite of the 
adjustment to higher interest rates, which is likely to contribute to a 
resumption of inflation.29 Moreover, several academic studies have 
confirmed the low elasticity or total inelasticity of gross fixed-capital 
formation at the interest rate in Tunisia, irrespective of the 
                                                     
29 This fundamental result illustrates the difficulty of using the interest rate as an 
operational objective, a primordial prerequisite to the migration towards a strategy 
of direct inflation-targeting.  
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specifications adopted by the investment function. The extent of the 
reaction of prices to a temporary and unexpected shock of the interest 
rate is lower than that caused by a monetary shock (bank loans or 
nominal effective exchange rate):30 
 
  
 
- Finally, the financial assets price channel seems totally inoperative in 
Tunisia. In theory a modification of the monetary policy instrument 
(for example a drop in the interest rate) would cause a rise in inflation 
that would lead to a rise in the price of financial assets as a result of 
portfolio arbitration, and specifically the wealth (liquidity) effect that 
would follow (increasing preference for holding bonds and 
debentures against holding currency). In this case, an increase in the 
TUNINDEX index is associated with a drop in inflation, which makes 
the impact of this transmission channel contrary to the expected 
theoretical effect:   
                                                     
30 Considering the weak capacity for using the interest rate as an operational 
objective, the current framework of monetary policy, based on broad monetary 
aggregates-targeting and supported by an active exchange rate policy, can 
effectively be used to control inflation, including imported inflation. 
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Therefore the monetary channels (bank loans and nominal effective 
exchange rate) are the main transmission channels of monetary policy in 
Tunisia. On the other hand, and because of delays in transmitting monetary 
policy to inflation, the interest rate channel appears to be weak. 
Consequently, in order to influence banking liquidity, a modulation of the 
monetary policy would be useful with temporary intervention mechanisms 
targeting the monetary transmission channels – exchange rate and bank 
loans. Another striking fact concerns the blocking of transmission channels 
for monetary policy. Monetary policy influences the conditions of financing 
provided by banks to companies and brings transmission mechanisms into 
play that interfere with their investment decisions and affect their 
profitability. In fact, an increase in the interest rate (monetary policy 
tightening) temporarily reduces inflation. Nevertheless, the response range 
of prices is weak and short-term in Tunisia. This basic result reveals the 
difficulty of using the interest rate as an operational objective. Moreover, 
the response range of prices to the interest rate is much weaker than that 
induced by a monetary shock (bank loans or nominal effective exchange 
rate). 
Specifically, although CBT undertakes to influence the short-term 
nominal interest rate (or money market rate) by fixing its key rate or its call 
for bids rate (depending on the level of banking liquidity), the relevant 
interest rate that should be analysed is rather the long-term real interest 
rate, which represents the real cost of loans in case of investment financing 
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by banks. However, in this context, there is a time inconsistency between 
current implementation of monetary policy and the expectations of 
Tunisian companies. Lowering the interest rate puts the economy in a 
liquidity trap because operators no longer decide between money and 
securities so that an increase in the money supply (injection of money) has 
no effect on real activity. In situations of deflation crises, where a real 
interest rate close to zero would be useful, this rate cannot be obtained. 
This suggests having a target of positive inflation.  
In reality, there is no single interest rate but an outfit range in which 
each rate corresponds to a term (maturity) and a category of specific 
borrowers. The sequence of rates used for various outlooks constitutes the 
curve of rates, which is still not yet available in the banking system. In such 
circumstances the intervention of the CBT at the short end of the curve, by 
fixing the reference rate for operations on a day-to-day basis (key rate), has 
no effect on debtor rates according to which loans are calculated. Freeing 
up the interest rate channel requires implementation of unconventional 
mechanisms and measures. 
For the other SEMCs, the comparative analysis of the transmission 
channels of monetary policy impulses concentrates solely on interest-rate 
and exchange-rate channels. Estimates are given on a quarterly frequency 
for a longer period Q1:1990 – Q4:2008, according to the approach 
developed by Neaime (2008). The inflation rate which refers to quarterly 
inflation with year-on-year trends is calculated on the basis of quarterly 
consumer prices indexes (IPC).31 All variables are expressed in logarithms 
except the interest rate.32 Unit root tests applied to variables converted into 
logarithms mean that the null hypothesis of a unit root for all variables can 
be rejected, which are therefore not stationary regarding level. On the other 
hand, the initial differences display stationary behaviour. The non-
stationary nature of the variables in level requires econometric estimates to 
be studied in a multivariate context. In the absence of co-integration 
relationships between the retained variables, a VAR(1) level model33 is 
estimated without restrictions on the coefficients each country. The 
                                                     
31 Base 100:2000.  
32 In this case CPI: Log (IPC), ER: Log (TCEN), TB: 3-month treasury bonds rate 
and GDP: Log (PIB). Data are from the IMF’s International Financial Statistics (IFS). 
33 According to Akaike’s AIC criteria.  
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response functions34 or domestic shock effects of monetary policy 
equivalent to an innovation of one standard deviation in the level of 
domestic prices with a confidence interval of 95% yield the following 
results. 
In Egypt, the prices respond quickly to an exchange-rate appreciation 
via their tradable goods prices component. The exchange-rate appreciation 
is inevitably transformed into a lowering of the interest rate to unblock 
contractionary pressures on domestic output. On the other hand, a fall in 
the interest rate also reduces capital inflows and helps, in the medium term, 
to lower the exchange-rate appreciation, which could handicap export 
competitiveness. 
 
                                                     
34 In the following this also refers to impulse functions and not to variance 
decomposition. 
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In Jordan, a shock on the exchange rate has a significant effect on 
output, on prices and on the interest rate. This is mainly attributable to the 
rigidity of monetary policy, which focuses only on the exchange rate 
targeting and does not allow fine-tuning of the macroeconomic situation by 
easing monetary conditions. The effect of a shock on the interest rate 
appears to be the most significant for GDP, where transmission is fast and 
with no adjustment delays. 
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In Lebanon, inflation is affected significantly by a shock on the 
exchange rate, so that a rise in the interest rate inevitably translates into a 
nominal appreciation. In fact, this adjustment mechanism is due to the 
control of the treasury bonds rate by the central bank as an operational 
instrument of monetary policy in order to stabilise the exchange rate of the 
national currency. 
 
 
In Morocco, prices respond quickly to any exchange rate appreciation 
which is followed by a significant and permanent response to a lowering of 
the interest rate. Besides prices, real domestic output also decreases in the 
CRISIS MANAGEMENT IN THE SOUTHERN AND EASTERN MEDITERRANEAN | 153 
 
short term as a consequence of the interest-rate shock and causes 
contractionary pressures. Lowering of the interest rate reduces capital 
inflows and contributes in the medium term to lower the exchange-rate 
appreciation, which could handicap export competitiveness. 
 
 
Finally, in Turkey the exchange rate trend appears to be disconnected 
from GDP dynamics, from inflation and from the interest rate as a result of 
recent currency crises. The interest-rate channel has become neutral 
compared with the exchange-rate channel. 
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5.1.2 Major constraints on the operational frameworks: Prospects 
of inflation-targeting in the aftermath of the financial crisis 
The field for implementation of economic policies at an international scale 
was a major factor in demonstrating the break in the decoupling inflation 
and monetary policy both in advanced economies as well as in developing 
economies (Figure 5.2). 
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Figure 5.2 Comparative inflation rates 
Average annual variations in % of GDP Annual variation in %* 
  
* A significant drop in the inflation gap between economies with targeting and the others. 
It is therefore advisable to contemplate, using the terminology of 
Blanchard et al. (2010), rethinking and redefining monetary policies in the 
aftermath of the financial crisis. Several leading ideas on this question were 
swept away by the crisis. Such is the case of the hypothesis according to 
which monetary policy should only address the volatility and level of 
inflation. New approaches suggest that central banks should accept and 
even target inflation rates beyond the objective of 2%, and combine 
monetary policy and macroprudential policy more closely in a more 
countercyclical manner than before. Monetary policy would then focus 
more on financing growth for lack of prudential instruments, allowing the 
credit spillover effects towards assets markets to be controlled. More 
particularly, as economies with formal targeting mechanisms have defined 
them according to inflation rates, the question is whether it would be better 
to target the level of prices. A target focusing on the level of prices offers 
several advantages, including: i) a reduction of uncertainty regarding the 
level at which prices will stabilise for long-term forecasts and ii) less 
variability in production. 
But, in this context, major Mediterranean economies are some way 
behind formal inflation-targeting because of non-compliance with several 
technical and institutional prerequisites. The evaluation of compliance with 
the constituent elements of formal inflation-targeting in Mediterranean 
countries is analysed in Table 5.2, which breaks them down into four 
blocks: i) institutional elements, ii) operational elements, iii) technical 
elements and iv) organisational elements. 
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Table 5.2 Compliance with constituent elements of inflation targeting in selected SEMCs 
 Levels of compliance 
Algeria Egypt Jordan Lebanon Morocco Tunisia Turkey 
1. Institutional components 
1.1 Mandate focusing on price stability as the 
priority objective of the central bank 
High High High High High High High 
1.2 De facto vs de jure autonomy of central bank Low Intermediate Low Intermediate High Low High 
1.3 Accountability of central bank and 
transparency of monetary policy 
Low Intermediate Low Intermediate High Intermediate High 
2. Operational components 
2.1 Stability of the macroeconomic framework 
2.1.1 No budget (fiscal) dominance Low Intermediate Low Low High Intermediate High 
2.1.2 Strength of external position High Low Low Intermediate High Low High 
2.2 Stability and efficiency of the financial system 
2.2.1 Efficiency of financial market Low Intermediate Low High High Low High 
2.2.2 Efficiency of monetary market Intermediate Intermediate Low Intermediate High Low High 
2.2.3 Efficiency of foreign exchange market Intermediate High Low Intermediate High Intermediate High 
2.2.4 Stability and efficiency of banking system Low Intermediate Low Intermediate High Low High 
2.3 Efficiency of monetary and exchange 
operations of central bank 
Intermediate High Intermediate Intermediate High Intermediate High 
2.4 Efficiency of the interest rate transmission 
channel 
 
Low High Low Intermediate High Low High 
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3. Technical components 
3.1 Infrastructure needed for inflation targeting 
3.1.1 Availability of a measure of inflation 
targeting 
Low Intermediate Low Low High Low High 
3.1.2 Definition of the inflation target and its 
duration 
Low Intermediate Low Low High Low High 
3.1.3 Early indicators of inflation Low High Low Intermediate High Low High 
3.1.4 Technical tools of inflation predictions Low High Low Intermediate High Intermediate High 
3.2 Publishing of regular reports on inflation Low High Low Low High Low High 
3.3 Publishing of regular reports on monetary 
policy 
Low High Low Low High Low High 
4. Organisational components 
4.1 Well-established analytical capacities Low High Intermediate High High Intermediate High 
4.2 Transparency of the decision-making process Low Intermediate Low Intermediate Intermediate Low High 
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5.2 Rethinking macroeconomic policies: Towards a new early 
warning system of financial crisis 
Early warning system (EWS) models can have substantial value to policy-
makers by allowing them to detect underlying economic weaknesses and 
vulnerabilities, and possibly taking pre-emptive steps to reduce the risks of 
experiencing a financial crisis. An application of a new EWS of financial 
crisis is given for Tunisia. The objective is to determine which are the 
factors that trigger shocks to the real economy (including the commodity 
market) and distinguish them from those of equity capital markets in 
explaining the outbreak of financial crisis. 
The answer to this question is essential if we want to be able to better 
detect early signals of crisis in the future. Would we be able to detect in 
time the occurrence of financial crises? Why do economists fail to predict 
these crises well in advance? The answers to these questions are crucial 
because crises have become more frequent and generate large 
macroeconomic costs. In this context, the identification of early indicators50 
and construction of early warning systems are essential for the prevention 
of systemic risks and crises. The purpose of the following sections is to 
empirically determine the factors that may drive currency crises51 and to 
learn in terms both of predictability and prevention possibilities. Moreover, 
the macroeconomic contexts at national and international level but also, 
and more specifically, the architecture of the national banking (monetary) 
and financial systems will be highlighted to detect their sensitivity in the 
occurrence of crises. 
5.2.1 Construction and implementation of an Early Warning 
System: Case study of Tunisia 
The leading international monetary and financial monitoring indicator 
(IVMF) or continuous macroeconomic vulnerability index (IVM)52 is the 
dependent variable in our model to build an Early Warning System (EWS). 
It is based on the same approach as used by Cartapanis et al. (1998, 2002) 
and Ari & Dagtekin (2007, 2008) in the construction of an indicator of 
                                                     
50 Eichengreen & Hausmann (1999).  
51 Monetary crises are defined as currency crises, banking crises or twin crises, i.e. a 
combination of banking and currency crises. 
52 In the literature on early warning signals, two types of alternative indicators are 
used: the Speculative Pressure Index (SPI) and the Effective Crisis Index (ECI). 
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currency crisis, and consists of the average monthly variations of fragility 
and unsustainability indicators that form the credit to the economy 
(CREDEC), the real effective exchange rate (ITCER), the nominal interest 
rate (TIN) and the current deficit ratio with respect to international reserves 
(DEFCRES), weighted by the inverse of their respective standard deviations 
to standardise volatile components of the index.53 The data used covered 
the period from January 1999 to December 2009, on a monthly basis. 
The vulnerability indicator is higher in the following cases: 
 when excesses in banking credit generate inflationary pressures , 
 when the domestic currency appreciates sharply in real terms or the 
interest rate depreciates in nominal terms or 
 when the ratio of current account deficit to foreign exchange 
reserves is increasing : 
  (1) 
In fact, the choice of indicators is justified by similar experiences in 
recent currency crises as well in emerging and developed countries, and 
attempts to detect early signs that meet the following observations:54 
 A decline in credit triggers a financial accelerator mechanism that 
spreads to different markets (real estate, stock market and foreign 
exchange). 
 Major fundamental imbalances and risks of macroeconomic 
overheating generally reflect excess credit, the overvaluation of the 
real exchange rate (and thus the misalignment), dwindling foreign-
exchange reserves, excessive monetary growth leading to a sharp 
decline in interest rates and current-account deficits. 
                                                     
53 The nominal interest rate is defined as the average money market rate. The real 
effective exchange rate is calculated using the methodology developed by Mouley 
(2011). 
54 With reference to theories of currency crises of the first and second generations. 
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 A country permanently recording a current-account deficit cannot 
fund it with foreign capital inflows. If international financial markets 
believe that the deficit is unsustainable, the country becomes 
insolvent, which increases the probability of a crisis. In the same vein, 
the imbalances are also the result of unsustainable macroeconomic 
policies (expansionary monetary and fiscal policies that stimulate a 
strong credit growth, the accumulation of debt and over-investment 
in real assets). 
 Subsequently, a policy tightening to maintain inflation and adjusting 
foreign positions led to a slowdown in economic activity, difficulties 
in servicing debt and increasing bad loans threatened the capital 
position of banks. 
 
The graph above shows that the index detected three peaks of 
currency crises in the Tunisian economy. The unit root tests (Augmented 
Dickey-Fuller, ADF) show that the index is stationary I (0) at both absolute 
level and at the first derivative at 1% level (Table 5.3).55 
 
 
 
                                                     
55 In addition, normality tests show that the index follows a normal distribution. 
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Table 5.3 ADF unit root test of the continued crisis index 
 Level  First derivative 
Model with constant   
ADF test statistic -10.7650 -18.4734 
VC (1%)* 
VC (5%) 
VC (10%) 
-3.4815 
-2.8837 
-2.5784 
-3.4819 
-2.8838 
-2.5785 
Order of integration   
Model with constant and trend   
ADF Test Statistic -10.7323 -18.4036 
VC (1%)* 
VC (5%) 
VC (10%) 
-4.0309 
-3.4447 
-3.1469 
-4.0314 
-3.4450 
-3.1471 
Order of integration I (0) I (0) 
* MacKinnon's Critical Values for rejecting the null hypothesis of unit root. 
 
Table 5.4 Descriptive statistics of the continued crisis index 
Average  0.013223 
Median -0.003431 
Maximum  0.979374 
Minimum -0.339959 
Standard deviation  0.154172 
Skewness  3.448642 
Kurtosis  21.30695 
Jarque-Bera  2088.997 
Probability  0.000000 
No. of observations 131 
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In addition, although the determination of the crises periods for 
Tunisia is insensitive to changes in definition of the term of crisis,56 there 
might be differences in terms of standard deviations. Setting a high 
threshold minimises the likelihood of predicting a crisis where there is 
none, while the probability of not predicting an actual crisis decreases. To 
avoid these biases, dating crisis is identified when IVMF index exceeds a 
threshold equal to three standard deviations ( ), plus the average for 
the entire reporting period ( ):57 
   (2) 
This method appears optimal to detect the precise dates of crises and 
to minimise the probability of identifying crisis wrongly. 
 
                                                     
56 The same graphical results are indeed obtained with two different alternative 
definitions:
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57 This threshold seems optimal with respect to three other crisis levels in terms of 
standard deviations, namely 
IVFM.5,1 , IVFM.2  and IVFM.5,2 , estimated for the 
sensitivity analysis of the datation on arbitrary crisis levels. 
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During the reporting period, three periods of currency crises seem to 
have hurt the Tunisian economy, as follows: 
 The first in 2000, due to a significant increase in the current-account 
deficit during this year, partly due to the sharp rise in imported 
energy prices and the dollar appreciation, accompanied by an 
unprecedented growth in outstanding loans of around 13.1%. 
 The second in 2007 as a result of excess liquidity in the banking 
system due to an autonomous expansion of liquidity, as well as a 
credit growth of 9.8% compared to an average of 6.1% during the 
period 2004-06 with gross NPLs (% of total loans) of about 17.6%. 
Meanwhile, and in view of the macroeconomic-balance approach 
used by the repository CGER (Consultative Group on Exchange Rate 
Issues) of the IMF, the real effective exchange rate of the dinar was 
over-valued by 2.7% during this year. 
 The third in 2009 as a logical consequence of the contagion effects 
related to the recent international financial and economic crisis and 
what it involved in the deterioration of the current-account deficit 
and dwindling foreign exchange reserves. 
This analysis completes other attempts to analyse the financial crisis 
by academics and international organisations, presented in the table below. 
Nature of the financial crisis Crisis periods References 
Sovereign debt crisis 1991-92 Roubini et al. (2003) 
Banking crisis 1988-89 
1991-95 
Caisse des dépôts et 
consignations (1998) 
Systemic banking crisis 1991-94 Laeven & Valencia (2008) 
1991 Boyd et al. (2009) 
5.2.2 Econometric methodology: A binomial Probit model 
The monitoring framework (early warning system) is based on a binary 
Probit model that functions as a prevention tool.58 For this, we transpose 
                                                     
58 But other binary models (binary Logit) or multinomial (multinomial Logit) are 
also used in the literature. In particular, a multinomial approach taking into 
account two or more levels of financial distress reduces the number of false alarms 
and assist banking supervisors to decipher the characteristics of a looming crisis. In 
the work of Bussière & Fratzscher (2006), devoted to currency crises, there are a 
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the index (IVFM) into a discrete qualitative variable ( ), binomial (or 
binary) of occurrence of crisis, taking the value (1)59 if the index is greater 
than  and (0)60 otherwise. The econometric estimation 
method then arises exclusively from a binomial Probit.61 The binary options 
model or qualitative response model is used for estimating the probability 
of identifying crises. The Probit method uses a continuous distribution and 
exponential probability that allows moving from classical linear regression. 
This implies the use of the method of maximum likelihood. Instead of 
trying to minimise errors (which is the case of the method of least squares), 
it estimates the weights of the explanatory variables ( ) to correctly 
predict and anticipate the binary dependent variable ( ). Thus, the 
regression of the Probit method is as follows: 
   (3) 
Where,  denotes the vector of (i) explanatory variables ( ), 
(F) a cumulative distribution function, continuous and strictly increasing 
and ( ) all parameters that seeks to estimate and reflect the impact of 
changes in the vector (X) on the probability of a crisis. The parameters ( ) 
then measure the estimated sensitivities with respect to the probability of 
crisis variables. These sensitivities are estimated using the method of 
maximum likelihood. The likelihood function (l) is given by:  
   (4) 
                                                                                                                                       
‘quiet’ period (no crisis), a ‘pre-crisis’ period, before the crisis period (rising risk of 
attack), a ‘crisis’ regime considering only the first year of the crisis (assumed date 
of onset of the crisis) and finally, a ‘time of crisis’ regime that considers the period 
following the first crisis year until quietness returns. 
59 Crisis regime. 
60 Non-crisis regime. 
61 In other cases, the variable quality can be trichotomic taking the value (1), (2) and 
(3). The econometric estimation method then follows either a multimodal or 
multinomial Probit or a Logit. 
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a. The experimental protocol of early warning 
The control system (monitoring) is based on a macroeconomic appropriate 
choice of crisis indicators that stems from both the theoretical and empirical 
literature but also the judgment.62 The explanatory variables in the vector 
 are selected from empirical economic and financial alert 
indicators designed on a monthly frequency,63 in order to better capture the 
sudden and brutal nature of currency crises as well as the variance of 
economic and financial variables. The variables have a monthly frequency 
for the period from January 1999 to December 2009. 
The existing literature on banking crises in early-warning models 
highlights the macroeconomic factors as the main factors of a banking crisis 
in developing countries.64 However, it insists very little about the specific 
variables for the banking sector and the fragility process. For our part, we 
combine two levels of warning indicators. The first category of variables 
includes macroeconomic indicators, relying on macro-prudential indicators 
of sound financial systems published by the IMF (Evans et al., 2000 and 
Plihon, 2009). The second category is derived from the CAMELS65 
                                                     
62 See also Gonzalez-Hermosillo (1999) and Demirguc-Kunt & Detragiache (2005). 
63 Except for the data of certain economic variables, especially for the monthly 
series that is only available in annual or quarterly frequencies, like fiscal balances, 
internal and foreign public debt, foreign direct and portfolio investment, current 
account deficits, etc. For this, we have adopted statistical procedures to interpolate 
and/or extrapolate the data as proposed in statistical programme Eviews 7.1 linear 
extrapolation, namely Constant Match Average and Sum, Quadratic Match Average and 
Sum and Cubic Match Last. It should be noted that we had similar results for both. 
64 The pioneering work of Demirguc-Kunt & Detragiache (1998, 2000, 2005), Hardy 
& Pazarbasioglu (1998), Caprio & Klingebiel (1996, 2003), Lindgren et al. (1996), 
Kaminsky & Reinhart (1999) and Eichengreen & Arteta (2000) used a binary Probit 
approach, and found that real and financial macroeconomic important variables 
when it comes to triggering international crises. With regard to emerging 
economies, such work generally concludes that the probability of a currency crisis 
is based on a high domestic credit growth and a high ratio of debt relative to 
reserves. On the other hand, the pro-cyclicality of credit fuelled by changes in 
terms of trade and the importance of non-performing loans are the main factors of 
banking crisis. 
65 C, Capital adequacy; A, Asset quality; M, Management; E, Earnings; L, Liquidity; 
and S, Sensitivity to market risk. 
 tit xX ,
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accounting ratios used to evaluate the financial conditions of a bank.66 
Moreover, our full analysis is advancing on a recent IMF indicators guide 
also used for dating exit strategies from unconventional monetary policy 
measures (see IMF, 2010). 
At first, anchoring the theoretical underpinnings will take 
precautions for the optimal choice of the different early warning indicators. 
Also, the gross selection adopts the following hierarchical tree table, broken 
down by modules and blocks of variables related to features of the 
international and domestic environment, which includes the real, public, 
money, banking, financial and foreign sectors and other leading economic 
indicators and international exogenous shocks: 
b. Selection of early indicators and calibrations  
The table below details the theoretical specification of the expected impacts 
of economic and financial early-warning indicators on the probability of a 
currency crisis ( ). Similarly, the symbols of variables, sources 
and explanations of the changes made are also explained. 
 
 
                                                     
66 Thus, we consider the capital ratio (equity + reserves/total assets, FPRP), the 
profitability ratio (net income/total assets, ROA) and financial profitability (net 
income/(equity + reserves) ROE) for the return on assets and finally several 
liquidity ratios: the liquidity ratio (liquid assets/total assets RSLB), total loans-to-
total assets ratio (TCA), deposits-to-loan ratio (RCPD), deposits-to-assets ratio 
(DVA) and the ratio of total deposits to total assets (TDA). 
,1 tt XC 
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Economic and financial early warning indicators   
Platform and specifications of indicators  Mnemonics, data sources and transformations (1999:01 – 
2009:12) 
Data Catalogue Theory and expected impact of progress 
indicators 
Expected 
sign 
 Mnem. 
unit 
Unit Source Explanations and 
transformations 
A. Device 1: International Environment 
A.1. International Monetary and Financial Environment Module 
A.1.1. Block: International exogenous shocks 
Terms of trade index 
– Eurozone  
Deterioration (growth) in the terms of 
trade reduces (improves) foreign 
partners’ export capacity and therefore 
weakens (resp. consolidates) the position 
of the balance of payments of the 
country, exacerbating (limiting) 
vulnerabilities and the likelihood of a 
crisis in the country. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(-) 
 
 ITEZE Base level 
(2005:100) 
DataStream 
IFS - FMI 
The ratio is calculated 
by dividing the export 
prices by the import 
ones (2005: 100) 
Terms of trade index 
– United States 
 ITEUS Base level 
(2005:100) 
DataStream 
IFS - FMI 
Terms of trade index 
– Japan 
 ITEJP Base level 
(2005:100) 
DataStream 
IFS - FMI 
Index of commodity 
prices 
The increase (decrease) in the price of 
raw materials increases (reduces) the 
international transmission of imported 
inflation and thus weakens (strengthens) 
the balance of payments position of the 
country, exacerbating (limiting) 
vulnerabilities and the likelihood of a 
crisis in the country). 
 
 
(+) 
 IPMP Base level 
(2005:100) 
DataStream 
IFS - FMI 
IFS - World All 
Primary Commodities 
index  
IFS Index (2005:100) 
A.1.2. Block: Short- and long-term international interest rates 
FED Funds rate in 
the US 
A country is more vulnerable to a 
currency crisis if it is faced with rising 
international interest rates, as investors 
 
 
 
 TFFUS % FED  
EONIA - ECB  TEONIA % Eurostat  
168 | MONETARY POLICY IN THE PRE- AND POST-CRISIS PERIODS 
 
(Eurozone) may wish to reallocate their portfolios in 
favour of more stable and secure 
investment (capital flight). The home 
country can record net outflows and/or 
experience an increase in interest expense 
on foreign debt (Source: Theories of crises 
second generation). 
 
 
 
 
 
(+) 
 
LIBOR - 3 months  LIBOR % Datastream  
EURIBOR - 3 months  EURIBOR % Datastream  
Refinancing rates 
REFI - ECB 
(Eurozone) 
 TREFIZE % Eurostat ECB Key rate 
A.1.3. Block: Spread on the financial markets 
LIBOR–OIS spread An increase (decrease) in risk premiums 
or Libor spread denotes an increase 
(decrease) in liquidity risk, and therefore 
a precursor of instability (stability) 
Financial and increase (decrease) of 
counterparty risk on international 
interbank markets. 
 (+)  SLIBOIS Basis 
Points 
Datastream 
Haver 
Analytics 
OIS data are not 
available before 
November 2003; we 
used therefore the 
proposed method in 
the Eviews 7.1 package 
for linear 
interpolation/ 
extrapolation, namely 
Constant Match Average 
and Sum, Quadratic 
Match Average and Sum 
and Cubic Match Last. It 
should be noted that 
each time we had 
similar results. 
TED – Spread An increase (decrease or shrinkage) of 
the TED-spread induces an increase 
(decrease) in liquidity risk. 
(+)  TEDS Basis 
Points 
Datastream TED - Spread measures 
the default risk on 
loans (CD: Credit 
Default) and therefore 
approximates the 
estimated probability 
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of non-repayment of 
interbank loans. 
A.1.4. Block: Volatility in the financial markets 
VIX index Measuring volatility applied to the stock 
market index S&P 500. 
 
 
(+) 
 IVIX % 
Change 
in 
volatility 
Bloomberg 
Finance LP 
Haver 
Analytics 
Sustainable threshold 
is 20%. 
VIX series: 
http://fr.finance.yaho
o.com/q?s=%5EVIX 
http://www2.standar
dandpoors.com/portal
/site/sp/en/us/page.t
opic/indices_500vix/2,
3,4,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0
,0.html 
Vstoxx Index On the European market, VStoxx index is 
equivalent to the VIX (the VStoxx 
measure expected volatility of the DJ 
EuroStoxx). 
 
 
(+) 
 IVSTX % 
Change 
in 
volatility 
Datastream Sustainable threshold 
is 20% 
A.1.5. Block: Volatility in emerging markets 
EMBI (JP Morgan 
Chase & Co.) Global 
Index (Emerging 
Market Bond Index) 
- Both indices assess liquidity risks in 
emerging markets. The EMBI index 
measures the volatility of the debt or 
obligations (Debt / bond volatility), 
while the MSCI index measures the 
volatility of equities (equity volatility). 
- The increase (decrease) in liquidity risk 
is measured by the increase (decrease) in 
risk premiums and volatility in all forms 
and media financing whether equity 
markets (MSCI) or debt (EMBI index 
 
 
 
 
 
(+) 
 EMBI % Datastream Monthly change year-
on-year 
MSCI (Morgan 
Stanley Capital 
International) 
Emerging Market 
Index 
 MSCI % Datastream Monthly change year-
on-year 
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bond issues). 
A.1.6. Block: Inflation 
HICP Eurozone   
(+) 
 IPCHZE % Datastream Monthly change year-
on-year ICP United States   IPCUS % IMF-IFS 
ICP Japan   IPCJP % IMF-IFS 
A.1.7. Block: Current account balances 
Eurozone These indicators incorporate risks 
associated with accentuation of global 
imbalances at international level. 
 
 
 
 
(+/-) 
 SCZE % of GDP UK Pocket 
Data Bank 
The data is not 
available for a 
monthly frequency, 
we used the Linear 
Match Last (LML) 
statistical method in 
the Eviews 7.1. 
software package to 
transpose the data to 
a monthly frequency.  
 
United States  SCUS % of GDP UK Pocket 
Data Bank 
Japan  SCJP % of GDP UK Pocket 
Data Bank 
A.1.8. Block:  M2 / exchange reserves 
Eurozone   
 
(+/-) 
 MRESZE Level Datastream 
IMF-IFS 
 
United States   MRESUS Level Datastream 
IMF-IFS 
 
Japan   MRESJP Level Datastream 
IMF-IFS 
 
A.2. International Real Environment Module 
A.2.1. Block: Gross public debt 
Eurozone    DPZE % of GDP Eurostat The data is not 
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United States   
(+) 
 DPUS % of GDP Eurostat available for a monthly 
frequency, we used the 
Linear Match Last 
(LML) statistical 
method in the Eviews 
7.1. software package 
to transpose the data to 
a monthly frequency.  
 
Japan   DPJP % of GDP Eurostat 
A.2.2. Block: Real GDP Growth 
Eurozone   
 
(-) 
 CPIBRZE % IMF-IFS The real GDP growth 
is approximated by the 
year-on-year change 
IPI which is extracted 
from IFS (2005:100) 
United States   CPIBRUS % IMF-IFS 
Japan   CPIBRJP % IMF-IFS 
A.2.3. Block: Output Gap 
Eurozone The output gap provides an important 
determinant for the aggregate demand 
that is fundamental to detect inflationary 
movements due to increased demand. 
 
 
 
 
(+) 
 
 OGZE Level Measured by the difference 
between actual GDP and potential 
GDP estimated by the Hodrick-
Prescott filter 
United States  OGUS Level 
Japan  OGJP Level 
A. 3. Advanced international indicators module 
A.3.1. Block: Advanced international confidence indicators and sentiment 
Indicator of the US 
Conference Board 
(Consumer 
Confidence Index) 
Leading index (or advanced) projected 
from a coincident index and a lagging 
index. There is also a composite index of 
leading economic indicators obtained 
from both the beige (or tan) book on 
 
 
 
 
 CCIUS % Pollingrepor
t.com 
Monthly change year-
on-year 
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current economic conditions in the 
United States, the Green book on the 
business climate and the Blue book on 
the monetary and financial conditions set 
by the Fed. 
 
 
(-) 
 
Economic Sentiment 
Indicator (ESI) in the 
Eurozone (European 
Commission) 
 (-) 
 
 ESIZE Level 
 
Datastream Quality composite 
indicator (limit: 100) 
A.3.2. Block:  International business climate indicators 
ISM Manufacturing 
PMI 
- In general, an improvement in these 
advanced international indicators 
denotes a better understanding by the 
operators of the business climate, and 
therefore a high probability of recovery 
in economic activity and growth, 
contributing to consolidate the positions 
of the balance of payments, increased 
foreign demand for domestic exports and 
reduces the probability of crisis. 
- The indicator ISM Manufacturing PMI 
in the US is derived from the aggregation 
of the Empire State Manufacturing Index 
(the Fed of New York), the Philly FED 
Manufacturing Index (FED Philadelphia) 
and Chicago Manufacturing PMI. 
- The S&P Case-Shiller Composite 20 
(Real estate) index in the United States 
- The leading index in Japan 
- The composite PMI for the euro area 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(-) 
 ISMUS Level 
 
www.ism.
ws 
Quality composite 
indicator including the 
area code UMitch of 
the University of 
Michigan 
(benchmark: 50) 
S&P Case-Shiller 
composite 20  
(Real Estate) in the 
US 
 SPCSUS % macromark
ets.com 
Monthly change year-
on-year 
Japan’s Leading 
Index 
 LIJP  
(2005:100) 
www.esri.c
ao.go.jp 
 
PMI Composite 
Eurozone 
 PMICZE Level 
 
Datastream Qualitative composite 
indicator (threshold: 0) 
Business Climate 
Indicator “BCI” for 
the Eurozone 
(European 
Commission) 
 BCIZE Level 
 
Eurostat Qualitative composite 
indicator (threshold: 
100) 
 
CRISIS MANAGEMENT IN THE SOUTHERN AND EASTERN MEDITERRANEAN | 173 
 
CLI for the OECD 
area 
indicator is derived from a PMI of 
manufacturing and services in the 
countries of the euro EU-16 area. 
- The Business Climate Indicator "BCI" 
the euro area (European Commission) 
 ICAZOCDE Level 
 
Datastream 
OCDE 
DataBase 
A. 4: Module International stock market indices 
A.4.1. Bloc: International stock market indices 
CAC 40 (France)   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(+/-) 
 CACFR  
 
 
 
 
 
Change %  
Bloomberg 
Finance LP 
Haver 
Analytics 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Monthly change year-
on-year 
DAX 30 (Germany)   DAXRFA Bloomberg 
Finance LP 
Haver 
Analytics 
Dow Jones (United 
States) 
  DJUS Bloomberg 
Finance LP 
Haver 
Analytics 
Nikkei 225 (Japan)   NKJP Bloomberg 
Finance LP 
Haver 
Analytics 
MSCI World Market 
Index (Morgan 
Stanley Capital 
International) 
  MSCIM Datastream 
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B. Device. 2: Domestic Environment 
        
B.1: Module domestic real sector 
Real GDP growth - The attacks are usually preceded by 
periods of economic downturn. The 
growth of industrial production should 
then decrease the probability of crisis. 
- Real imbalance: risk of foreign debt, low 
quality of domestic investment 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(-) 
 
 CRPIBTN % IMF-IFS The real GDP growth 
is approximated by the 
monthly year-on-year 
change of the 
Industrial Production 
Index (IPI) (2005:100) 
and the usage of a 
measure of monthly 
GDP 
Output Gap  OGTN Level Author Measured by the 
difference between 
actual GDP and 
potential GDP 
estimated by the 
Hodrick-Prescott filter. 
Terms of Trade 
Index 
Growth in terms of trade strengthens the 
position of the balance of payments, 
thereby reducing the likelihood of crisis. 
 
(-) 
 
 ITETN Level Author Calculated by the 
ratios of the respective 
price indices of export 
and import (2005:100) 
B.2.Module domestic monetary sector 
B.2.1. Block: Inflation and money supply 
Inflation  A high inflation rate indicates 
macroeconomic mismanagement 
resulting in higher domestic nominal 
interest rates, which creates a negative 
impact on the real and financial sectors. 
 
 
 
 
 
 INFTN Change 
(%) 
BCT The inflation rate refers 
to monthly year-on-
year change in 
inflation. It is 
calculated from the 
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An increase in inflation is expected to 
increase the probability of a crisis. 
(Source: Les théories de crises de 
première et deuxième générations) 
 
(+) 
 
monthly consumer 
prices indices 
(2005:100) 
M2 / Exchange 
reserves 
This ratio measures the ability of a 
central bank to deal with a speculative 
attack. In case of a currency crisis or 
banking crisis, depositors are flocking to 
the bank to exchange their currency 
holdings home against foreign currency. 
An economy is more vulnerable to a 
crisis if the ratio of the money supply on 
the stock of reserves is high. 
 
 
 
(+) 
 
 MRESTN Level BCT  
B.2.2. Block: Monetary policy instruments 
Real interest rate  (+/-)  TINR En % BCT Calculated by deflating 
the nominal interest 
rate by the inflation 
rate 
B. 3. Module foreign sector and capital flows 
Misalignment of the 
real effective 
exchange rate 
An overvaluation of the real effective 
exchange rate, firstly, attracts foreign 
capital rather short term, contributes to 
overheating of the domestic economy 
and, on the other hand, reduces the price 
competitiveness compared commercial 
competitors, resulting in a trade deficit. 
Overvaluation would imply an increase 
in the probability of a crisis. 
- Overvaluation of the real exchange: 
synonymous with disabilities future 
 
 
 
(+) 
 
 MTCER (2005:100) Author: Estimated using the CGER 
and FEER methodology  
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competitiveness and capital flight 
distortion. 
Foreign short-term 
debt/foreign 
exchange reserves 
A high ratio of short-term foreign debt to 
foreign exchange reserves increases 
liquidity risk (and insolvency) and thus 
induces a country's vulnerability to a 
speculative attack. The probability of 
attack increases in parallel with the 
increase in this ratio. 
 
 
 
(+) 
 
 DRESTN Level BCT The data is not 
available for a monthly 
frequency, we used the 
Linear Match Last 
(LML) statistical 
method in the Eviews 
7.1. software package 
to transpose the data to 
a monthly frequency.  
 
Short-term foreign 
debt/export receives 
Debt: dwindling foreign exchange 
reserves, liquidity risk and speculative 
attack 
(+)  DREXPTN Level BCT  
B.4. Module Soundness Indicators (and / or fragility) of the banking and financial system 
B.4.1. Block: Robustness factors 
Liquidity ratio  (-)  RLBTN % BCT Liquidity ratio: Liquid 
assets to liquid 
liabilities. The data is 
not available for a 
monthly frequency, we 
used the Linear Match 
Last (LML) statistical 
method in the Eviews 
7.1. software package 
to transpose the data to 
a monthly frequency.  
NPL (Non-
Performing Loans)  
 (+)  NPLTN % BCT – IMF 
- WB  
Monthly NPL rate is 
calculated by the ratio 
of nonperforming 
loans to total loans. 
This ratio replaces two 
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conventional ratios of 
gross NPLs (% of total 
loans) and gross NPLs 
(% of total assets) 
B.4.2. Block: Outstanding loans 
Total loans/Total 
deposits of the 
banking system 
The ratio of bank loans to bank deposits 
demonstrates the link between the assets 
and liabilities of the banking system. The 
increase in this ratio may indicate an 
increasing difficulty of the banking 
system to attract additional and/or an 
excessive growth of bank credit, which 
increases their non-performing loans. 
Following the increase of the ratio, the 
liquidity risk of the banking system in 
case of adverse shocks increases, so does 
the probability of a crisis (Source: Les 
théories de crises de première et 
troisième générations) 
 
 
 
(+) 
 
 CDSBTN % BCT   
Total bank 
deposits/M3 system 
A high ratio of bank deposits to money 
supply indicates a growing investor 
confidence in the banking system. The 
probability of a crisis should then 
decrease due to an increase in this ratio.  
 
 
 
 
(-) 
 
 DTMTN % BCT   
Mandatory reserves 
in the banking 
system/Assets total 
banking system  
Traders perceive a decrease in the 
mandatory reserve ratio as a sign of 
weakness of the banking system, 
increasing the likelihood of a crisis. With 
a high reserve ratio, the banking system 
 
 
 
 
 ROASBTN % BCT Reserve requirements 
on a monthly 
frequency are 
approximated by 
ordinary banks' current 
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is rather fluid and generates a strong 
resilience to adverse shocks. 
 
 
 
 
(-) 
 
account 
B.4.3. Block: Quality of the portfolio and management 
Return on assets 
(ROA) 
Profitability (RoA) (-)  ROATN % BCT The data is not 
available for a monthly 
frequency, we used the 
Linear Match Last 
(LML) statistical 
method in the Eviews 
7.1. software package 
to transpose the data to 
a monthly frequency.  
Return on equity 
(ROE) 
Financial profitability or equity (RoE) (-)  ROETN % BCT  
B.4.4. Block: Active seigniorage 
Advances from the 
central bank to the 
banking system / 
total liabilities of the 
banking system 
This ratio shows the share of loans from 
the central bank to liabilities in the 
banking sector. An increase in this ratio, 
indicates a more sizeable bailout by the 
Central Bank of banks in financial 
difficulties (bank liquidity), should 
increase the probability of a crisis. It is 
generally interpreted as a proxy for 
moral hazard. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(+) 
 SEIGTN Level BCT Advances from the 
central bank to the 
banking system affect 
the refinancing. 
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B.4.5. Block: Soundness Indicators (and / or vulnerability) of the financial system 
Stock index – 
Tunindex 
The collapse of the stock market index, 
which shows the massive withdrawal of 
capital, can be seen as a sign of 
vulnerability or early signs of a crisis. In 
addition, these indicators can be 
integrated into the platform of financial 
asset prices and thus to measure the risk 
of pro-cyclicality in the financial market. 
 
 
 
 
(+/-) 
 
 TUNINDEX Change 
(%) 
BVMT - 
BCT 
Monthly change year-
on-year 
180 | MONETARY POLICY IN THE PRE- AND POST-CRISIS PERIODS 
 
c. Correlation matrices 
Given the large number of potential explanatory variables and to overcome 
the problems of multicollinearity, we use a process variable selection based 
on correlation matrices. Thus, the previous gross platform is purged of 
redundancies related to the risk of multicollinearity among the variables 
used: 
 Strong correlations are evident between international warning 
indicators for business climate, confidence and sentiment. This is the 
case between the composite PMI for the euro area (PMICZE), the 
business climate indicator in the same area (BCIZE), the Economic 
Sentiment Indicator (ESIZE) and advanced in the OECD area 
(ICAZOCDE) composite indicator, the last variable will be preferred. 
Similarly, the correlation between the indicator S&P Case-Shiller 
(SPCSUS) and the ISM manufacturing PMI in the United States 
(ISMUS) suggests retaining only the latter. 
 ISMUS SPCSUS PMICZE BCIZE ICAZOCDE 
ISMUS 1.00     
SPCSUS 0.84 1.00    
PMICZE 0.53 0.05 1.00   
BCIZE 0.54 -0.21 0.79 1.00  
ICAZOCDE 0.56 -0.19 0.91 0.89 1.00 
Note: Because of their correlation coefficients, variables in bold are excluded from 
regressions. 
 The expected relationship between the real GDP growth rate in each 
zone (CRPIBRJP, CPIBRUS, CPIBRZE and CPIBRTN) and their 
respective outputs gap correlation (OGJP, OGUS, OGZE and OGTN) 
suggests retaining them because of their importance for the aggregate 
demand determination, which is fundamental to assessing 
inflationary movements due to increased demand. Similarly, high 
correlations of outputs gaps in the United States and Japan with the 
euro area implies retaining only the latter. 
 CPIBRJP CPIBRUS CPIBRZE CRPIBTN OGJP OGTN OGUS OGZE 
CPIBRJP 1.00      
CPIBRUS 0.89 1.00     
CPIBRZE 0.91 0.65 1.00    
CRPIBTN 0.51 0.48 0.61 1.00   
OGJP 0.75 0.53 0.57 0.39 1.00   
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OGTN 0.34 0.23 0.34 0.89 0.41 1.00  
OGUS 0.67 0.87 0.51 0.34 0.84 0.32 1.00 
OGZE 0.72 0.51 0.93 0.51 0.91 0.48 0.78 1.00 
 
 At the level of international short- and long-term interest rates, there 
is a strong correlation between the LIBOR and EURIBOR 3-month 
interest rates with EONIA (TEONIA) and REFI (TREFZE) of the 
European Central Bank, confirming that the latter plays a major role 
in channelling market expectations and the stance of monetary policy 
in the euro area. Similarly, the LIBOR is also used in the calculation of 
the spread with OIS. 
 LIBOR EURIBOR TEONIA TREFIZE 
LIBOR 1.00    
EURIBOR 0.63 1.00   
TEONIA 0.61 0.96 1.00  
TREFIZE 0.59 0.97 0.98 1.00 
 
 Due to the interdependencies of developments in the international 
environment, the correlations between the different levels of inflation 
(IPCH, IPCUS, IPCJP), current account balances (SCZE, SCUS, SCJP), 
public deficits (DPZE, DPUS, DPJP) and ratios of money supply 
relative to foreign exchange reserves (MRESZE, MRESUS, MRESJP) 
suggest retaining only the variables for the euro area, which is also 
justified because of the high cycle synchronisation with Tunisia. The 
same applies to the high correlation (0.83) between indices of the 
terms of trade in the United States and Japan (ITEUS, ITEJP) with that 
of the euro area (ITEZE). 
 The interweaving of international stock markets involves retaining 
only the MSCI (Morgan Stanley Capital International) Index as is also 
justified by the following correlation matrix. 
 MSCIM CACFR DAXRFA DJUS NKJP 
MSCIM 1.00     
CACFR 0.87 1.00    
DAXRFA 0.87 0.93 1.00   
DJUS 0.92 0.77 0.76 1.00  
NKJP 0.85 0.79 0.81 0.75 1.00 
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 The same is true of the high correlation (0.87) between the VIX 
indicators (IVIX) and VSTOXX (IVSTX), which suggests keeping the 
European volatility indicator. 
 Due to the strong correlation between the inflation rate and the real 
interest rate in Tunisia (-0.93), the inflation rate is favoured. This is 
also justified by the quasi-neutral interest rate policy during this 
period. Similarly, the expected (0.81) correlation between the ratio of 
short-term foreign debt to export earnings (DREXPTN) and its ratio 
to foreign exchange reserves (DRESTN) suggests retaining only the 
latter. 
 The number of terms-of-trade indices (ITETN) in Tunisia and the 
money supply (M2) relative to international reserves (MRESTN) are 
strongly and negatively correlated (-0.74). These two variables 
capture the same information on foreign factors. One retains the 
variable ITETN instead of MRESTN, which is involved in more 
collinearity problems. 
 The same reasoning is applicable to the various components of the 
CAMELS applied in Tunisia. ROA is retained and ROE is dropped. 
One can also split the liquidity ratios into two groups. Bankers have 
the first group of indicators more or less under control, including the 
liquidity ratio (RLBTN), calculated by the ratio of liquid assets to 
liquid liabilities, and the coverage ratio of loans-to-deposits 
(CDSBTN), calculated by the ratio of total loans to total deposits of 
the banking system. The second group of liquidity ratios is beyond 
the control of the bankers, and in particular the total deposits of the 
banking system reported in M3 (DTMTN). The CDSBTN and 
DTMTN variables are the only liquidity ratios that have a significant 
coefficient, when crossed with the dependent variable. Insofar as 
these two variables are competing, we chose the one whose 
contribution is most significant, the variable DTMTN. 
 Finally, we used the refinancing rate of the ECB (TREFIZE) because of 
its correlation with the FED Funds rate in the US (TFFUS), as well as 
the EMBI indicator, which is highly correlated with the MSCI index, 
The Economic Sentiment Indicator for the euro area (ESIZE) is 
correlated with the Conference Board indicator for the United States 
(CCIUS) and the ratio of the money supply relative to foreign 
exchange reserves in the euro area (MRESZE) due to its correlation 
with the respective ratios of the current account deficit (SCZE) and 
public debt (DPZE) to GDP. 
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d. The selected variables and their statistical properties 
In summary, only the following variables were selected for the econometric 
estimates. The final architecture of the system of early warning indicators is 
then derived from the following leading indicators: 
 
Order No. Mnemonic Descriptions 
International environment 
1 ITEZE Terms of trade index - eurozone  
2 IPMP Commodity prices index 
3 TREFIZE Refinancing rates REFI - ECB (eurozone) 
4 SLIBOIS Spread Libor – OIS 
5 TEDS TED – Spread 
6 IVSTX Indice Vstoxx 
7 EMBI EMBI (JP Morgan Chase & Co.) Global Index (Emerging 
Market Bond Index) 
8 IPCHZE HICP Eurozone 
9 MRESZE Money/currency reserves of the eurozone 
10 OGZE Output gap eurozone 
11 ICAZOCDE CLI for the OECD area 
12 MSCIM MSCI World Market Index (Morgan Stanley Capital 
International – Global Index) 
National environment 
13 OGTN Output gap 
14 ITETN Terms of trade index 
15 INFTN Inflation  
16 MTCER Misalignment of the real effective exchange rate 
17 DRESTN Foreign short-term debt/foreign exchange reserves 
18 RLBTN Liquidity ratio 
19 NPLTN NPL (Non-Performing Loans)  
20 DTMTN Total deposits of the banking system/M3 
21 ROASBTN Mandatory reserves in the banking system/total 
banking system assets 
22 ROATN Return on assets (ROA) 
23 SEIGTN Advances from the central bank to the banking system 
/ total liabilities of the banking system 
24 TUNINDEX Stock Index – Tunindex  
 
The changes in patterns of the leading indicators are presented in the 
following graphs: 
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International environment indicators  
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International environment indicators  
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National environment indicators – Tunisia 
 
  
   
  
-15
-10
-5
0
5
10
15
2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009
Output Gap (IPI - FM)
0.0
0.5
1.0
1.5
2.0
2.5
99 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09
ITETN
1
2
3
4
5
6
99 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09
INFTN
-6
-4
-2
0
2
4
6
8
99 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09
MTCER
2
4
6
8
10
12
14
16
99 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09
DRESTN
14
16
18
20
22
24
26
28
99 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09
NPLTN
CRISIS MANAGEMENT IN THE SOUTHERN AND EASTERN MEDITERRANEAN | 187 
 
National environment indicators – Tunisia 
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In addition, the unit root tests (Augmented Dickey-Fuller, ADF) show 
that all the leading indicators used are stationary both in level and first 
derivative at the 5% or 10%. 
5.2.3 Results of the econometric estimations 
From leading indicators selected for both international and domestic 
environments, several iterations of econometric estimates of Probit models 
were made, first with individual indicators (in level and variation) 
followed by successive and separated blocks of variables in order to 
observe the statistical and economic significance. This ‘back step’ 
procedure, which consists of re-estimating the model by eliminating the 
least-significant variables, can help to optimise the robustness of the final 
model. The results of the estimates presented below clearly show that all 
the variables have the expected sign and are significant. The overall 
significance of the model and the quality of the estimates are traced by the 
McFadden coefficient of multiple determinants (R²). Calculated using the 
method of maximum likelihood, this index normally has significantly 
lower values than those of (R²) values obtained in a classical regression. 
McFadden noted that values close to 0.5 indicate a good model 
specification, which is the case of our estimation with a value of (0.354): 
Estimated sensitivities Probit model 
Estimation method: ML - Binary Probit 
Sample (adjusted): 1999:02 - 2009:12 
Number of observations: 131 after adjusting endpoints 
Variable Coefficient z-Statistic 
ITETN -7. 531219 -1. 954772 
MTCER 4.565086 1.874175 
NPLTN 6.355675 1.852281 
SEIGTN 5. 924109 2. 930535 
TREFIZE 1. 604010 2.814009 
EMBI 0. 870160 1. 824012 
ICAZOCDE -1. 782442 -4.020373 
 McFadden R-squared 0.354722 
 
In addition to the Mc Fadden index of the likelihood ratio, the 
robustness of the model and the quality of the estimates are better analysed 
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by the ‘Expectation-Prediction-Table’,67 which allows us compare the actual 
structure of the observed binary choice with the choice structure predicted 
by the estimated model. Data on the estimated equation provide a discrete 
classification of the probability of a crisis based on the probability value P 
(C = 1) predicted by the model: 
   (5) 
In the literature on early warning systems there is no consensus on 
the choice of cut-off (or critical probabilities at which a supervisor issues a 
warning). In the case of in-sample prediction, Demirguc-Kunt & 
Detragiache (1998, 2000) suggest taking the unconditional probability of 
crisis whose seizure frequency in the sample is a proxy. By analysing the 
predictive ability of early warning indicators, Kaminsky & Reihnart (1999) 
advocate the noise ratio to minimum signal indicator. The table below 
provides an overview of the successful prediction of correct and incorrect 
classifications of the probabilities of the occurrence of a crisis (C=1) on the 
basis of a prediction rule that sets a cut-off value equal to a successful 
calibration (0.5). 
Expectation-PredictionTable 
Dependent variables:  
 
Estimation method: ML – Binary Probit 
 Estimated Equation 
 C=0 C=1 
Sensitivities (% correct) 71.43% 93.33% 
Sensitivities (% incorrect) 28.57% 6.67% 
 100.00% 100.00% 
 
The fraction of observations (C=1) are correctly predicted and 
classified by the model, which gives an actual occurrence of a crisis equal to 
93.33% (with a default rate assigned to the model specification of 6.67%), 
against 71.43% for the opposite (with a default rate of 28.57%). 
                                                     
67 For technical details, see Maddala (1983). 
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The early warning system (EWS) clearly indicates that the probability 
of occurrence of currency crises in Tunisia seems explained by the 
following nested mechanisms that policy-makers must anticipate for better 
early warning: i) a risk of deterioration of terms of trade, ii) a risk of over-
appreciation of the real effective exchange rate, iii) a worsening of NPLs 
and incidentally iv) an excessive use of central-bank refinancing.  
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6. BANKING POLICY IN THE SEMCS 
PRE- AND POST-CRISIS  
RYM AYADI AND WILLEM PIETER DE GROEN 
outhern and eastern Mediterranean countries (SEMCs) have 
undertaken substantial reforms in their financial sectors in recent 
years. The financial crisis has pressured the central banks of the 
majority of the countries to strengthen financial stability.  
This chapter develops a number of indicators to track the evolution 
and assess the adequacy of banking regulations pre- and post-financial 
crisis using publicly available and comparable surveys for a large sample of 
countries since the early 2000s. To allow comparability across the 
Mediterranean, the report develops the measures for 10 SEMCs (Algeria, 
Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, Morocco, Palestine, Syria, Tunisia and 
Turkey) and seven EU Mediterranean countries (Cyprus, France, Greece, 
Italy, Malta, Portugal and Spain).  
The aim is to develop quantitative measures of regulatory 
development to assess regulatory efforts over the years in general and in 
the pre- and post-financial crisis periods in particular. In line with Ayadi et 
al. (2011), seven distinct regulatory areas are identified for assessing the 
various dimensions of regulatory adequacy. These cover the definition of 
banking, licensing requirements, capital requirements, the independence 
and power of the supervisor, the presence of safety nets, disclosure and the 
availability of credit information using distinct data sources. All indicators 
are expected to be impacted by the financial crisis, but the most relevant 
one for assessing the impact of the crisis are the level of capital 
requirements, stringency of supervision and the presence of safety nets. In 
addition, a convergence analysis is undertaken between the SEMCs and the 
EU Mediterranean countries to assess whether there has been further 
regulatory convergence between the two regions pre- and post-crisis. 
Generally, the analysis shows that the majority of the SEMCs have 
increased capital requirements, but they still suffer from key weaknesses in 
implementing necessary safety nets, such as deposit insurance. In addition, 
S
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entry obstacles, political interference and the strength of legal rights are still 
below international benchmarks.  
The second section provides a description of the methods and data 
used. In the third section, quantitative measures are presented and 
discussed. Based on the results, conclusions and policy recommendations 
are drawn in the fourth section. 
6.1 Methodology 
The main source of information for the regulatory adequacy indices are the 
Bank Regulation and Supervision Surveys (henceforth the ‘BRSS’) 
developed by Barth et al. (2001), later revised in 2003, 2007 and 2011.68 All 
four surveys are built on official responses to questionnaires that were sent 
to the national regulatory and supervisory agencies of over 120 countries, 
most of which were returned.69 The questions cover a wide variety of areas, 
including banking activity, entry, capital regulations, supervisory 
authority, private monitoring, deposit insurance and external governance. 
The responses from the BRSS database served as the basis for our analysis 
and were verified and in some cases completed by semi-structured 
interviews with the regulatory authorities in the countries we analysed.70 
We then constructed and assessed all indicators pre- and post-crisis.  
One of the key advantages of the BRSS is that the questionnaires have 
remained relatively similar over the years, although the later versions cover 
more areas than the original survey. This particular feature of the datasets 
allows us to make comparisons by building composite indices based on 
specific answers over time to track the evolution of the different regulatory 
and supervisory elements. 
                                                     
68 For the discussion of the results and other aspects of the data, see Barth et al. 
(2006, 2008 and 2012).  
69 The number of countries responding to the survey varied over time. The original 
survey of Barth et al. (2001) had 117 country respondents, including a wide 
diversity of developed, developing and underdeveloped countries. The later 
surveys achieved greater participation, with 152 in 2003, 142 in 2007 and 125 
countries participating in 2011. 
70 The interviews were mainly semi-structured and aimed specifically at assessing 
the impacts of the financial crisis on bank regulation, supervision and financial 
stability. The results and conclusions complemented the background analysis on 
the basis of BRSS.  
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A key disadvantage of the Barth et al. (2001) survey is that the 
number of questions responded to in the 2003, 2007 and 2011 revisions vary 
from one country to another. For the Mediterranean countries, the 
aggregate response rates are generally lower than for the entire sample. As 
noted in Figure 6.1, among the SEMCs, the Moroccan regulatory authorities 
were the most responsive to the survey, with an average response rate 
above 95%. In contrast, three SEMCs – Algeria, Syria and Tunisia – had 
response rates of between 83% and 90%, which is well below the average 
rate for the Mediterranean countries.  
Although the response rates appear high in general, the existence of a 
single partial or empty answer renders the construction of a relevant 
composite index dubious, since there is no clear way of scoring for missing 
responses. Moreover, some countries, such as Algeria, Palestine, Syria, 
Tunisia and Turkey, have not responded to all four surveys. Palestine only 
responded to a single survey (the 2011 survey), Algeria (2003, 2007), Syria 
(2007, 2011) and Tunisia (2003, 2011) to two surveys and Turkey (2000, 
2003, and 2011) to three surveys. To avoid any inconsistencies, empty 
answers were scored as zero in the construction of the relevant indices. This 
approach is in line with Barth et al. (2006, 2012). To complete the analysis 
based on the BRSS, qualitative surveys (in the form of semi-structured 
interviews with regulatory authorities) have been undertaken to allow 
some expert judgments on the regulatory initiatives taken in response to 
the financial crisis. 
Figure 6.1 Average response rates to the BRSS of Barth et al., by country 
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Note: Response rates are averaged over the four surveys and correspond to the number 
of questions with complete answers (i.e. all empty or partial were excluded) divided by 
the total number of questions used to compute the composite indices presented in this 
report.  
Source: BRSS. 
A second disadvantage of Barth et al. (2001) and its subsequent 
versions is that the questions did not cover all regulatory and supervisory 
areas. Two major areas where the surveys lacked depth were the details on 
deposit insurance guarantee schemes and institutional variables, such as 
the extent of credit information-sharing and creditors’ legal rights. To fill 
the gap, several additional sources were used to supplement the 
construction of the composite indices, including the deposit insurance 
database of Demirgüç-Kunt et al. (2005), the IMF and World Bank’s 
Financial Sector Assessment reports, the World Bank’s Doing Business 
Indicators and the websites of the national authorities and direct questions 
in these areas to the interviewees.  
6.2 Composite indices 
Seven composite indices have been created using the various data sources 
identified above:  
1) Scope restrictions 
2) Entry obstacles 
3) Capital requirement stringency 
4) Supervisory authority 
5) Deposit insurance 
6) Private monitoring 
7) Credit information and laws 
These areas provide relatively broad coverage of the quality and 
evolution of banking regulation and supervision pre- and post-crisis. The 
composite indices have been calculated for each country and also for the 
SEMCs and EU-MED countries included in our sample.  
The following sections revise and compare the evolution of the 
regulatory conditions in each of these seven areas.  
6.3 Scope restrictions 
As is evident from the differing business models of financial institutions 
across the world, financial institutions are becoming increasingly complex 
and offering a wider spectrum of products. Some countries restrict banking 
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to a narrow range of activities, such as taking deposits and issuing credit 
with little flexibility in debt and asset management, while others provide 
more flexibility allowing them to make investments and conduct retail 
banking and insurance activities. The regulations typically restrict the 
extent to which banks may engage in the business of i) securities 
underwriting, brokering, dealing and all aspects of the mutual fund 
industry; ii) insurance underwriting and selling; and iii) real estate 
investment, development and management. In a crisis context, scope 
restrictions are expected to increase as was clearly shown by the recently 
renewed debate on the reintroduction of the Glass–Steagall Act in the US. 
The composite indicator used in this area to assess the extent of 
restrictions imposed on banking activity is based on the Banking Activity 
Restrictiveness Index in the BRSS.71 The surveys provide measures of the 
degrees of restrictiveness for each of the above four categories, ranging 
from unrestricted (1 point), mostly permitted (2 points) and too restricted (3 
points) to fully prohibited (4 points). The Banking Activity Restrictiveness 
Index sums up the scores for each category to come up with a measure of 
the extent to which restrictions are present for banks, with a maximum 
restrictiveness score of 12 points, where no activity other than narrow 
banking is allowed.  
The country-specific results summarised in Figure 6.2 and Table 6.1 
show that the regulators in the SEMCs impose more restrictions on the 
scope of activities than the EU-MED countries in general during the pre- 
and post-crisis periods. A deeper analysis of the survey results (not 
included here) shows that in both the SEMCs and the EU-MED countries, 
regulators impose some form of restriction on insurance activities. Israel 
and Jordan’s banks face high restrictions among the sampled countries, 
where all real estate activities and some securities and insurance activities 
are prohibited. This is largely in line with Turkey’s banks, although the 
latter have only to deal with a few restrictions in order to engage in 
securities activities, and Syria’s banks, which are prohibited from engaging 
in both insurance and real estate activities, but on the other hand have 
complete freedom to engage in securities activities. Morocco’s banks are 
similarly restricted in their activities, but are to a limited extent allowed to 
engage in insurance activities.  
                                                     
71 The Banking Activity Restrictiveness Index is constructed by summing up the 
scores for the World Bank Guide (WBG) questions 4.1-4.3, as detailed in Appendix 
2 of Barth et al. (2006).  
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Figure 6.2 Banking activity restrictiveness, by region (% of maximum score) 
 
Table 6.1 Banking activity restrictiveness, by country and region 
(% of maximum score) 
 2000 2003 2007 2011 
Algeria .. 42 50 .. 
Egypt 83 58 58 67 
Israel 83 83 75 83 
Jordan 67 50 67 83 
Lebanon 75 67 75 58 
Morocco 83 58 75 67 
Palestine .. .. .. 42 
Syria .. .. 67 75 
Tunisia .. 67 .. 50 
Turkey 75 50 .. 75 
SEMCs* 80 63 67 73 
Cyprus 42 67 67 58 
France 33 33 58 67 
Greece 58 67 50 50 
Italy 58 67 75 58 
Malta 58 67 67 67 
Portugal 50 58 75 42 
Spain 50 42 42 42 
EU-MED* 44 46 59 58 
AVG 47 47 59 59 
STDEV 14 15 12 11 
* Regional averages are weighted by total banking assets. 
Note: Higher values represent more restrictive rules, with a maximum score of 12 points.  
Source: BRSS. 
Algerian banks are prohibited from engaging in insurance activities, 
but have complete freedom to engage in securities and real estate activities. 
In contrast, Palestine’s banks have complete freedom to engage in 
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insurance activities and face fewer restrictions in both securities and real 
estate investment activities. Lebanon’s banks are prohibited from engaging 
in real estate activities yet they have a large degree of freedom to engage in 
insurance and securities activities. Egypt imposes some restrictions on 
insurance and real estate, largely comparable with the EU-MED countries. 
It is not possible to judge the changing conditions in Tunisia owing to the 
incompleteness of information. Turning to the EU-MED countries, the 
banks in general face fewer restrictions than most of their neighbours. All 
EU-MED banks have complete freedom to engage in securities activities. 
Moreover, Spanish, Portuguese and Greek banks are also less restricted 
from engaging in insurance and real estate activities. Still, Cypriot and 
Maltese banks are prohibited from engaging in real estate activities and 
French banks in insurance activities.  
The figures show that there is a convergence tendency when the 
regional weighted averages are considered during the pre- and post-crisis 
period. Indeed, while the EU-MED countries’ weighted averages have 
moved up the restriction in this area gradually over time, the SEMCs’ 
averages have slightly gone down, converging to the former. However, 
there are clear differences within each sub-region. For example, Israel and 
Jordan impose substantial restrictions while Palestine has the most flexible 
system. As for the EU-MED countries, Spain’s system imposes the least 
amount of restrictions, while France and Malta have increasingly narrowed 
the scope of banking activities over the years. This EU-MED trend may 
change as a result of the new banking reforms that are moving towards 
more restrictions on banking activities as a result of the financial crisis.72 
This might bring convergence to a higher level with the SEMCs, if these 
countries do not change the level of activity restriction. 
6.4 Entry obstacles 
The competitive conditions in a country depend crucially on the regulatory 
structures and conditions that might hinder or prevent entry into the 
banking sector by domestic or foreign banks. In some countries, the 
                                                     
72 In 2012, Commissioner Michel Barnier nominated a group of experts chaired by 
Erkki Liikanen to examine the need for reforms in the structure of the EU’s 
banking sector. In the final report published in October 2012, the experts advised 
the European Commission among other things to curb excessively risky 
investment banking activities.  
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obstacles may take the form of excessive licensing or entry requirements, 
which are applicable to domestic and foreign banks alike. In others, the 
governments may restrict foreign entry as part of a conscientious policy 
choice, either explicitly by setting limits on ownership or more importantly 
by rejecting foreign applications in a disproportionate manner.73 Lastly, a 
banking sector that is predominantly state-owned may be disadvantageous 
for the development of privately owned banks.74 
The first indicator that comes to mind for measuring how much the 
regulatory structure obstructs entry is legal licensing requirements, which 
may hamper entry by making the procedures unnecessarily cumbersome. 
Entry obstacles are expected to be more pronounced in a crisis context.  
The relevant measure is based on the set of requirements for the 
licensing application to be considered valid. The index is built on the total 
number of required documents, including i) draft by-laws, ii) an 
organisational chart, iii) financial projections, iv) financial information on 
potential shareholders, v) the background of directors, vi) the background 
of management, vii) details of funding sources and viii) market 
differentiation intended.75 
Figure 6.3 and Table 6.2 show that most SEMCs impose levels of 
stringency in terms of entry requirements that are similar to those of EU-
MED countries. These requirements have increased since the eruption of 
the financial crisis both in the EU-MED countries and SEMCs. In particular, 
                                                     
73 Denials of domestic banks are not considered here as they are more likely to arise 
from prudential concerns, including funding deficiencies or other financial 
problems, which are commonplace for home-grown banks in countries with less 
developed financial systems that have limited access to external capital.  
74 Aside from their potentially negative impact on entry, state-owned banks may 
fulfil an important developmental role in under-developed regions. Recent 
evidence shows that in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region, public 
banks compensate for the low private-bank involvement in the small- and 
medium-sized enterprise (SME) sector, engaging in more risky loan issuance, 
although they seem to have less than sufficient capacity to manage such risks 
(Rocha et al., 2010). See also Andrianova et al. (2010) for recent evidence that 
government ownership of banks is associated with higher long-run growth rates in 
developing countries. 
75 The entry in the banking requirements index is constructed by summing up the 
scores for the WBG questions 1.8.1-1.8.8, as detailed in Appendix 2 of Barth et al. 
(2006).  
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all of the eight requirements named above are commonplace in all ten 
SEMCs for which the latest survey was completed. As for the EU-MED 
countries, almost all of them require all eight documents. Only Greece and 
Portugal do not legally require banks to provide information on the 
background of future managers.  
Figure 6.3 Requirements for entry into the banking sector, by region 
(% of maximum score) 
 
Table 6.2 Requirements for entry into the banking sector, by country and region 
(% of maximum score) 
2000 2003 2007 2011 
Algeria .. 88 100 .. 
Egypt 75 100 100 100 
Israel 75 38 38 100 
Jordan 100 88 100 100 
Lebanon 100 100 100 100 
Morocco 100 100 100 100 
Palestine .. .. .. 100 
Syria .. .. 100 100 
Tunisia .. 100 .. 100 
Turkey 88 88 .. 100 
SEMCs* 83 77 79 100 
Cyprus 100 75 38 100 
France 75 75 88 100 
Greece 100 88 88 88 
Italy 100 100 100 100 
Malta 100 100 100 100 
Portugal 88 88 88 88 
Spain 100 100 88 100 
EU-MED* 87 87 90 99 
AVG 87 86 90 99 
STDEV 12 14 9 3 
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* Regional averages are weighted by total banking assets. 
Note: Higher values represent more restrictive rules as a share of a maximum of 8 points. 
Source: BRSS. 
These results show that most countries in the Mediterranean require 
similar documents for licensing. This means that these figures probably 
give at best an incomplete picture of the obstacles faced by potential 
entrants. More realistically, these requirements are most likely used on 
both sides of the Mediterranean to screen potential entrants, ensuring that 
they are ‘fit and proper’ to run a banking business.  
As noted above, the set of licensing requirements do not paint a 
complete picture of entry obstacles. The second index considers the more 
discretionary power that the authorities enjoy by granting or rejecting 
entry. More specifically, the index is based on the fraction of licensing 
applications for foreign banks that have been denied within the past five 
years from the day the survey was conducted.76 
Figure 6.4 and Table 6.3 clearly show that denials of foreign banking 
applications are more commonplace in the SEMCs, which is in stark 
contrast to the EU-MED countries, where such denials are very rare. In 
particular, all of the licensing applications for foreign banks for the years 
between 1995 and 2002 were denied in Egypt. More recently, Egypt denied 
nearly a third of the foreign licensing applications (four out of five) in the 
five years leading to 2011. Jordan denied two of the four applications over 
the same period. Turkey also refused two of the fifteen foreign 
applications. Israel and Morocco denied several foreign banking 
applications in the past, but none of the five applications was denied in the 
last observation period of 2006 to 2010. Algeria, Lebanon, Palestine, Syria 
and Tunisia do not appear to use foreign denials as an entry obstacle. 
Overall, the percentage of foreign denials in the SEMCs has decreased 
gradually since 1995 and the trend is decreasing after the financial crisis.  
                                                     
76 The share of foreign denials are addressed by WBG question 1.10, as detailed in 
Appendix 1 and 2 of Barth et al. (2006). 
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Figure 6.4 Share of foreign applications denied, by region (%) 
 
 
Table 6.3 Share of foreign applications denied, by country and region (%) 
 2000 2003 2007 2011 
Algeria .. 0 .. .. 
Egypt 100 100 32 80 
Israel 0 17 20 0 
Jordan .. 80 90 50 
Lebanon 0 0 0 0 
Morocco .. 0 50 0 
Palestine .. .. .. 0 
Syria .. .. 0 0 
Tunisia .. 0 .. 0 
Turkey .. 42 .. 13 
SEMCs* 33 34 28 18 
Cyprus 0 0 0 20 
France 0 .. 0 0 
Greece 0 14 0 0 
Italy 0 13 3 9 
Malta 0 0 0 0 
Portugal 0 0 0 0 
Spain 0 7 0 0 
EU-MED* 0 10 1 2 
AVG 2 13 2 3 
STDEV 13 15 6 10 
* Regional averages are weighted by total banking assets. 
Source: BRSS. 
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The third and last indicator on entry obstacles relates to the 
dominance of government-controlled banking. The index is a simple 
measure of the market power of banks that are majority-owned by the 
state, i.e. the percentage of total banking assets controlled by the 
government-owned banks (e.g. the government possesses more than 50% 
of the bank’s equity).77 The relevant data are available for the 2003, 2007 
and 2011 surveys. 
Figure 6.5 and Table 6.4 point at significant differences between 
SEMCs and the Euro-Med countries. While the state has little control over 
banking in the EU-MED countries, except for Greece and Portugal, public 
banks represent a significant part of the banking activity in the SEMCs. 
This remains particularly the case for Algeria, Egypt and Syria, where the 
state has control over a significant majority of the banking sector. State-
owned banks in these countries often enjoy implicit or explicit state 
guarantees, with access to public funding, and are possibly subject to less 
strict or to flexible rules, which may represent a disadvantage for potential 
entrants and more generally undermine healthy competition (Barth et al., 
2004). Since 2007, the trend of state ownership in banks seems to be 
decreasing, which might open new opportunities for competition. 
Figure 6.5. Market share of government-controlled banks, by region 
(% of total assets) 
 
                                                     
77 The share of government-controlled banks is addressed by WBG question 3.8.1, 
as detailed in Appendix 1 of Barth et al. (2006). 
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Table 6.4 Market share of government-controlled banks, by country and region 
(% of total assets) 
 2003 2007 2011 
Algeria 96 90 .. 
Egypt 65 67 .. 
Israel 46 0 0 
Jordan 0 0 .. 
Lebanon 2 .. .. 
Morocco 35 29 .. 
Palestine .. .. 0 
Syria .. .. 71 
Tunisia 43 .. .. 
Turkey 32 .. 32 
SEMCs* 43 35 22 
Cyprus 4 3 1 
France 0 0 2 
Greece 23 .. 11 
Italy 10 9 0 
Malta 0 0 0 
Portugal 23 25 23 
Spain 0 0 0 
EU-MED* 4 3 2 
AVG 7 4 3 
STDEV 13 10 8 
* Regional averages are weighted by the total banking assets. 
Notes: Figures represent share of banks with at least 50% state ownership. 
Source: BRSS. 
Put together, the three indices provide a contrasting picture of the 
sampled countries in terms of entry obstacles. The sets of documents 
needed for a valid licensing application are largely similar on both sides of 
the Mediterranean and have even been strengthened in the post-financial 
crisis period. These requirements are most likely used to ensure that only 
‘fit and proper’ undertakings are allowed to operate as banks. Only two 
countries, Greece and Portugal, can be distinguished in this respect, with 
few licensing requirements. Turning to less official controls that the 
authorities exert on the banking sector, foreign entry denials are 
proportionally high in some of the SEMCs, particularly in Egypt and 
Jordan. The state also maintains substantial direct control over the banking 
sector in most of the countries in the region, with publicly owned banks 
still accounting for more than two-thirds of the banking-sector activities in 
Algeria, Egypt and Syria. There are some signs, however, that such trend is 
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decreasing during the crisis period. In short, although the official entry 
conditions appear comparable, there are significant and persistent entry 
obstacles that can curtail competition in the SEMCs’ banking sectors, 
possibly emanating from official authority in practice and political 
interference.  
6.5 Capital requirement stringency 
One of the common aims of regulating banks is to ensure that they operate 
soundly through a solid capital base to sustain their operations and risk 
taking. Regulatory capital requirements are an important part of these 
rules, which determine the minimum amount of capital a bank should hold 
relative to its total assets (or risk-weighted assets). 
Comparing the capital ratios represents a good first step towards 
understanding how sound the banking sector is. The capital ratios in the 
SEMCs are clearly higher than in the EU-MED countries, as depicted in 
Figure 6.6 and Table 6.5. For a start, with the exception of Greece, all the 
countries have maintained a total capital ratio of between 9% and 15%. 
Since 1998, the banks in the SEMCs have become better capitalised, with 
the average capital ratios reaching 16.9% towards the end of the period. In 
2011, the capital ratios slightly decreased to 15.5%; especially the capital 
ratios of fast-growing banking sectors, like that of Turkey, declined.  
Figure 6.6. Regulatory capital ratios, by region (% of risk-weighted assets) 
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Table 6.5 Regulatory capital ratios, by country and region 
(% of risk-weighted assets) 
 1998 2001 2005 2009 2011 
Algeria .. 11.9 12.0 22.1 20.9 
Egypt 10.2 9.8 14.1 15.1 15.6 
Israel 9.2 9.5 10.7 12.6 14.0 
Jordan .. 17.5 17.6 19.6 18.2 
Lebanon .. 18.0 22.9 13.7 13.3 
Morocco 13.1 12.6 11.5 11.8 11.7 
Palestine .. .. .. 21.9 21.6 
Syria .. .. .. 21.0 .. 
Tunisia .. 10.6 12.4 12.2 11.5 
Turkey .. 20.8 22.8 20.6 16.6 
SEMCs* 9.9 13.7 15.7 16.9 15.5 
Cyprus 9.9 14.0 13.0 12.0 8.3 
France .. 12.1 11.4 12.4 12.8 
Greece 11.4 13.6 13.3 11.7 -1.7 
Italy 13.4 10.4 10.6 12.1 12.7 
Malta .. .. .. 13.5 13.5 
Portugal 12.3 9.5 11.3 10.5 9.8 
Spain 12.5 13.0 11.7 11.9 12.4 
EU-MED* 12.9 11.7 11.3 12.1 12.1 
AVG 12.6 11.9 11.6 12.4 12.4 
STDEV 1.1 1.7 1.8 1.8 2.5 
* Regional averages are weighted by total banking assets. 
Notes: Figures represent the share of total capital in risk-weighted assets using the 1988 Basel 
Accord definitions. 
Sources: BRSS and IMF Global Financial Stability Reports. 
The SEMCs’ banks appear to be at least as well capitalised as their 
northern counterparts, especially since the early 2000s. Does this result 
reflect the stringency of capital requirements or a lower appetite for risk? In 
other words, is it the regulations that make the banks sounder or are the 
banks simply not willing to take too many risks? To answer this important 
question, it is necessary to look deeper into the rules.  
There are different ways of measuring the stringency of capital 
requirements. The index that is used here gives consideration to the types 
of capital allowed, the risk weights applied and whether the minimum 
capital ratios vary with risk. More specifically, the capital stringency index 
aims at determining the extent to which capital requirements restrict 
leverage potential and risky behaviour, including questions on i) whether 
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the minimum capital-to-asset requirements are in line with 1988 Basel 
Accord definitions; ii) whether the minimum ratio varies with the bank’s 
credit risk or iii) market risk and whether the value of iv) unrealised loan 
losses, v) unrealised security losses or vi) foreign exchange losses are 
deducted from regulatory capital. Additionally, the index seeks to measure 
the restrictions imposed on the source of regulatory capital, such as vii) 
whether these funds are verified by regulatory authorities and, whether 
viii) cash and government securities, or more generally ix) non-borrowed 
funds are the only allowed forms of capital for initial disbursements and 
subsequent injections.78 A greater number of affirmative responses to these 
questions lead to a higher stringency score. 
Figure 6.7 and Table 6.6 summarise the comparison of the stringency 
of capital requirements for the countries in our sample. A quick glance 
through the figures reveals that the capital requirements have become more 
stringent in most of the countries in the sample as a result of the financial 
crisis, most probably. More and more SEMCs are implementing legislation 
to align their capital requirements with the Basel II capital standards. 
Jordan, Lebanon, Morocco, Syria and Turkey, for instance, adopted 
legislation that allowed banks to vary their minimum capital requirements 
depending on banks’ individual credit risk and market risk. The 
implementation of this legislation led to a jump in capital stringency 
between 2007 and 2011. Among the SEMCs, Tunisia is the only exception, 
with clearly less stringent capital requirements. The Tunisian authorities 
notably filled out fewer questions regarding capital stringency than seven 
years earlier.  
Among the EU-MED countries, Cyprus has the most stringent capital 
requirements, with affirmative answers to six out of seven questions in 
2011, followed by France and Spain. Like all other EU-MED countries, the 
Cypriot regulatory/supervisory authorities do not verify the sources of 
funds to be used as capital. For France and Spain, there was a clear 
tendency towards a substantial strengthening of the rules. However, 
during the financial crisis, the capital requirements in these countries were 
                                                     
78 The stringency of the capital requirements index is addressed by WBG questions 
3.1.1, 3.2, 3.3, 3.9.1, 3.9.2, 3.9.3, and 1.5–1.7. The calculation of the index is detailed 
in Appendix 2 of Barth et al. (2006, pp. 337-338). One question (WBG 3.7) on the 
fraction of revaluation gains allowed as part of capital has been omitted from the 
calculation of the index because the responses were not available for most of the 
countries in our sample.  
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relaxed a bit. Both countries allowed banks to increase capital with assets 
other than cash or government securities. The initial capital of banks in 
Greece, Italy and Malta can also include borrowed funds. Banks in Portugal 
are not obliged to deduct unrealised losses in securities portfolios from 
capital, but may fund capital contributions using assets other than 
government securities or cash. 
Figure 6.7 Stringency of capital requirements, by region (% of maximum score) 
 
Table 6.6 Stringency of capital requirements, by country and region 
(% of maximum score) 
 2000 2003 2007 2011 
Algeria .. 44 78 .. 
Egypt 56 33 33 71 
Israel 33 56 44 86 
Jordan 67 67 56 86 
Lebanon 56 67 56 71 
Morocco 56 56 33 86 
Palestine .. .. .. 86 
Syria .. .. 33 71 
Tunisia .. 67 .. 57 
Turkey 56 56 .. 86 
SEMCs* 48 53 46 81 
Cyprus 11 44 67 86 
France 56 22 89 71 
Greece 33 56 33 57 
Italy 44 33 33 57 
Malta 67 56 56 57 
Portugal 44 67 78 57 
Spain 78 89 89 71 
EU-MED* 55 40 73 68 
AVG 54 41 72 69 
STDEV 12 25 25 8 
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* Regional averages are weighted by total banking assets. 
Note: Higher values represent more restrictive rules as a share of a maximum score of 9 
points in 2000, 2003 and 2007 and 7 points in 2011.  
Source: BRSS. 
With these results in hand, it is easy to see that there is a pattern of 
convergence. EU members Greece, Italy, Malta and Portugal have rather 
flexible capital requirements, while the opposite is true for Cyprus, France 
and Spain. In contrast, the capital requirements of most of the SEMCs are in 
general more stringent than the EU-MED averages, especially regarding 
rules concerning the usage of non-cash or government securities and 
borrowed funds for capital.79 
6.6 Supervisory authority 
A key issue in the effectiveness of banking regulations is whether the 
supervisory authorities have the necessary powers to apply a variety of 
measures to discipline or, at the extreme, resolve banks that violate the 
rules or engage in imprudent activities. To that extent, in most countries, 
the supervisors take prompt corrective action against a bank if the capital 
falls below the minimally required level. If the deterioration of the bank 
continues, the supervisor must have the ability to find a resolution before 
the bank becomes insolvent, posing a systemic threat. To be effective, the 
supervisors need access to reliable and frequently updated information on 
the condition of the banks. The judicial systems often allow the courts to 
intervene, thereby diminishing, postponing or reversing illegitimate 
supervisory actions, but these actions should not undermine the 
supervisor’s chief responsibility of protecting and ensuring an orderly 
operation of the banking market. These aspects of supervisory system 
issues should be in line with the regulatory priorities and not subject to 
political patronage, which keeps supervisory authority independent and 
far from any interference. In short, the supervisors should have the 
authority to discipline potentially troubled banks and resolve problems 
while remaining independent of political influence.  
Two indices are used for measuring supervisory authority.  
                                                     
79 These results are largely in line with the key regulatory shortcomings identified 
for the region in Tahari et al. (2007), using compliance of European countries with 
Basel Core Principles (BCPs) on prudential regulations and requirements (BCPs 6 
to 15) as a benchmark. 
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The first index measures the official power of the supervisor to take 
specific actions to correct or prevent problems. The relevant questions 
include the ability of supervisors to i) meet external auditors without the 
approval of a bank, ii) communicate directly with auditors on illicit 
activities undertaken by a bank’s management or directors, iii) receive 
disclosure of off-balance sheet items, iv) take legal action against negligent 
auditors, v) change the organisational structure of troubled banks, vi) order 
the management or directors to cover losses and vii) suspend dividend 
distributions, as well as viii) bonuses and ix) management fees. 
Additionally, for the 2003, 2007 and 2011 surveys, questions on troubled 
banks considered the supervisors’ ability to x) declare insolvency, xi) 
suspend ownership rights, xii) supersede shareholder rights and xiii) fire or 
hire management or xiv) directors.80 An affirmative answer to any of these 
questions represents greater supervisory power. Some of these powers may 
only be exercisable by some supervisory-like institutions, such as the 
depository insurance agency or the bank restructuring agencies, which 
grant more moderate power to supervisors.81 In other cases, the courts or 
the government may be involved, which would serve to void the power of 
the supervisors in those actions.  
Interestingly, Figure 6.8 and Table 6.7 show that the SEMCs and EU-
MED countries grant more or less the same power to their supervisory 
authorities. These powers remained relatively unchanged pre- and post-
crisis for the SEMCs and have been strengthened in the EU-MED. Yet there 
are large differences among the individual countries. In Jordan and 
Palestine, the official supervisor is allowed to intervene directly in all the 
domains highlighted above. On the other hand, the official supervisor in 
Syria has mostly elementary tools. It has, for instance, the possibility to 
meet external auditors without the approval of the bank. But it is not 
allowed to communicate directly with auditors on illicit activities or take 
any legal action against these auditors. The official supervisor can further 
prevent dividends being paid out, but it cannot suspend bonuses for the 
management. Moreover, as in all the SEMCs excluding Jordan and 
                                                     
80 The official supervisory power index is addressed by WBG questions 5.5-5.7, 6.1, 
10.4, 11.2, 11.3.1-11.3.3, 11.6, 11.7, and 11.9.1-11.9.3. The calculation of the index is 
detailed in Appendix 2 of Barth et al. (2006, pp. 339-342).  
81 In these cases, the aggregate score is augmented by only half points; for more 
details, see the calculation of the index in Appendix 2 of Barth et al. (2006, pp. 339-
342).  
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Palestine, the Syrian official supervisor does not have the authority to 
declare a bank insolvent or supersede shareholder rights. 
Figure 6.8 Official supervisory power, by region (% of maximum score) 
 
Table 6.7 Official supervisory power, by country and region (% of maximum score) 
 2000 2003 2007 2011 
Algeria .. 76 58 .. 
Egypt 100 74 74 64 
Israel 44 37 53 50 
Jordan 67 74 47 79 
Lebanon 100 53 53 50 
Morocco 78 66 68 43 
Palestine .. .. .. 79 
Syria .. .. 68 36 
Tunisia .. 68 .. 57 
Turkey 67 82 .. 68 
SEMCs* 69 63 60 59 
Cyprus 100 42 63 64 
France 67 37 45 57 
Greece 56 63 53 39 
Italy 33 26 37 71 
Malta 67 74 74 71 
Portugal 67 74 74 71 
Spain 44 47 61 57 
EU-MED* 54 38 48 60 
AVG 56 40 48 60 
STDEV 16 13 10 8 
* Regional averages are weighted by total banking assets. 
Note: Higher values represent more restrictive rules as a share of a maximum score of 9 
points in 2000, 19 points in 2003 and 2007, and 14 points in 2011. 
Source: BRSS. 
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Turning to the EU-MED countries, it is interesting to see that the new 
member state, Cyprus, grants increasing official power to its authorities. 
The same applies to France and Italy and, to a lesser extent, Portugal and 
Spain. Greece once again obtains the lowest score in official supervisory 
power: unlike other countries in our sample, the Greek supervisory 
authority has no right to meet the external auditor without prior approval 
of the bank or sue the auditors for negligence. The banks are also not 
obliged to publish information on off-balance sheet positions. Furthermore, 
the supervisor does not have any power to suspend shareholder rights or 
replace management.  
The second index for assessing supervisory authority turns more 
generally to the independence of the supervisor from political influence. 
For this index, three questions from the BRSS are considered: i) Are 
supervisory bodies accountable only to a legislative body? ii) Are 
supervisors legally liable for their actions committed in the exercise of their 
duties? and iii) Does the head of the agency have a fixed term? The level of 
independence is determined by points obtained from counting affirmative 
answers to questions (i) and (iii) and a negative answer to (ii).82 
The results depicted in Figure 6.9 and Table 6.8 show a clear 
divergence in terms of independence from political interference. While the 
banking supervisors of the EU-MED countries have become more 
independent, far less has changed in the SEMCs. The biggest concern 
remains the accountability of the supervisor directly to the executive arm, 
i.e. the president, the prime minister or other cabinet members, which is the 
case in all of the SEMCs.83 
Of particular concern is Algeria, where none of the three criteria 
outlined above was satisfied in the last available survey, which implies an 
enormous potential for political interference. The same can also be said of 
other countries, such as Israel, Lebanon, Morocco and Syria. In comparison, 
the supervisor is only accountable to a legislative body (such as a 
                                                     
82 The independence from political interference index is addressed by WBG 
questions 12.2, 12.10 and 12.2.2. The calculation of the index is slightly different 
from the specification in Appendix 2 of Barth et al. (2006, pp. 349-350), in that to 
score a point in question 12.2, the supervisory bodies should be accountable to no 
one other than a legislative body, such as the parliament or congress.  
83 In the case of Morocco, the governor of the Bank Al-Maghrib serves at the 
discretion of the King.  
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parliament) in almost all EU member states except Greece and Italy, as well 
as in Egypt, Jordan, Palestine, Tunisia and Turkey. Once again, the Italian 
supervisory authority remains well below the EU standards in terms of 
independence from political interference due to its accountability to the 
central government and its legal liability for damages to a bank in the 
exercise of its duties. Another key distinguishing factor is the fixed term for 
the head of the regulatory authority, which is not available as an option in 
Algeria, Israel, Morocco or Syria, but has become increasingly popular 
among the EU members.  
The results of the BRSS surveys reviewed in this section show that the 
powers granted have increased or remained constant in almost all of the 
countries. Moreover, the official powers granted to supervisors appear to 
be on the rise on both sides of the Mediterranean. Turning to operational 
independence, government officials have the ability to politically interfere 
in the work of the supervisors. Therefore, despite the fact that the 
supervisors are assigned almost full authority, it is possible that these 
powers remain notional due to government interference. Provided that 
some of the SEMCs have a substantial government presence in the banking 
sector (already noted above), operational independence should be a 
guiding principle to ensure that all banks – publicly or privately-owned – 
are treated equally. 
Figure 6.9 Independence from political interference, by region (% of maximum 
score) 
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Table 6.8 Independence from political interference, by country and region 
(% of maximum score) 
 2003 2007 2011 
Algeria 33 0 .. 
Egypt 67 67 67 
Israel 0 33 33 
Jordan 67 33 67 
Lebanon 33 33 33 
Morocco 33 33 33 
Palestine .. .. 67 
Syria .. 0 33 
Tunisia 67 .. 67 
Turkey 33 .. 67 
SEMCs* 31 35 53 
Cyprus 67 100 100 
France 33 33 100 
Greece 67 33 67 
Italy 0 33 33 
Malta 100 67 67 
Portugal 67 67 100 
Spain 33 67 100 
EU-MED* 27 42 85 
AVG 28 42 82 
STDEV 19 15 28 
* Regional averages are weighted by total banking assets. 
Notes: Higher values represent more independence as a share of a maximum score of 3 
points. 
Source: BRSS. 
6.7 Deposit insurance 
A deposit insurance system is one of the key elements of a country’s 
financial safety net, designed to prevent any disruptions to the financial 
markets and the economy. By protecting depositors, the deposit insurance 
schemes provide confidence to relatively small depositors and prevent 
bank runs. At the same time, they may introduce moral hazard, 
diminishing the depositors’ incentives to monitor and screen the banks and 
amplifying the shareholders’ incentives to engage in excessive risk. The 
moral hazard problem implies that banks have incentives to take on risk 
that can be shifted to a deposit insurance fund or, ultimately, the taxpayers.  
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Efforts are being taken across the world to mitigate moral hazard 
problems arising from deposit guarantee schemes.84 First, the amount of 
coverage matters. In some countries, aside from limits on the total amount, 
co-insurance is imposed to ensure that depositors bear some share of the 
costs.85 Second, the use of risk-adjusted premiums may also serve to better 
internalise the costs of the risks that they take. Third, the way that the 
deposit insurance schemes are funded also matters. For example, when the 
government is explicitly or implicitly involved in providing the necessary 
funds, moral hazard may be attenuated, especially in countries where the 
government has ample resources. In turn, when the system is backed with 
funds provided by banks, moral hazard can be limited by the 
understanding that the amount of guarantees is restricted by the pooled 
reserves.  
Looking at the existing schemes, there are clear differences in the two 
sets of countries bordering the Mediterranean (Table 6.9). The revised EU 
Deposit Insurance Directive requires EU member states to maintain deposit 
insurance with a coverage limit of at least €100,000, raised from a minimum 
of €20,000 in the aftermath of the 2007–09 financial crisis.86 Most of the EU-
MED countries have chosen to set this base amount as their coverage limits, 
representing between four and six times the average figures for annual 
income per capita. The 2009 amendment also abolished the co-insurance 
system, which allowed up to 10% of losses to be shared with covered 
depositors. Risk-based premiums exist in about half of the countries, 
including France, Greece, Italy and Portugal. Setting itself clearly apart 
from the other countries in the region, Italy has an ex-post funding 
structure, where the banks are required to contribute after the deposit 
guarantee scheme is activated. Cyprus, France and Malta have hybrid 
systems in which substantial amounts of supplementary (ex-post) funding 
may be activated if the funds’ resources fall below pre-set levels. The levels 
                                                     
84 See Kane (2000) and Demirgüç-Kunt et al. (2005) for a review of the potential 
effects and key design features of the deposit insurance schemes.  
85 Empirical evidence shows that the coverage limits and co-insurance practices 
serve to reduce the likelihood of bank failure substantially (Demirgüç-Kunt & 
Detragiache, 2002).  
86 See Directive 2009/14/EC, which amended the Deposit Guarantee Directive 
94/19/EC. The minimum amount of €100,000 has been in force since 31 December 
2010.  
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of ex-ante funds display substantial variation, wherever they exist, with a 
low of 0.1% of eligible deposits in France and a high of 1.69% in Greece. 
Turning to the SEMCs, Egypt, Israel, Palestine, Syria and Tunisia 
have no schemes in place.87 In Algeria, Morocco and Turkey, the coverage 
limits represent one to two times the average annual income, pointing at a 
much lower level of protection afforded than in the EU. As in the EU-MED 
countries, the deposit guarantee schemes do not have a co-insurance 
option. Turkey is the only country that uses risk-based premiums.  
The deposit insurance scheme index identifies the level of observance 
of standards that are thought to mitigate the moral hazard problem. Since 
recent information is available, the index is constructed for the years 2003, 
2007 and 2011. For countries with an explicit system, three issues are 
relevant: i) whether a co-insurance discount is applicable to pay-outs, ii) 
whether premiums are risk-adjusted and iii) whether only banks take a 
primary role.88 An additional point is scored for an affirmative answer to 
each one of these questions. A score of zero is assigned to countries where 
no explicit system exists, since in those cases the government is assumed to 
provide implicit guarantees, implying a greater incentive for banks to take 
risks.89 
                                                     
87 In Egypt, although the legal framework allows for the establishment of an 
autonomous deposit insurance fund, no scheme has been set up yet. 
88 The calculation of the deposit insurance scheme index follows the format 
detailed in Barth et al. (2006, p. 354), except that a score of zero is assigned to 
countries with no explicit insurance scheme.  
Three separate sources were used for the information on the deposit insurance 
scheme. First, the BRSS provided the basic information and evaluation for 2003 and 
2007. Whenever the BRSS gave conflicting or incomplete results, the information 
contained in Demirgüç-Kunt et al. (2005), the European Commission’s (2010) 
assessment of EU deposit guarantee schemes as well as the legal documents from 
the websites of Bank Al-Maghrib and Banque d’Algérie were used. 
89 Gropp & Vesala (2004) shows that credible implicit guarantees operating 
through the expectation of public intervention at times of distress can aggravate 
the moral hazard problem when compared with explicit deposit guarantee 
schemes. As the authors note, the key issue is whether the institutional and fiscal 
conditions would make the inherent guarantees credible. It is assumed here that 
the three countries with no explicit systems, namely Egypt, Israel and Tunisia, 
have ample fiscal resources and the necessary institutional framework that could 
make such guarantees credible.  
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Table 6.9 Deposit guarantee schemes in the Mediterranean, latest available figures 
 
Est. date Coverage limit Funding 
(public or 
banks) 
Co-
insurance 
Risk-based 
premiums 
Ex post/ 
ex ante 
Coverage 
ratio** € 
(current) 
(% of GDP per capita in 2012, 
PPP) 
SEMCs                 
Algeria 1997 6,000 108 Banks No No Ex ante n.a. 
Egypt .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 
Israel .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 
Jordan 2000 52,500 1,142 Banks No No Ex ante 1.87 
Lebanon 1967 2,500 19 Banks No No Ex ante n.a. 
Morocco 1993 7,000 177 Banks No No Ex ante n.a. 
Palestine .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 
Syria .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 
Tunisia .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 
Turkey 1983 21,000 182 Banks No Yes Ex ante 6.05 
EU-MED                 
Cyprus 2000 100,000 479 Banks No* No Hybrid 0.31 
France 1999 100,000 363 Banks No* Yes Hybrid 0.10 
Greece 1995 100,000 515 Banks No* Yes Ex ante 1.69 
Italy 1987 103,291 428 Banks No* Yes Ex post 0.00 
Malta 2003 100,000 494 Banks No* No Ex ante 0.40 
Portugal 1992 100,000 561 Banks No* Yes Ex ante 1.06 
Spain 1977 100,000 424 Banks No* No Hybrid 0.65 
* Co-insurance has been abandoned by the amending Directive 2009/14/EC. 
** The actual EU-MED coverage ratio is calculated as the ratio of ex-ante funds and eligible deposits using published figures for 2007–08. 
For Turkey and Jordan, the end of 2011 total reserves of the deposit insurance schemes is divided by the total insured deposits. 
Sources: European Commission (2010), IMF (2008), Bank Al-Maghrib and Banque d’Algérie. 
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The scores in Figure 6.10 and Table 6.10 show that moral hazard 
issues stemming from implicit guarantees are more of a threat in the 
SEMCs. For the most part, this is owing to the absence of explicit deposit 
guarantee schemes in Egypt, Israel, Palestine, Syria and Tunisia. The 
Algerian system was equivalent to an implicit guarantee in 2003, as the 
government had a direct funding role.90 Looking at countries with explicit 
systems, some similarities emerge. Out of the three issues outlined above, 
Algeria, Cyprus, Spain, Greece, Jordan, Lebanon, Malta and Morocco only 
satisfied the requirement that the banks (and not the government) take the 
primary role of funding the scheme in 2011. The French, Greek, Italian and 
Portuguese systems, in contrast, include risk-adjusted premiums, 
significantly impacting the EU-MED averages. Lastly, the EU-MED 
averages display a downward trend, which is entirely due to the gradual 
abandonment of the co-insurance payouts. On the other hand, in 2010 the 
European Commission published a proposal to harmonise the deposit 
guarantee schemes in the EU, which would oblige the EU member states to 
implement a risk-based, deposit guarantee scheme that is bank-funded. 
However, the proposal has not been adopted, since the European 
Parliament and Council have not yet agreed on the final terms. 
Many of the SEMCs do not have an active deposit insurance scheme, 
albeit some countries, like Israel, Palestine, Syria and Tunisia, are studying 
or considering implementing one. A badly designed scheme can invite 
additional risks and may not be better than a system with no scheme at all. 
The results show that the schemes in Jordan, Lebanon and Morocco (as well 
as in some EU-MED countries) may indeed amplify the moral hazard risks. 
Still, these conclusions should be interpreted with care. As the recent 
financial crisis has shown, when a run on a bank has the potential to spur 
broader panic, the governments are likely to step in to stop a potential bank 
run, notwithstanding the types of explicit arrangements in place.91 One 
may wonder, quite justifiably, whether the named arrangements really do 
mitigate moral hazard when they may be so easily replaced with limitless 
                                                     
90 Under Law No. 90-10 of 1990 regarding money and credit, the Algerian Treasury 
was a contributor to the deposit guarantee fund (Art. 170). More recently, the 
government’s funding role has been replaced with full funding by banks under the 
amending Law No. 03-11 of 2003 regarding money and credit (Art. 118).  
91 This was amply demonstrated during the fall of Northern Rock in 2007, when 
the UK Treasury extended the existing guarantees on bank deposits – with a 
maximum payout of £31,700 at the time – to cover all deposits. 
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state support. Yet, it should not be forgotten that such blanket guarantees 
are not viable in most of the SEMCs with limited public resources. 
Therefore, the explicit schemes, wherever they exist, are the only viable 
insurance for depositors, highlighting the importance of the design issues 
in resource-poor countries.  
Figure 6.10 Deposit insurance index, by region (% of maximum score) 
 
Table 6.10 Deposit insurance index, by country and region (% of maximum score) 
 2003 2007 2011 
Algeria** 67 100 100 
Egypt 0 0 0 
Israel 0 0 0 
Jordan 67 67 33 
Lebanon 33 33 0 
Morocco 67 67 33 
Palestine 0 0 0 
Syria 0 0 0 
Tunisia 0 0 0 
Turkey 33 67 67 
SEMCs* 22 40 35 
Cyprus 67 33 33 
France 100 67 67 
Greece 33 33 67 
Italy 67 67 67 
Malta 67 33 33 
Portugal 100 100 67 
Spain 33 33 33 
EU-MED* 77 59 59 
AVG 74 58 57 
STDEV 30 18 18 
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* Regional averages are weighted by total banking assets. 
** The Algerian deposit guarantee system, which has existed since 1997, was partly funded 
by the government in 2003.  
Notes: Higher values represent more restrictive rules as a share of a maximum score of 3 
points. 
Sources: BRSS, Demirgüç-Kunt et al. (2005), European Commission (2010), Federal Deposit 
Insurance Corporation, Bank Al-Maghrib and Banque d’Algérie. 
6.8 Private monitoring 
Most of the regulatory factors relate to the rules and standards set forth by 
the regulators, which are used to distinguish between acceptable and 
unsound behaviour. In this manner, the regulatory principles are often well 
defined, calling for compliance with specific rules or standards. There are 
other hard-wired forces that also influence banks, however. Market forces 
and investors may additionally be crucial in shaping decisions and, in 
particular, restraining risky behaviour. For example, block-holders can, at 
least in theory, exercise their voting power to influence managerial actions. 
More realistically, debtors or stockholders use available information to 
assess the banks’ conditions and indirectly influence the management by 
withdrawing funds, which has an impact on the borrowing costs of the 
banks. As far as depositors and other debt-holders are concerned, private 
monitoring could be seriously undermined when an explicit and over-
generous scheme for deposit insurance exists.  
The availability of reliable and timely information for investors is at 
the core of market discipline. The index is therefore based on the survey 
responses to a number of questions on disclosure rules and standards. 
These concern whether i) a certified audit is required and whether all of the 
top ten banks are rated by ii) domestic or iii) international credit rating 
agencies. They also consider whether income standards include accrued 
but unpaid interest on iv) performing or v) non-performing loans, vi) banks 
are required to produce consolidated accounts, vii) directors are liable for 
erroneous or misleading reporting, viii) subordinated debt is allowable or 
required as part of capital, ix) off-balance items are disclosed to the public, 
x) banks are required to disclose risk-management procedures and xi) 
supervisors are required to make enforcement actions public.92 The private 
                                                     
92 The private monitoring index is addressed by WBG questions 5.1, 5.3, 10.7.1-2, 
10.1, 10.1.1, 10.3, 10.6, 3.5-6, 10.4.1, 10.5 and 11.1.1. The calculation of the index is 
slightly different from the specification in Appendix 2 of Barth et al. (2006, pp. 350-
 
222 | BANKING POLICY IN THE SEMCS PRE- AND POST-CRISIS 
 
monitoring score increases with affirmative answers to the previous set of 
questions.  
The comparisons point at a small but growing disparity between the 
two set of nations surrounding the Mediterranean in Figure 6.11 and  
Table 6.11. Although most countries fulfil a majority of the 
requirements, the continual progress of the European countries is not 
paralleled in the SEMCs.  
The most striking difference between the SEMCs and EU-MED 
countries is the share of the top ten banks that are rated by (international or 
domestic) credit-rating agencies (CRAs), which has widened substantially 
according to the 2011 survey. In particular, almost all of the top ten banks 
are rated by credit rating agencies in the EU, except Cyprus and Malta. In 
the SEMCs, most banks are not rated. In some cases, this is due to the 
inherent structure of the market. For example, Algeria’s largest banks are 
state-owned and as of 2007 they were not subject to ratings. In other 
countries, there are clear problems with disclosure. In three of the most 
developed markets in the region – Israel, Lebanon and Morocco93 – only 
half of the top ten banks are rated.94 
Another common issue that has attracted special attention recently is 
the exclusion of accrued (though unpaid) interest from income statements, 
which allows banks undue flexibility in determining their earnings. Lastly, 
according to the 2011 BRSS, the banks in Tunisia are not required to make 
public their risk-management procedures, despite this requirement having 
become standard in the region in recent years.  
 
                                                                                                                                       
352), excluding a question on the presence of an explicit deposit insurance, which 
is already covered in another index. 
93 The observation for Morocco is from the 2007 survey, since the Moroccan 
authorities did not report the equivalent number in the most recent survey. 
94 These results may also arise from a small or highly concentrated banking sector. 
In such a case, only a handful of top banks will dominate the banking sector, while 
the other (smaller) banks will be subject to less investor scrutiny.  
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Figure 6.11 Private monitoring, by region (% of maximum score) 
 
 
Table 6.11 Private monitoring, by country and region (% of maximum score) 
 2000 2003 2007 2011 
Algeria .. 64 55 .. 
Egypt 78 73 73 73 
Israel 89 82 82 73 
Jordan 78 64 64 73 
Lebanon 100 64 64 36 
Morocco 67 73 64 73 
Palestine .. .. .. 82 
Syria .. .. 82 73 
Tunisia .. 55 .. 55 
Turkey 67 73 .. 73 
SEMCs* 79 73 71 69 
Cyprus 67 73 73 82 
France 67 55 73 91 
Greece 67 64 82 73 
Italy 67 73 73 73 
Malta 89 73 73 73 
Portugal 89 55 64 55 
Spain 89 73 82 82 
EU-MED* 71 63 75 83 
AVG 72 64 74 82 
STDEV 9 9 5 10 
* Regional averages are weighted by total banking assets. 
Note: Higher values represent more restrictive rules as a share of a maximum score of 9 
points in 2000 and 11 points in 2003, 2007 and 2011. 
Source: BRSS. 
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These results show that the regulatory structures of the SEMCs have 
not matched the progress made in the EU-MED countries in enhancing 
disclosure rules. Still, it is true that there are broad similarities on both 
sides of the Mediterranean. For example, a certified audit is compulsory in 
all of the sample countries and the accounting rules exhibit similarities in 
most of the countries. Even so, the proportion of banks subject to 
independent ratings has not changed much in the SEMCs over the past few 
years. 
6.9 Credit information and laws 
Access to information and laws on creditor protection are crucial elements 
for ensuring the smooth operation of credit markets. Economic theory 
suggests two critical limits to the amount of credit that financial institutions 
can grant to potential borrowers. On the one hand, credit conditions are 
clearly bound by the ability of creditors to enforce contracts, exact 
repayment, claim collateral and possibly gain control over the receivables. 
The easier these actions are, the more likely it is that lenders will grant the 
loans. On the other hand, lenders would like to have access to accurate 
information on the potential borrowers, such as credit histories, other 
lenders and other banking transactions.  
Theoretical models suggest that an operational information-sharing 
infrastructure can reduce adverse selection in credit markets and facilitate 
access to credit, especially among more opaque borrowers, such as SMEs 
(Pagano & Jappelli, 1993). When such information is available, the creditors 
can make a better judgement of the creditworthiness of the borrowers. 
Other studies have documented the importance of creditors’ rights for the 
availability of credit (La Porta et al., 1998; Levine, 1998). Recent studies 
have confirmed these views with increasingly convincing evidence that 
both credit-information mechanisms and creditors’ rights have a significant 
impact on the flow of credit and financial development (Jappelli & Pagano, 
2002; Djankov et al., 2007; Haselmann et al., 2010). 
The indices on credit information and laws developed in this section 
are based on the “Getting Credit” methodology developed in the World 
Bank’s Doing Business surveys.95 The relevant area covers the legal rights 
                                                     
95 First started in 2003, the World Bank’s Doing Business surveys cover over 180 
countries, providing a snapshot of regulatory and legal conditions and their effects 
on businesses, especially on SMEs. Each year, the surveys are sent out to a large 
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of borrowers and lenders with respect to secured transactions and the 
extent of credit-information sharing. Two sets of indicators are used for 
these purposes.  
The first set describes how well the collateral and bankruptcy laws 
facilitate lending, covering: i) the ability to use moveable assets while 
keeping possession of assets and the ability to obtain non-possessory 
security rights in ii) a single or iii) all moveable asset classes without 
requiring a specific description of the collateral. It also covers iv) the 
extension of security rights to future or after the acquisition, v) the ability to 
secure all types of debts and obligations through a general description, and 
vi) the availability of a collateral registry. In addition, it looks at the ability 
of secured creditors to obtain priority without exceptions in the case of vii) 
defaults, viii) liquidation and ix) restructuring; and x) the possibility of out-
of-court agreements on collateral enforcement. An affirmative answer to 
any one of these questions enhances the relevant scores.96 
Figure 6.12 and Table 6.12 show that fewer legal rights are granted to 
creditors in the SEMCs. Israel does exceptionally well, better than almost 
all countries, by satisfying all but one criterion on the availability of out-of-
court agreements on collateral enforcement. Among the EU-MED 
countries, Cyprus does equivalently well, complying with all but one 
criterion, namely regarding the secured creditors’ claims during 
reorganisation. France and Spain also perform well. Other countries, 
including those in the SEMCs, score relatively poorly, complying only with 
the criteria on the use of movable assets as collateral, the ability to grant 
non-possessory rights for a group of assets and the use of debts in collateral 
agreements. 
                                                                                                                                       
number of local experts specialising in different fields, including lawyers, 
consultants, officials and other professionals who are in close contact with the legal 
and regulatory structures of the countries covered (the results of the surveys are 
available at www.doingbusiness.org).  
96 See the World Bank’s Doing Business website for more details on the 
methodology (www.doingbusiness.org/methodology/getting-credit).  
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Figure 6.12 Strength of legal rights, by region (% of maximum score) 
 
* Regional averages are weighted by total banking assets. 
Table 6.12 Strength of legal rights, by country and region (% of maximum score) 
 2003 2007 2011 
Algeria 30 30 30 
Egypt 30 30 30 
Israel 90 90 90 
Jordan 20 20 20 
Lebanon 30 30 30 
Morocco 30 30 30 
Palestine** 10 10 10 
Syria 10 10 10 
Tunisia 30 30 30 
Turkey 40 40 40 
SEMCs* 48 45 45 
Cyprus .. 90 90 
France 40 70 70 
Greece 40 40 40 
Italy 30 30 30 
Malta .. .. 30 
Portugal 30 30 30 
Spain 60 60 60 
EU-MED* 41 56 57 
AVG 41 56 56 
STDEV 12 18 18 
SEMCs w/o Israel* 32 33 33 
* Regional averages are weighted by total banking assets. 
** Data for West Bank and Gaza. 
Note: Higher values represent more independence as a share of a maximum score of 10 
points. 
Source: World Bank Doing Business surveys. 
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The second index measures the availability, coverage and depth of 
credit information, either through public credit registries or private credit 
bureaus. The relevant questions relate to the: i) collection of both positive 
and negative information, ii) collection of data on firms and information, 
iii) collection of data from retailers and utility companies, iv) availability of 
credit history for at least two years, v) availability of data on small loans 
(i.e. less than 1% of annual incomes) and vi) ability of borrowers to access 
their credit history. As above, an affirmative answer to any one of these 
questions leads to an additional score for the credit information index. 
Figure 6.13 and Table 6.13 clearly show that the SEMCs have 
progressively closed the gap with the EU-MED countries in terms of the 
depth of credit information. The average score of the SEMCs in the last 
survey was even higher than the score of their EU-MED counterparts. In 
recent years, the credit bureaus in Algeria, Egypt, Morocco, Palestine and 
Tunisia have improved their information provisioning substantially. In the 
more recent Doing Business survey, Egypt even satisfied all six criteria. The 
credit bureaus in Lebanon, Morocco, Tunisia and Turkey only failed to 
satisfy the criteria to also collect data from retailers and utility companies. 
Similarly, the credit bureau in Israel also met five of the criteria, but it did 
not report both positive and negative credit information. Jordan and Syria 
are clearly outliers in the southern and eastern Mediterranean; 
exceptionally, both countries have credit bureaus that only met two of the 
criteria.  
Figure 6.13 Depth of credit information, by region (% of maximum score) 
 
* Regional averages are weighted by total banking assets. 
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Table 6.13 Depth of credit information, by country and region in 2003, 2007 and 
2011 (% of maximum score) 
 2003 2007 2011 
Algeria 17 33 67 
Egypt 33 83 100 
Israel 50 83 83 
Jordan 33 33 33 
Lebanon 67 83 83 
Morocco 17 33 83 
Palestine** 0 50 67 
Syria 0 0 33 
Tunisia 33 83 83 
Turkey 83 83 83 
SEMCs* 49 72 81 
Cyprus .. 0 33 
France 67 67 67 
Greece 67 67 83 
Italy 100 83 83 
Malta .. .. 0 
Portugal 83 83 83 
Spain 83 83 83 
EU-MED* 79 74 74 
AVG 77 74 75 
STDEV 17 11 11 
* Regional averages are weighted by total banking assets. 
** Data for West Bank and Gaza. 
Note: Higher values represent greater independence as a share of a maximum score of 6 
points. 
Source: World Bank Doing Business surveys. 
Turning to the EU-MED countries, Cyprus and Malta are exceptions 
with low scores. In Cyprus, the private credit bureau only meets two 
criteria and there is not a single credit bureau in Malta. More broadly, the 
other EU-MED countries comply with almost all of the criteria. Like many 
of their SEMC counterparts, French, Greek, Italian and Portuguese credit 
registries do not collect information from retailers or utility companies. 
Moreover, the French credit bureau does not provide both positive and 
negative information. The Spanish credit bureaus do not distribute 
historical credit information older than two years, but meet all the other 
criteria.  
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In summing up, the figures above show that substantial reforms in 
recent years have helped the SEMCs clearly to close the gap with the EU-
MED countries in terms of the use of credit information. The same cannot 
be said concerning the strength of legal rights; the EU-MED countries’ 
average is clearly higher than that of the SEMCs.  
6.10 Conclusions 
The previous section reviewed the quality and the level of convergence of 
the regulatory and supervisory structures of the SEMCs and EU-MED 
countries in the pre- and post-financial crisis periods. The assessment 
included seven dimensions, including the scope of banking, entry 
obstacles, the stringency of capital requirements, the power and 
independence of the supervisory authority, the incentives provided by the 
deposit insurance scheme, private monitoring, and creditors’ rights and 
access to information. This section provides a summary of these areas, 
offering a comparative analysis of the seven composite indicators that 
aggregate the relevant indices.  
Figure 6.14 Levels of convergence of regulatory standards in the SEMCs and EU-
MED region pre- and post-crisis  (2007 and 2011) 
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Note: The figures above sum up the weighted averages for the SEMCs and EU-MED 
countries for the regulatory indices in each of the seven areas discussed in sections 6.3 
to 6.9.  
The collective assessment of the regulatory and supervisory 
structures of the SEMCs with the EU-MED standards pre- and post-crisis 
gives a mixed picture (Figure 6.14). Despite some improvements, key 
weaknesses remain in deposit insurance, entry obstacles and the strength of 
legal rights. Moreover, some disparities have also become more apparent, 
especially in the potential for political interference and private monitoring.  
Turning to the individual countries, Table 6.14 provides an overview 
of the key weaknesses in each of the 10 SEMCs. The diagrams in Figure 6.15 
further show the main impacts of the financial crisis on the regulatory 
developments in six SEMCs that participated in both the Barth 2007 and 
2011 databases.  
There has been no improvement in the deposit insurance index in 
recent years, because the Egyptian, Israeli, Palestinian, Syrian and Tunisian 
authorities have chosen not to put in place an explicit insurance scheme. As 
discussed in section 6.7, implicit schemes may enhance risk-taking through 
a blanket government guarantee for the leading institutions. In addition, in 
Algeria, Jordan, Lebanon and Morocco, no effort has been made to align 
the banks’ incentives by implementing risk-based premiums or co-
insurance schemes, which would help internalise some of the costs to the 
deposit guarantee schemes that stem from excessive risk-taking.  
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Table 6.14 Summary of key regulatory weaknesses in the 10 SEMCs, by country 
Area General remarks Algeria Egypt Israel Jordan 
I. Scope 
restrictions on or 
prohibition of 
various activities 
Slightly more 
stringent than EU-
MED standards 
Some restrictions 
on real estate; 
insurance activities 
prohibited 
Some restrictions 
on insurance & real 
estate 
Some restrictions 
on securities 
trading & 
insurance; real 
estate activities 
prohibited 
Some restrictions 
on securities 
trading & 
insurance; real 
estate activities 
prohibited 
II. Entry 
obstacles – 
Licensing, 
foreign entry & 
presence of 
public banks 
Below EU-MED 
standards due to 
foreign denials & 
the role of 
government 
Public banks 
represent >90% of 
bank activity 
Foreign denials; 
public banks 
represent > 60% of 
bank activity 
 Foreign denials 
III. Capital 
requirements 
that restrict risks 
More stringent 
capital 
requirements than 
the EU-MED 
 Market risks not 
considered 
  
IV. Supervisory 
authority – 
Ability to 
prevent & 
correct problems 
Below EU-MED 
standards due 
potential for 
political 
interference 
High potential for 
political 
interference 
Some potential for 
interference 
High potential for 
political 
interference 
Some potential for 
interference 
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V. Deposit 
insurance – 
Presence of an 
explicit scheme 
& mitigation of 
moral hazard 
Below EU-MED 
standards due to 
the implicit 
insurance & adverse 
incentives 
No co-insurance or 
risk-adjusted 
premiums 
No explicit deposit 
insurance scheme 
No explicit deposit 
insurance scheme 
No co-insurance or 
risk-adjusted 
premiums 
VI. Private 
monitoring – 
Availability of 
reliable & timely 
information to 
investors 
Increasing disparity 
due to limited rated 
banks and flexibility 
in accounting 
Top banks not 
rated; flexibility in 
accounting 
Several top banks 
not rated 
Several top banks 
not rated 
Several top banks 
not rated 
VII. Credit 
information & 
laws – Ability to 
facilitate lending 
Below EU-MED 
standards due to 
deficient legal rights 
No private credit 
registry; limited 
legal rights for 
creditors 
Limited legal rights 
for creditors 
 No private credit 
registry; limited 
legal rights for 
creditors 
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Table 6.14 Key regulatory weaknesses in the 10 SEMCs, by country (cont.) 
 Lebanon Morocco Palestine Syria Tunisia Turkey 
I. Scope 
restrictions 
Real estate 
activities 
prohibited 
Some restrictions 
on insurance; 
real estate 
activities 
prohibited 
 Insurance & real 
estate activities 
prohibited 
Some 
restrictions on 
securities & 
insurance 
Some restrictions 
on insurance; 
real estate 
activities 
prohibited 
II. Entry 
obstacles 
Public bank 
activity 
Foreign denials  Public banks 
represent >70% 
of bank activity 
Public banks 
have a 
diminishing 
role 
Foreign denials; 
Public banks 
represent >30% 
of bank activity 
III. Capital 
requirements 
Broad definition 
of capital 
  Broad definition 
of capital 
  
IV. 
Supervisory 
authority 
High potential 
for political 
interference 
Some potential 
for interference 
Some potential 
for interference 
High potential 
for political 
interference 
Some potential 
for interference 
Some potential 
for interference 
V. Deposit 
insurance 
No co-insurance 
or risk-adjusted 
premiums 
No co-insurance 
or risk-adjusted 
premiums 
No explicit 
deposit 
insurance 
scheme 
No explicit 
deposit 
insurance 
scheme 
No explicit 
deposit 
insurance 
scheme 
 
No co-insurance 
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VI. Private 
monitoring 
Several top 
banks not rated 
Several top 
banks not rated; 
flexibility in 
accounting 
Several top 
banks not rated 
Several top 
banks not rated 
Flexibility in 
accounting 
rules; no risk 
management 
disclosure 
Flexibility in 
accounting 
VII. Credit 
information 
& laws 
No private credit 
registry; limited 
legal rights for 
creditors 
Limited legal 
rights for 
creditors 
No private credit 
registry; barely 
any legal rights 
for creditors 
No private credit 
registry; barely 
any legal rights 
for creditors 
No private 
credit registry; 
limited legal 
rights for 
creditors 
Limited legal 
rights for 
creditors 
Source: Authors’ compilation. 
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Figure 6.15 Impact of the financial crisis on regulatory standards in six SEMCs, 
by area 
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Note:  The figures above diagram the indices in six out of the 10 SEMCs analysed in this 
chapter between 2007 and 2011. Algeria, Palestine, Tunisia and Turkey are excluded 
because of insufficient observations for one of the two years. The figures above sum 
up the averages for the regulatory indices in each of the seven areas discussed in 
sections 6.3 to 6.9.  
 
Another major issue, the presence of entry obstacles, continues to be a 
key weakness in the regulatory structures of the region. Although the 
licensing requirements exhibit similarities in all countries of the 
Mediterranean, other indicators point to substantial barriers to entry. 
Government ownership, which is widespread in the region, gives undue 
advantages to incumbent banks and restricts entry incentives. In Algeria, 
Egypt and Syria as well as to some extent Morocco, Tunisia and Turkey, 
government ownership remains significant. Although government 
ownership may have some benefits, the authorities have to ensure that such 
roles are well defined within a national strategy with clear objectives and 
instruments, and that they do not represent an obstacle to the development 
of the financial system.97 The rates of foreign denials remain very high, 
further supporting the idea of substantial entry barriers and competitive 
advantages enjoyed by domestic incumbent banks.  
In addition to the two key weaknesses summarised above, the 2011 
survey points at three new concerns. Poor accounting practices have 
contributed to an increasing disparity in private monitoring indices. 
Furthermore, political interference has become a significant possibility, 
potentially undermining supervisory authority and reinforcing the 
governments’ direct control – an additional concern for the competitiveness 
and efficiency of the banking sector (Casu & Ferrari, 2013). As the eruption 
of public discontent in Tunisia and Egypt in early 2011 clearly attests, the 
region’s governments have attempted to maintain (perhaps for far too long) 
a tight grip on their countries’ political and economic systems. It is exactly 
such forms of interference that may conflict with the objectives of the 
financial and competition authorities.  
In contrast, the SEMCs have implemented a number of reforms to 
improve the availability and use of credit information by financial 
                                                     
97 Rocha et al. (2010) notes the essential role that public banks fulfil in the region by 
providing financing to SMEs. The authors note that private banks are unable to fill 
this gap largely owing to the generally weak quality of the financial infrastructure, 
including the availability and reliability of information on potential borrowers.  
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institutions. Egypt, and more recently Morocco, established private credit 
bureaus in 2006 and 2009, respectively. The SEMC–EU gap has been 
bridged. The SEMCs’ average is now above the EU-MED average. Algeria, 
Israel, Jordan, Lebanon and Tunisia continue to rely solely on public 
registries, three of which meet all the criteria except collecting credit 
information on retail stores or utility companies. The same applies to 
Turkey, which has both public and private credit bureaus. Although the 
literature provides little guidance, private credit bureaus have better access 
to new technologies and know-how to ensure that information-sharing 
mechanisms work effectively. The countries in the region should continue 
to monitor developments and spearhead innovative systems to use the 
stock of information and infrastructure already developed by the public 
systems.98 
                                                     
98 Morocco may serve as an interesting example, by effectively combining the data-
collection roles and capacities of the Bank Al-Maghrib, which operates the public 
registry, with the newly established private credit bureau, Experian-Morocco. For a 
comparative analysis of the Moroccan and Egyptian credit information systems, 
see Madeddu (2010, pp. 21-23). 
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7. CONCLUSIONS 
he global financial crisis dealt an exogenous shock to the southern 
and eastern Mediterranean countries (SEMCs), which was primarily 
reflected in their balance of payments and then transmitted to the 
rest of the economy. While the economic slowdown has been modest, this 
group is also likely to experience a slow recovery, further hampered by the 
regional political instabilities brought on by the Arab spring. Limited 
external financing, little space for fiscal stimulus, a real appreciation of 
most domestic currencies, sluggish receipts from tourism and remittances, 
and increasing food and energy prices in the future will all continue to be a 
drag on growth for some time. Thus, the weaknesses in the short term will 
persist, largely affected by the slow improvement in the world economy. 
This concluding chapter outlines the most salient results of the research. 
The policy implications and recommendations are elaborated in Ayadi & 
De Groen (2013), who provide a comprehensive matrix of crisis 
transmission channels and policy responses to tackle the key 
vulnerabilities.  
On the external sector. A slowdown in exports might continue as long as 
growth and unemployment figures for trading partners remain gloomy. 
Tourism and remittances have proved resilient so far, but with the global 
recession persisting and wealth effects settling in, countries in the region 
might not be able to sustain higher GDP growth. In fact, the resilience 
shown by remittances may be due to the fact that migrants have lost their 
jobs and returned home with their stock of accumulated savings, which 
helps to compensate for the reduced flow of remittances. But in the coming 
period, this compensation might come to an end as it is a one-time event. 
Similarly, global FDI flows fell sharply and SEMCs will continue to be 
directly affected by this trend. Competition to attract FDI will become even 
tougher as countries in the region continue to experience a downgrading 
trend as a result of political instabilities.  
On the real sector. The repercussions of the crisis continue to reverberate 
from the balance-of-payments to the real economy. Since external demand 
declined sharply, enhancing domestic demand remains the only way to 
T
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enhance growth, at least until trading partners show sustainable economic 
recovery. The lack of modern infrastructure to raise the region’s 
competitiveness and take full advantage of the growing global 
manufacturing and services trade can also pose a risk for investments and 
growth.  
On the monetary sector. With the decline in interest rates and inflation 
worldwide and also the decline in inflation in all the sampled countries, 
there seems to be room for adopting an expansionary monetary policy 
through decreasing interest rates to stimulate domestic demand.   
On banking and capital markets. Most of the SEMCs have been saved 
from the negative impact of the crisis during the initial phase of the crisis 
between 2007 and 2008. Banks in the region had little direct exposure to the 
toxic products that weakened the balance sheets of many banks in the US 
and the EU. However, the main impact of the global financial crisis came 
later, during 2009 and onwards. As economic conditions in the EU – the 
region’s main partner – worsened, so did the external demand for the 
region’s products, leading to severe drops in exports, tourism receipts and 
remittances in the SEMCs. In addition, bouts of risk-aversion among global 
investors lowered capital inflows. The economic stimulus programmes of 
the local authorities did not succeed in offsetting these reductions in capital 
inflows. Moreover, higher international commodity prices were even 
severely worsening the fiscal problems in several of the SEMCs.  
The impact of the financial crisis on the banking systems assessed by 
pre- and post-crisis comparisons of the liquidity, performance, efficiency 
and fragility showed divergent impacts between countries. Overall, the 
results underline that the impact of the financial crisis on the banking 
sectors in the SEMCs was very limited. The more developed banking 
sectors of Israel and Turkey were the only exceptions. In Israel both 
performance and efficiency deteriorated, while the system became more 
fragile. In Turkey both liquidity and performance worsened and the 
banking system became more fragile. 
The impact of the financial crisis on capital markets varied from 
country to country. In particular, as of November 2012, the Israeli, Tunisian 
and Turkish stock exchanges had outperformed the US Dow-Jones index 
during the global crisis. At the same time, the Egyptian, Jordanian, 
Palestinian and Syrian indices remained below their January 2007 levels. 
The correlation coefficients between the region’s stock markets and 
commodity indices highlight several interesting findings. The results show 
that the correlations clearly increased in Israel, Turkey, the US, and Europe 
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after the crisis (up until the ousting of Mubarak). The same is also true only 
for grains in Egypt, especially after the onset of the Arab spring uprisings. 
The correlation with grains also increased in the post-crisis period, up until 
January 2011, for Palestine. The correlation of the market returns with Brent 
oil increased in Jordan, but only weakly so. The correlation of the market 
returns with the US and EU markets highlights a close relationship 
between these countries. Clearly, the correlation with the US and EU is 
extremely strong for Egypt, Israel and Turkey. The results show that the 
relationships have not increased after the crisis for most cases, except for 
Egypt (with the US only), Tunisia (only weakly) and Jordan (relatively 
strongly so). Even though Israel’s and Turkey’s stock markets display the 
closest interdependence with both the EU and the US, the relationship has 
not become more sensitive after the crisis or the ousting of Mubarak.  
As for the fiscal, monetary and financial policy responses, post crisis: 
On fiscal sustainability. The research reveals several vulnerabilities 
of the Tunisian and Egyptian economies that clearly undermine their debt 
sustainability. One important conclusion from the debt sustainability 
scenario analysis performed is that political instability has significant 
implications on debt sustainability. Political stability is crucial for 
investments – both domestic and foreign – in Egypt and Tunisia. With 
political uncertainty, investments will decline, remain low and will take 
time to pick-up. This means lower production (lower GDP), which might 
also translate into higher unemployment (as the population and the labour 
force increase every year). Lower production also means lower profits for 
investors and lower income for workers, leading to lower revenues for the 
government. As we have seen from their budgets, tax revenues are 
forecasted based on highly optimistic assumptions that do not really take 
into account the possibility for a lower level of private investment and 
therefore lower level of tax revenue. The direct implication of such an 
optimistic assumption is an increase in the budget deficit and in the debt 
ratio, beyond the level the government expected. Another implication of 
the political instability is the loss of trust on the part of the international 
community in political transitions. This can lead to downgrades of the 
countries’ credit ratings and an increase of their interest rates for borrowing 
on the international markets. This can also make it much more difficult for 
the government to finance its deficit or to refinance its existing debt, 
putting further pressure on debt sustainability. 
A second important conclusion is related to expenditures. Indeed, the 
revolutions demanded more social justice and more employment 
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opportunities, but increasing current expenditures would be one big 
mistake. Any government that is freshly elected, and seeks re-election or 
more power, would be tempted to increase wages and increase hiring in 
the public sector to satisfy the population. Such an action, however, would 
have dramatic implications for the future and would be a heavy weight to 
bear for years to come. The situation in Tunisia is much better than in 
Egypt, where the deficit and the debt ratio are already very high, but the 
implications for debt sustainability are the same.  
Finally, it is clear that the exchange rate could be a factor in debt 
sustainability. On the one hand, maintaining a fixed exchange rate at an 
overvalued level is harmful for the whole economy and is obviously 
unsustainable. On the other hand, the devaluation of the currency can lead 
to serious implications for debt sustainability. Tunisia is again much 
healthier than Egypt. The sharp decline in the official reserves in Egypt, 
combined with an appreciation of the real effective exchange rate over the 
past 10 years, reflect the urgent need for an exchange-rate correction. The 
recent depreciation is a step in the right direction, but the continuous 
interventions from the Central Bank are both irrational and harmful. The 
Gulf countries’ deposits in the Egyptian Central Bank are absorbed by the 
market right away, leading to the need for more borrowing. The 
mismanagement of the exchange rate in Egypt is only leading to higher 
debt without any stabilisation of the market. Therefore, and in the absence 
of alternatives, the government should authorise the Central Bank to allow 
the exchange rate to float and depreciate. This will increase the debt ratio, 
indeed, but it will avoid accumulating more and more foreign debt, and 
ultimately having to devalue the pound, resulting in an even higher debt. 
On monetary policy. There appears to be homogeneity in the 
operational framework followed by central banks, despite some differences 
in the specificities. Although price stability was announced as the final 
objective of the unconventional measures, errors in the monitoring and 
controlling of the interest rate forced monetary authorities to shift the 
intermediate objectives to targeting money supply and credit aggregates. 
The specificities are mainly visible in the oil-exporting countries (i.e. 
Algeria and Libya) that followed restrictive monetary policies controlling 
the monetary base to absorb the structural excess liquidity in the banking 
system. In the other countries, monetary authorities have adjusted their key 
policy interest rates to maintain positive real interest rates. In general, the 
low interest rates in combination with a broad range of monetary policy 
instruments revamped economic growth in most of the countries, except 
for the crisis countries (i.e. Tunisia and Egypt). 
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Low operational independence and a slow adjustment characterise 
the formal procedures that central banks in the region, with the exception 
of Turkey and Morocco, use to target inflation. Excessive use of subsidies 
and price controls seem to be the main obstacles to adopt explicit inflation 
targets. Turning to exchange rate policy, monetary authorities in a floating 
exchange rate regime in general target the real effective exchange rate, 
whereas they aim at a constant nominal exchange rate, if the currency is 
pegged or linked for example to the dollar or SDR. 
While inflation in these countries usually depends on international 
energy and food prices as well as domestic tensions and demand, thorough 
econometric analysis suggests that inflation is determined by a 
combination of the items above and the monetary transmission channels.  
However it appears that the adjustment mechanism of the interest 
rate is relatively weak, or the interest rate is slightly volatile in response to 
price fluctuations. In turn, active control offsets inflation corrections. 
Hence, the central bank interest is thus more important for exchange rate 
stability than the real stability. 
To conclude we recommend the establishment of a (systemic) risk 
management system. In this context, an early warning system (EWS) and 
effective early prevention system was implemented in Tunisia to prevent 
systemic risks and crises. The system allows to: i) decompose the impact of 
shocks on the real economy and financial markets and ii) identify early 
warning indicators or estimate a binomial Probit model. These leading 
indicators have been grouped into three blocks related to i) macroeconomic 
resilience factors, ii) factors weakening bank (CAMELS accounting ratios) 
and iii) macro-prudential factors indicating the soundness of financial 
systems. 
The results of the econometric analyses have generally shown that the 
early warning system clearly indicates that, in addition to the actual 
obvious effects, the probability of a negative impact of international 
financial crisis seem explained by the mechanisms of monetary contagion, 
i) the risk of deteriorating terms of trade, ii) the risk of over-appreciation of 
the real effective exchange rate, iii) the swelling of compromised bank 
accounts and incidentally iv) excessive use of central bank refinancing. 
On banking policy. The collective assessment of the regulatory and 
supervisory structures of the SEMCs in comparison with the EU-MED 
standards pre- and post-crisis gives a mixed picture. Despite some 
improvements, key weaknesses remain in deposit insurance, entry 
obstacles and legal rights. Moreover, some disparities have also become 
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more apparent, especially in the potential for political interference and 
private monitoring.  
The deposit insurance index has failed to improve between 2007 and 
2013, because the Egyptian, Israeli, Palestinian, Syrian and Tunisian 
authorities have chosen not to put in place an explicit insurance scheme. 
Implicit schemes may enhance risk-taking through a blanket government 
guarantee for the leading institutions. In addition, in Algeria, Jordan, 
Lebanon and Morocco, no effort has been made to align the banks’ 
incentives by implementing risk-based premiums or co-insurance schemes, 
which would help internalise some of the costs to the deposit guarantee 
schemes that stem from excessive risk-taking.  
Another major issue, the presence of entry obstacles, continues to be a 
key weakness in the regulatory structures of the region. Although the 
licensing requirements exhibit similarities in all countries bordering the 
Mediterranean, other indicators point at substantial barriers to entry. 
Government ownership, which is widespread in the region, gives undue 
advantages to incumbent banks and restricts entry incentives. In Algeria, 
Egypt and Syria as well as to some extent Morocco, Tunisia and Turkey, 
government ownership remains significant. Although government 
ownership may have some benefits, the authorities have to ensure that such 
roles are well-defined within a national strategy with clear objectives and 
instruments, and that they do not represent an obstacle to the development 
of the financial system. The rates of foreign denials are also still very high, 
further supporting the idea of substantial entry barriers and competitive 
advantages enjoyed by domestic incumbent banks.  
In addition to the two key weaknesses summarised above, the 2011 
survey points at three new concerns. Poor accounting practices have 
contributed to an increasing disparity in private monitoring indices. 
Furthermore, political interference has become a significant possibility, 
potentially undermining supervisory authority and reinforcing the 
governments’ direct control – an additional concern for the competitiveness 
and efficiency of the banking sector (Casu & Ferrari, 2013). As the eruption 
of public discontent in Tunisia and Egypt in early 2011 clearly attests, the 
region’s governments have attempted to maintain a tight grip on their 
countries’ political and economic systems. It is exactly such forms of 
interference that may conflict with the objectives of the financial and 
competition authorities.  
In contrast, the SEMCs have implemented a number of reforms to 
improve the availability and use of credit information by financial 
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institutions. Egypt, and more recently Morocco, established private credit 
bureaus in 2006 and 2009, respectively. Algeria, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon and 
Tunisia continue to rely solely on public registries, three of them meeting 
all the criteria except collecting credit information on retail stores or utility 
companies. The same applies to Turkey, which has both public and private 
credit bureaus. Although the literature provides little guidance, private 
credit bureaus have better access to new technologies and know-how to 
ensure that information-sharing mechanisms work effectively.  
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